Bhattākalankadēva and Philosophy

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1 Sūtram 442: dhātōr ēkānēkatvē 'm-ar-ay-ir-en-enavō 'nya-yuşmad-asmāsu kartari

vŖTTIH — anya-yuṣmad-asmad-arthēṣu pratyēkam ēkatvānēkatvayōr vivakṣitayōr yathā-kramam dhātōh am, ar, ay, ir, en, ev, ētē pratyayā bhavanti kartari abhidhēyē. anyatvam ca yuṣmad-asmad-apēkṣam sannidhānāt. anyasminn ēkatvē am, anēkatvē ar. ēvam yuṣmad-arthē 'pi ēkatvē ay, anēkatvē ir. tathaivāsmad-arthē 'pi ēkatvē en, anēkatvē evu.

PRAYŌGAḤ — tān irddam, tām irddar; nīn irdday, nīm irddir; ān irddem, ām irddevu. anya-yuṣmad-asmadām aprayōgē 'pi tad-artha-vivakṣāyām bhavanti. nōḍidam, nōḍidar; nōḍiday, nōḍidir; nōḍidem, nōḍidevu. dēvadattanam kaṇḍem; dēvadattanam kaṇḍay; nimmam kaṇḍam; nimmam kaṇḍem; ennam kaṇḍam; ennam kaṇḍay ity-ādāv anyayuṣmad-asmadām prayōgē 'pi vyadhikaraṇatvād am-ādayō na bhavanti. COMMENTARY — When singularity or plurality regarding another, us, or you is intended, the suffixes *am*, *ar*, *ay*, *ir*, *en*, and *evu* appear after a verbal root, when the agent of the verbal action is being expressed. Because 'another' is close to 'us' and 'you,' it is in relation to those two. For another we have *am* in the singular and *ar* in the plural; for you we have *ay* in the singular and *ir* in the plural, and for us we have *en* in the singular and *evu* in the plural.

USE — tān irddaṁ (he was), tām irddar (they were); nīn irdday (you [sg.] were), nīm irddir (you [pl.] were); ān irddeṁ (I was), ām irddevu (we were). These suffixes are used to express these meanings even when the corresponding words for persons are not used: nōdidaṁ (he saw), nōdidar (they saw); nōdiday (you [sg.] saw), nōdidir (you [pl.] saw); nōdideṁ (I saw), nōdidevu (we saw). In the following examples, words for persons are used, but corresponding suffixes are not, because they do not refer to the same person: dēvadattanaṁ kaṇḍaṁ (I saw D.); dēvadattanaṁ kaṇḍaṁ (I saw you [pl.]); nimmaṁ kaṇḍaṁ (I saw you [pl.]); nimmaṁ kaṇḍaṁ (I saw you [pl.]); ennaṁ kaṇḍaṁ (he saw me); ennaṁ kaṇḍaɣ (you saw me).

enō dīrgham api kēcid icchanti.

tani-vaņņam lañcam īvēm puruļi ninage pū-goñcalam bēgadindam ninag' īvēm tumbi kendāvareya misupa mel-moggeyam māņad' endum ninag' īvēn añce kampam ninag' osayisuvem kūde tengāļiy enn ōpanan ind' āraydu tand' ennodan irisidod' end' āke mātādutirppaļ¹

ātanum nīnum irddir; *ātanum ānum irddevu*; *ānum ātanum irddevu*; *ānum ātanum irddevu* ity atra śabda-para-vipratiṣēdhāt parāśraya ēva bhavati.

vyāкнyā — iha tāval lōkē prayōgārham sabdatattvam dvividham. nāma-prakrtikam dhātu-prakrtikam cēti. tatra nāma-prakrtikam sub-anta-strī-pratyaya-kāraka-samāsataddhitādi-bhēda-prabhēdam sa-prapañcam nirūpyēdānīm dhātu-prakrtikam savistaram nirūpayitum upakramamāņas tāvat tinantam nirūpayitum āha — *dhātōr* ity-ādi.

Some people accept long *en* as well:

She said: If you look for my lover right now and bring him back to me, I will give you, parrot, a ripe fruit as a gift, and to you, bee, I will straightaway give a cluster of flowers, and to you, goose, I will give you the brilliant soft bud of a red lotus, always without interruption, and I will make your fragrance beautiful, south wind.

In the following examples the latter person (in the list given in the *sūtra*) is the one the verb agrees with: *ātanum nīnum irddir* (he and you were); *ātanum ānum irddevu* (he and I were); *ānum ātanum irddevu* (I and he were).

DISCUSSION — Now in this world there are two basic categories of linguistic expressions that can be used, those based on *nouns*, and those based on *verbal roots*. Among them, those based on nouns, with their varieties such as declensions, feminine suffixes, thematic roles, compounds, and secondary derivates have already been discussed at length, and now, with *sūtra* 442, we will commence the detailed discussion of those based on verbal roots, starting with finite verbs.

^{1.} Andayya's Kabbigara Kāvam, v. 63. The meter is mahāsragdhare (sragdhare with two light syllables instead of a heavy syllable at the beginning).

yady api lōkē dvi-vidham ēva tattvam vācya-vācakaprabhēdāt, tatra sarvō 'py arthō vācyō 'bhidhēya iti yāvat, sarvō 'pi śabdō vācakō 'bhidhānam iti, tathā ca dhātavō 'pi kriyā-rūpasyārthasya vācakā iti abhidhānāni bhavanti, abhidhānam tu nāmaivēti sarvam api śabda-tattvam nāmaprakrtikam ēvēty aikadhyam ēva nānaikadhyam iti kutō dvaidhyam iti; tathāpi nāma-śabdēnātra vastu-vācakam ēvōcyatē, na vācaka-mātram. *vastu-vācīni nāmanī* ti vacanāt.² dhātavō hi na vastu-vācakāḥ, api tu kriyā-vācakā ēva. *kriyārthō dhātur* ity uktatvāt.³ kriyā ca na vastūcyata iti. Now it is the case that there are two categories of things in the world, those that express and those that are expressed, among which every thing can be expressed, i.e., is a denotable, and every linguistic expression can express, i.e., is a denotation. Accordingly verbal roots, too, are denotations, since they express a thing, viz. an action, and denotations are just nouns. Hence every category of linguistic expression is based on nouns, so there is just a single category, not more than one. How then can there be two categories? Notwithstanding this line of reasoning, the linguistic expression "noun" here expresses something that itself expresses an *entity*, not an expression in general, in accordance with the statement "nouns express entities." For verbal roots do not express entities, but rather actions, since it has been said that "the meaning of a verbal root is action."

3. Śākatāyaņaśabdānuśāsanam 1.1.22.

^{2.} Kātantram, commentary on 2.4.1 (nāmnām samāsō yuktārthah).

nanu pramāņa-siddham artha-jātam sarvam api vastv ēva bhavati. śaśa-viṣāṇādikam aprāmāṇikam tuccham ēvāvastu iti lōkē prasiddhiḥ. tathā ca kriyāyā api vastutvāt katham avastutēti cēn na. kriyāyā vastu-dharmatvam ēva, na vastutvam. anēka-dharmātmakō bhāvō hi vastūcyatē. *dravya-paryāyātmakam vastv* iti vacanāt.⁴ naikaikam dharma-mātram iti. dharmāṇām vastv-amśatvēna vastutvābhāvāt. atha vastv-amśā api vastūny ēvēti cēt kim upacāravŗttyā, mukhya-vŗttyā vā? nādyaḥ, iṣṭāpattēḥ. na dvitīyaḥ, vastvānantya-prasaṅgāt. atō vastv-amśānām na prasiddha-vastuvad vastutvam, nāpi tucchavad avastutvam, kintu vastv-amśatvam ēvēti. taduktam *tattvārtha-ślōka-vārttikē*⁵—

naisa vastu na cāvastu vastv-amsah kathyatē yatah nāsamudrah samudro vā samudrāmso yathocyatē

iti. na ca samudrāmis
ō 'pi samudra ēvēti śankyaḥ. amisāntarasya tattvātattvānya
taratva-nirņayē bādhaka-sadbhāvāt. tad apy uktam
6 $-\!\!-\!\!$

One might object that it is quite well-known in the world that all things established by valid sources of knowledge are in fact entities, and anything that is not so established is a non-entity, i.e. a nothing, like a hare's horn; accordingly, even action must be an entity, if it is not to be a non-entity! This is wrong, since action has the *property* of an entity, but it is not itself an entity. For an entity is something that consists of many properties, according to the statement that "an entity consists of substance and modification." And no entity can be a property alone. For properties form parts of entities, and hence they are not themselves properties. One might object that parts of entities, too, are simply entities, but in that case, do you mean would they be called so by transference or by primary reference? It can't be the first, because then you and I would be in agreement. And it can't be the second, because then it would follow that entities are infinite. Hence parts of entities are not themselves entities, like the entities we are familiar with, nor are they non-entities, like nothings, bur rather just parts of entities. As was said in the Tattvārtha-ślōka-vārttikam:

This is neither an entity, or a non-entity, since it is called a part of an entity, just as a part of the ocean is neither the ocean nor non-ocean.

Nor should one think that a part of the ocean is just the ocean, because another part would sublate the determination of its being either the ocean or not. As was said:

^{4.} Pramāņamīmāmsā 1.1.30, although perhaps quoted from an earlier source.

^{5.} Part 2, p. 322 (where the text in fact begins *nāyam vastu na cāvastu*).

^{6.} Tattvārthaślōkavārttikam part 2, p. 322.

tan-mātrasya samudratvē śēṣāmśasyāsamudratā samudra-bahutā vā syāt tattvē kvāsti samudravit

iti. atō vastv-amśānām vastutvam aupacārikam ēva, na vāstavam iti. ata ēva na tad-grāhakam pramāņam kintu naya ēva. naya-pramāņabhēda-cintā tu mahatīty āstām tāvad ity uparamyatē.

kiñca, astu vānyatra yathā-kathañcid vastv-amśasyāpi vastutvam. *vaiyākaraņa*-matē tu kriyā-bhinnasyaivārthasya vastutvēna kathanam iti tad-vācakāny ēva nāmāni. kriyāyās tu avastutvēna na tad-vācakam nāmōcyatē. nāmnām samāsō yuktārtha iti *kātantra*-śāstrē 'pi nāma-śabdēna dhātu-vyavacchēdakaraņāc ca. atō nāma-dhātu-prakrti-bhēdād dvaividhyam anupaplutam ēvēti.

tatra dhātu-prakrtikam dvividham: tin-antam krd-antam cēti. dhātubhyas tin-krtyör ēvotpattēh. yady api tēbhyö vikaraņa-rūpā dapada-vādi-pratyayāś ca bhavanti, tathāpi tē dhātōs tini krti vā vihitē tad ēva nimittam āsādya tad-āyattās samskārakatayaiva vidhīyantē, na svatantratayā kasyacid vācakā bhavantīty avagantavyam. If that alone were to be the ocean, then another part would be, too, and there would be a multiplicity of oceans. If that were the case, what would our cognition of "ocean" refer to?

Hence we can only call parts of entities "entities" in a transfered sense, not essentially. And for this reason what yields the idea that they are entities is not a source of knowledge (*pramāņam*), but only a perspective (*nayaḥ*). But there is an enormous discussion of the difference between perspectives and sources of knowledge, so let's let this be.

Moreover, we could say, in other cases, that a part of an entity is an entity in a certain respect. But according to the grammarians we can only call something separate from action an entity, and nouns are just what express that; by contrast, since an action is not an entity, it is said not to be expressed by a noun. Moreover by using the linguistic expression "noun" (in *sūtra* 2.4.1) the *Kātantram* distinguishes them from verbal roots. Hence the twofold distinction of linguistic expressions based on nouns and verbal roots stands.

Among these two groups, the group based on verbal roots is itself twofold, consisting of finite verbs and primary derivatives. Although the suffixes *dapa*, *da*, and *v* occur after verbal roots in the form of tense-forming suffixes (*vikaraṇa-*), it should nevertheless be understood that they are occasioned by the addition of a finite verbal ending or primary derivative suffix to a verbal root, and that they are added only as a kind of preparation (*saṁskāratayā*) in dependence upon them; they are not expressive of anything on their own. tatra krt-pratyayāḥ kartrādi-kārakē bhāvē ca yathāyōgam bhavanti. tin-samjñakās tu samskrtē kartari karmaņi bhāvē ca bhavanti. bhāsāyām tu kartr-karmaņōr ēva, na bhāvē. ata ēva bhāsāyām dhātvartha-lakṣaņō bhāvaḥ krd-vācya ēvēti rāddhāntaḥ.

dhātavō 'pi dvēdhā, sakarmakā akarmakāś cēti. tatra karmaņi pratyayāḥ sakarmakēbhya ēva, nākarmakēbhyaḥ. kartari tu sarvēbhyō 'pi bhavantīti vaktum āha *dhātōr* iti. sakarmakād akarmakāc ca dhātu-mātrād ēva na tad-viśēṣād iti prakrti-nirdēśaḥ.

am-ar-ay-ir-en-evava iti şannām pratyayānām svarūpa-nirdēśah.

nanv amādīnām pratyayānām am-ar-ay-ir-en-evu tin iti tin-samjñā krtāsti. tathā ca *lingāt sub* iti vad dhātōs tin ity ēva nirdēsō yuktō lāghavāt. na pratyēka-nirdēsō gauravāt samjñā-karaṇa-vaiyarthāc cēti cēt. Among them, primary derivative suffixes are used both in the sense of a thematic role, such as the agent, and in the sense of the verbal action itself $(bh\bar{a}v\bar{e})$, whereas finite verbal suffixes are used in Sanskrit in the sense of the agent, the patient, and the verbal action itself, but in the vernacular only in the sense of the agent or the patient, and not in the sense of the verbal action itself. For this reason we hold that, in the vernacular, the verbal action associated with the meaning of a verbal root must be expressed by a primary derivative.

Verbal roots, too, are twofold: transitive and intransitive. Among them, patient-oriented suffixes only follow transitive roots, not intransitive roots; agent-oriented suffixes, however, follow all roots. This is why he says *after a verbal root*. He uses the bare form to indicate that the suffixes follow any root, transitive or intransitive, and not a specific category.

With *am-ar-ay-ir-en-evava*^{*h*} he uses the proper form of the six suffixes.

Objection: The suffixes beginning with *am* have been given the technical term *tin*, and that for reasons of economy it would have been more appropriate to say "after a verbal root, *tin*," just as he earlier said "after a nominal base, *sup*" (*sūtra* 203), rather than to list them individually, which is both less economical and would make the technical term useless.

na. lāghavādarēņa tathā karaņē tin-samjñāḥ pratyayatvāvisēṣāt sarvē 'pi yugapat prasajyērann ity anista-bhiyā tathā mā prasankṣīd ity ēvam artham gauravam apy anādrtya tathā nirdēsaḥ krta iti. na caivam karaņē 'py ēṣa dōṣaḥ samānaḥ. na hy am-ādīnām pratyēkanirdēsō yugapat-prāptim niruṇaddhi. tathā ca bhakṣitē 'pi lasunē na sāntō vyādhir iti syād iti vācyam. pratyēka-nirdēsē 'nya-yuṣmadasmāsu pratyēkam ēkatvānēkatva-vivakṣayā ṣaṭsu viṣayēṣu ṣaṇṇām tēṣām yathā-sankhyēnaiva prāptir bhavati. yaugapadyānavakāsāt. naivam tin iti nirdēsē yathā-krama-prāptiḥ. sama-vacana-bhāvād yugapat-prāptir ēva syāt. tathā ca lingāt sub ity anantaram karmaņy am ity-ādivad atrāpītara-vyāvrttyā niyamārtham yatnaḥ kartavyaḥ. tat-karaņē ca gauravam. atō 'traivam nirdēsa ēva varam lāghavād ity abhiprētya tathaiva vivrņōti *anyasminn ēkatvē am anēkatvē ar* ity-ādi.

Response: This is wrong. Supposing we did so, for reasons of economy, then everything designated by the technical term tin would apply at once, since they are all equally suffixes. And we don't want that. That is why they have been listed, notwithstanding the lack of economy. Moreover, it is not the case that the same fault (viz. simultaneous application) applies if we list the suffixes in this way, too. You might be thinking: well, if listing the suffixes individually blocks their simultaneous application, then it might be that illness does not subside even when garlic is eaten.⁷ But when they are listed individually the six suffixes apply to the six referents, that is to say, to another, you, and us, each singular and plural respectively, since there is no scope for them to apply simultaneously. And they would not apply in the right order if the technical term tin were to be used; instead, they would all apply simultaneously, since *tin* would express all of them equally. And accordingly, just as sūtra 204 (karmany am, "the ending am in the sense of the patient") comes right after sūtra 203 (lingāt sup, "a declensional ending comes after a nominal base"), here too effort would have to be taken to restrict the rule by excluding other operations, and that would result in a lack of economy. For this reason the formulation in the *sūtra* is better, for reasons of economy. And with this in mind he expains the sūtra accordingly ("for another we have am in the singular and *ar* in the plural").

^{7.} I am not sure of the meaning of this expression.

nanv anyatvam itara-nirūpaņādhīna-nirūpyam vastu-svarūpam. lōkē sarvatra kiñcid apēkṣya kaścid anya iti prasiddhēh. tathā ca yad-apēkṣayānyatvam tan-nirūpaṇam āvaśyakam. tad-anirūpaņē tan-nirūpaṇasyāsambhavād ity āśaṅkya nātrāpēkṣaṇīyam anyan nirūpyam.

yatō 'tra yuṣmad-asmad-dvayam sannihitam asti. atas tad-apēkṣam ēvānyatvam ity āha *anyatvam* ity-ādi. tatra hētum āha *sannidhānād* iti. vyāpti-pratyāsattyōḥ pratyāsattir garīyasīti nyāyād iti.

nanv ēvam api yad-apēkṣam anyatvam tat prathamatō nirūpaņīyam. tasya tan-nirūpaņādhīnatvāt. tathā ca yuṣmad-asmad-anyēṣv ity ēva vaktavyam. yathā minas triśō 'smad-yuṣmad-anya iti *jainēndra*śāstram.⁹ nānya-yuṣmad-asmāsv iti vyutkrama iti cēt,

na, am-ādīnām ṣaṇṇām ēkatvādiṣu ṣaṭsu viṣayēṣu yathā-kramasiddhy-artham ēvam nirūpaṇam. anyathā viṣaya-viṣayiṇām vyatyāsaḥ syāt. asti caivam rītiḥ prācām api. yathā lo 'nya-yuṣmadasmāsu tip-tas-jhi-sip-thas-tha-mib-vas-mas iti.¹⁰ *jainēndra*-śāstrē tūddēśyē vidhēyē cobhayatrāpi tathaivānupūrvīti tathā nirdēśaḥ. ata ēva tatra min ity ēva pratyāhārō na tin ity avagantavyam. **Objection**: To be "another" means to be an entity that depends for its description on the description of something else, since in the world, in every case something is "another" in reference to something. And accordingly we require a description of the think in reference to which something else is "another," since it would be possible to describe it without describing that. And "another" is not described in relation to anything else in this *sūtra*.

Response: He addresses this with "another." In this case "another" is in relation to the words "you" and "us" that are proximate to it in this $s\bar{u}tra$. He gives the reason: "because it is close." The principle is that between invariable concomitance and proximity, proximity is stronger.⁸

Objection: Even if this were the case, then that in relation to which it is "another" ought to have been mentioned first, and accordingly he should have said "you, us, and another," as was done by the *Jainēndra* grammar. "Another, you, and us" is out of order.

Response: No, in fact they are described in order that the suffixes (*am* etc.) can apply in order to the six referents, beginning with the singular. Otherwise the referents and the corresponding suffixes would have been exchanged. Moreover this is how ancient grammars, too, have done it, for example $l\bar{o}$ '*ny-yuşmad-asmāsu tip-tas-jhi-sip-thas-tha-mib-vas-mas*. As for the *Jainēndra* grammar, you should understand that it has mentioned the terms in that way so as to maintain the order of the topic and comment in both cases, and that is precisely why it uses the abbreviation *min* rather than the abbreviation *tin*.

10. Śākaţāyanavyākaraņam

^{8.} I do not know the source of this principle.

^{9.} Jainēndravyākaraņam

nanu yuşmad-asmac-chabdau pūrva-śāstrēşu sarvatra tyad-ādi-gaņapaṭhitau. tayōś ca bhāṣāyām anupasarjanayōḥ prayōga ēva nāsti. nāvyaya-śatr̥-tyad-ādīty anēna liṅga-saṁjñāyā ēva niṣēdhāt. ataḥ katham anayōr atra prayōgaḥ, yat-sannidhānād ēkānēkatva-viṣayē dhātōḥ pratyayōtpattir? iti cēt. **Objection**: The linguistic expressions *yuṣmad* and *asmad* are included in a list of *pronouns* in all earlier grammars, and those are not used in the vernacular, except as the first member of a compound, since they are excluded from the technical term "base" (*linga-*) by *sūtra* 10 (*nāvyaya-śatṣ-tyad-ādi*, "indeclinables, participles, and pronouns are not considered bases"). How, then, can they be used in this *sūtra*, such that the relevant suffixes appear after a verbal root to express singularity or plurality in proximity to them?

na. atrānya-yusmad-asmāsv iti na sāksād ētē śabdāh samabhivyavahāra-visayatayā vivaksitāh, yēnēdam āpādanam sobhēta, kintu tad-artha-vācakā bhāsā-visayā ēvāmādi-pratyaya-vidhiniyāmakatayā vivaksitā iti nōkta-dōsah. tatra yusmac-chabdārthavācakō nin-śabdah asmac-chabdārthasya tu en-śabdah. tābhyām anyē yē 'rthās tēsām sarvēsām sāmānyēna vācakas tan-śabdah. viśēsēna tu tat-tad-vācakās tadbhava-tatsama-dēśya-prabhēdānām aviśēsā ēvēti tan-nin-en-śabda-samabhivyāhāra-sācivyēna nirdiśati tān irddam, tām irddar iti-ādi. tatrāpi tat-tac-chabda-sannidhānē saty ēva dhātōs tat-tat-pratyayōtpattir iti na nirbandhah, kintu tac-chabda-sannidhānē tad-asannidhānē 'pi vā tat-tad-arthavivaksā-mātrēnāpi tathā tat-tat-pratyayotpattir bhavatīti. ata ēva cātra sūtrē asmāsv ity artha-pradhānō nirdēśah. anyathā asmatsv ity ēva prayujyēta nāsmāsv iti. artha-visayē hi yusmad-asmacchabdayor asadharini prakriya. śabda-svarupa-visaye tu sadhariny ēva. yathā yuşmadi madhyamah asmady uttamah yusmad-asmadōh padam padāt param ity ādi-pūrva-śāstra-prayoga ity abhiprētyāha anyēty-ādi.

Response: In this *sūtra*, the linguistic expressions *anya*, *yusmad*, and asmad are not intended to refer to the linguistic forms directly — which would make this objection quite appropriate — but what is intended, rather, are the linguistic expressions that express those meanings in the vernacular, such that they can constrain the operation of the rules for the suffixes in question. Hence the fault that you have brought up does not apply. Among those linguistic expressions, nin expresses the meaning of the linguistic expression yusmad ("you"), and en expresses the meaning of the linguistic expression asmad ("us"), and tan expresses in general all those meanings apart from those two. With the examples (tān irddam, tām *irddar*, etc.) he indicates, by including the linguistic expressions tan, nin, and en, that there is no difference between the linguistic expressions that express those meanings across the divisions of Sanskrit-derived, Sanskrit-identical, and regional lexemes. Despite this, however, one should not insist that the relevant suffixes are added to a verbal root *only* when the corresponding linguistic forms are present; rather, the relevant suffixes are added anytime there is the *intention* of expressing the corresponding meanings, whether the corresponding linguistic expressions are present or not. That is why asmāsu is used in this sūtra, with an emphasis on the meaning of the word *asmat*, rather than *asmatsu*, which would indicate the linguistic form of asmat itself. For the special derivation of the linguistic expressions yusmad and asmad is called for when they refer to a meaning, and the general derivation only when they refer to the linguistic forms themselves. Earlier grammars, for example, have used "second person in the presence of yusmad" and "first person in the presence of *asmad* to indicate a form that follows another in the presence of the words yusmad and asmad. With all this in mind, he says: anya etc.¹¹

^{11.} Patañjali's Vyākaranamahābhāsyah on 1.4.105.

uktam ca *kātantra*-śāstrē nāmni prayujyamānē 'pi prathama iti. apiśabdād aprayujyamānē 'py abhyupagamāt. tathā pāņinīyē 'pi. yuṣmadi samānādhikaraņē sthāniny api madhyama iti. sthāniny apīty aprayujyamānē 'pi. yasyāprayuktasyārthaḥ pratīyatē sa sthānīti vaiyākaraņā iti rītim abhiprētya tathā tan-ādi-śabda-prayōgam antarāpi pradarśayati *nōdidam*, *nōdidar* ity-ādi.

atra *tān* iti sāmānyatō vā *dēvadattam*, *yajñadattam* ity-ādi-višēṣatō vā vivakṣaṇīyam. yady apy atrāmādīnām ṣaṇṇām pratyayānām dvayōr dvayōr yathā-kramam prathama-madhyamōttama-puruṣa-samjñā prasiddhā. yad āha *darpaṇa-kāraḥ*¹²—

am-ar-ay-ir-en-evugaļ akkum kramad-ēkānēka-vacanadoļ pratyēkam samanise yugaļatey ākhyāta-mārggadoļ nelasi ninda purusa-trayakam Moreover it says in the *Kātantra* "the third person is used even when a noun is used, and from the word "even" we understand that it is used even when a noun is not used. *Pāņini*'s grammar similarly says "the second person is used with reference to something coreferential with the word 'you,' even when there is a substituend." The latter means that the second person is used even when something coreferential with 'you' is not used, since grammarians consider that form to be a substituend whose meaning is understood even when it is not used. With this in mind, he exemplifies the suffixes even without the use of the words *tān* and so on (*nōḍidaṁ*, *nōḍidar*, etc.).

In these cases one can either intend a general "another" with *tān* or a specific "another" with Dēvadatta, Yajñadatta, and so on. Now it is true that each two of the six suffixes (*am* and so on) in order have the well-known technical terms "third person," "second person," and "first person." As the author of the *Darpaṇam* says:

There are the suffixes *am*, *ar*, *ay*, *ir*, *en*, and *evu*; in which each successive pair expresses the singular and plural, in that order, of the three persons in verbal agreement.

^{12.} Śabdamaņidarpaņam

iti. *nāgavarmā*py asūtrayat *tāsu dvē dvē prathama-madhyamōttamapuruṣā* iti.¹³ tathāpy atra tat-samjñā-krta-prayōjanābhāvād akaraṇam. samjñā-karaṇam hi prayōjanārtham. tac cēt samjñāntarēṇa tēna vināpy vānyathaiva sidhyati. na tad avaśyam vaktavyam iti niyamaḥ. asti ca pūrva-śāstrēṣu apy ēṣā rītiḥ. yathā *kātantrapāṇinīyā*di-śāstrē trīņi trīņi prathama-madhyamōttama-puruṣā iti samjñā. *jainēndra*-matē tu minas triśō 'smad-yuṣmad-anyā iti samjñāntaram ēva. *śākaṭāyana*-matē tu lō 'nya-yuṣmad-asmāsv ity-ādinā vinaiva samjñām prakriyā nirvyūdhā. atō 'trāpi tayaiva rītyā nirvōdhum śakyata ity ēvam abhiprāyēṇaiva tad-akaraṇam, na tu tad-artha-niṣēdhamanasēti mantavyam. Similarly Nāgavarman's sūtra reads: "the third, second, and first person are represented by each pair." Nevertheless we have not used these technical terms, because there is no reason to do so. For there has to be a reason for making a technical term, and if the same thing can be accomplished without it, or with a different technical term, then we don't need it. This is a constraint of ours, and the same procedure is found in earlier grammars. For example, in the Kātantra and Pāņinīya grammars, the technical terms "third person, second person, and first person" are used for each triplet (of finite verbal endings). But in the Jainendra grammar, we have another technical term entirely (minas triśo 'smad-yusmad-anyā). And in *Śākatāyana*'s grammar, the derivation proceeds without any technical term at all (lo 'nya-yusmad-asmāsv). Hence, in this case, too, it can proceed in the same way, and with this in mind we have not used the technical terms "third person," "second person," and "first person." But don't think that we have done so to reject the meanings of those terms.

^{13.} Karnātakabhāsābhūsanam sūtra 198.

nanv atrānya-yuṣmad-asmāsu pratyēkam ēkānēkatvayōr yathākramam am-ādi-pratyayā vihitāḥ. na hi tē sarvatraivam niyamēna prayujyantē. kvacid vyabhicāra-darśanād iti tad udāhrtya darśayati *dēvadattanam* ity-ādi. *dēvadattanam kaņdem*, *dēvadattanam kaņday* atrōbhayatrāpi *dēvadattanam kaņdem*, *dēvadattanam rpi* na dhātōr *am* drśyatē. tathā *ninnam kaņdam*, *ninnam kaņdem* atrōbhayatrāpi *ninnam* ity yuṣmad-ēkatva-sannidhānē 'pi na dhātōr *ay*. tathā *ennam kaņdam*, *ennam kaņday* atrōbhayatrāpi *ennam* ity asmad-ēkatva-sannidhānē 'pi na dhātōr *en*. sarvatrāpi *ennam* ity asmad-ēkatva-sannidhānē 'pi na dhātōr *en*. sarvatrāpi pratyayāntarasyaiva śravaņāt. tathā tatraiva prayōgē *dēvadattaram*, *nimmam*, *yemmam* ity anēkatva-prayōgaś ca. tathā *dēvadattanim kāņalpațţir*, *kāņalpațţevu*; *ninnim kāņalpațţar*, *kāņalpațţevu*; *ennim kāņalpațţar*, *kāņalpațţir* ity-ādi karmaņi prayōgē sarvatrāpy ukta-lakṣanābhāvāt katham ētad ity anuyōgē tat tathaivēty prativakti *am-ādayō na bhavant*īti.

Objection: The suffixes am etc. are taught, in sequence, for "another," "you," and "us," in the singular and plural. For they are not necessarily used in this way in all cases, since we observe some deviation. To exemplify this he brings forward forms like *deva*dattanam. In both devadattanam kandem ("I saw Devadatta") and dēvadattanam kanday ("You saw Dēvadatta"), we have a singular term for "another" (*devadattanan*), but *am* is not observed after the verbal root. Similarly in both ninnam kandam ("He saw you") and ninnam kandem ("I saw you"), we have a singular term for "you" (*ninnan*), but *ay* is not observed after the verbal root. Similarly in both ennam kandam ("He saw me") and ennam kanday ("You saw me"), we have a singular term for "us" (ennan), but en is not observed after the verbal root, since in all these cases we have a completely different suffix. We have similar uses in the plural with dēvadattaran, nimman, and emman. And similarly dēvadattanim kānalpattir ("vou were seen by Dēvadatta"), kānalpattevu ("we were seen"), ninnim kānalpattar ("they were seen by you"), kānalpattevu ("we were seen"), ennim kānalpattar ("They were seen by us"), *kānalpattir* ("you were seen") — how can these passive usages be accounted for, since the definining characteristic is absent? He responds to this objection with the phrase "The suffixes am etc. do not occur" etc.

tatra hētum āha — vyadhikaraņatvād iti. ayam āśayaḥ. atrānyaikatvādiṣu am-ādi-pratyayāḥ kartari vidhīyantē. tatra sāmānādhikaraņyam vivakṣaņīyam. samānādhikaraņē kartarīti. na cāyam arthas sūtrēņāsūcitaḥ katham abhyupagantava ity śaṅkyaḥ, sāmarthya-siddhatvāt. śruta-prakrta-sāmarthyānumitō hi sūtrārtha iti. pūrva-śāstrē 'pi tathaivāṅgīkaraṇāt. yady apy ayam arthaḥ kvacit *pāṇinīyādau* mandānugrahārthaṁ samānādhikaraņē iti sākṣād ēvōktaḥ, anyatra tu sāmarthya-labhya iti sākṣād-avacanē 'py aṅgīkrta ēvēty atrāpy avaśyaṁ aṅgīkartavyam ēva. sāmānādhikaraņyaṁ cātra tiṅ-vācyasya kartuḥ karmaņō vā prathamānta-padābhidhēyatvam ēva nānyat.

nanu yadi nōcyatē tad tad ēvābhidhattē nānyēnōktasyānyō 'bhidhāyaka iti. tathā ca tin-vācyasya kartuḥ karmaņō vā tin ēvābhidhāyaka iti katham asya prathamābhidhēyatā. anyathā ghaṭa-padavācyaḥ paṭa-padābhidhēyō 'pi syād iti atiprasajyata iti cēt. With "because they are not coreferential" he gives the reason for this. Here is the idea. The suffixes am and so on are taught in the sense of the agent in reference to another in the singular and so on. Their coreferentiality with the agent is intended ("in the sense of a coreferential agent"). And one should not wonder at how this meaning is arrived at despite not being indicated by the *sūtra*, because it is provided by context (*sāmarthya*-). For the meanings of sūtras are elicited based on the context of what is actually uttered, since earlier grammars have accepted this as well. Now it is true that Pānini and others have made this meaning explicit for the benefit of dull people (by saying "coreferential"), but in other cases they have accepted it without saying so explicitly, since it can be obtained from context. Hence we have to accept it here as well. And in this case coreferentiality consists precisely in the agent or patient, which is expressed by the finite verbal suffix, being denoted by a word ending with the first case suffix.

Objection: Unless you actually said, "this denotes this; one thing does not denote something that is expressed by something else," and "a finite verb denotes either an agent or a patient, which is in turn expressed by the finite verb." how can [the agent or patient] be denoted by the first case suffix? Otherwise it would end up that what is expressed by the word "pot" would end up being denoted by the word "cloth."

atra brūmah. pacati, pacasi, pacāmīty-ādau kartari prayogē kartā tāvat pratīvatē. tatra dhātv-arthānukūla-krtimān kartēti sāmānyatah kartrtva-prakāraka-pratītāv api sa ko vēti visesa-bubhutsāyām itaravyāvrttyā kartr-viśēsa-dēvadattvādi-prakāraka-pratipatty-artham dēvadattas tvam aham ity-ādy-anya-yusmad-asmat-padāni prayujyantē. yady api tatra dēvadattādi-sabdā ēvānvaya-vyatirēkābhyām dēvadattādy-artha-vācakāh, tathāpi prayuktair ēva śabdair arthāvabōdhō nāprayuktaih. prayōgaś ca na prakrti-mātrasya pratyayamātrasya vā. na kēvalā prakrtih prayoktavyā, na ca kēvalas ca pratyaya iti niyamāt. kintu padatvam āpannasyaiva. padatvam ca savibhaktikasyaiva nāvibhaktikasya. vibhakty-antam padam iti vacanāt.¹⁴ atō 'tra padatva-nirvāhārtham yayā kayācid vibhaktyā bhāvyam. tatra kā vā prayoktavyēti cintāyām dvitīyādayo vibhaktayah karmādi-kārakē sambandhē ca yathā-yatham vidhānād upaksīna-śaktikās sāvakāśā iti prathamaikāparam anyatrāvidhānād an-upaksīna-śaktir niravakāśā viśistāstīti saivātra vidhīyata iti tad ēva prathamānta-padābhidhēyatvam iti.

Response: In active usages like "he cooks," "you cook," "I cook," an agent is understood. In those cases, there is a general notion whose relational qualifier is "being an agent," viz. "the agent is the one who is possessed of an action that is conformant to the meaning of the verbal root." Nevertheless, when there is a desire to know who the agent is more specifically, the words for another, you, and us, viz. "Dēvadatta," "you," or "I," are used for the sake of an understanding whose relational qualifier is a particular agent, such as "being Devadatta," through excluding the others. And although, thanks to positive and negative concomitance, it is the linguistic expression "Devadatta" (etc.) in those earlier cases that expresses the meaning Devadatta, nevertheless the awareness of the meaning comes through the linguistic expressions that are actually used, not through those that are not used. Moreover there is no use of a base or an affix on its own, since there is the constraint that neither a base nor an affix on its own can be used. Indeed they have to be used once they become a word, and only something with an inflection can become a word, not something without an inflection, since it is said that "a word is that which ends in an inflectional affix." For this reason, there must be some inflectional affix or another. in order to guarantee that the form is a word. Given that that is the case, when we think about which inflectional affix is to be used, the second case etc. have exhausted their capacity in expressing factors like the patient, and connection, since that the way they are taught, and are therefore spoken for; by contrast, the first case has not exhausted its capacity to express anything else, since it is not taught for anything else, and is therefore not spoken for, and this is what distinguishes it. Hence that inflectional affix is taught in these cases, and hence that is what it means to be denoted by a word ending in the first case.

na ca dvitīyādivat prathamāpy anyatra vihitaivēty upaksīnaśaktir ēva. tāsām iva sarvaika-vākyatayaikatra vidhānābhāvē 'pi vaiyākarana-mata-bhēdēna tasyā api sankhyādyartha-viśēsēsu vidhāna-darśanāt. tathā hi: ēka-dvi-bahāv iti śākaţāyanah, prathamā-vibhaktir lingārtha-vacanē iti sarvavarmā, prātipadikārtha-linga-vacana-parimāna-mātrē prathamēti pāninir ity ēvam tat-tan-mata-bhēdēna tatra tatra vidhāna-darśanāt katham ēsāpy an-upaksīņa-śaktir ucyatē. vihita-sthala ēva śakty-upaksayād iti vācyam. idam ēva hi tat-tad-abhiprāya-prayālocanāyām tinvācya-kāraka-sāmānādhikaranya ēva paryāptam iti. tat-paryālōcanāprakāras tu nyāsa-bhāsyādi-granthēsv ēva prapañcita iti tatraivānusandhēyō 'sya grantashya sanksēpa-ruci-adhikāritvād iti. ata ēva minaikārthaivēti tat-sāmānādhikaranya ēva prathamam nyarūrupad bhagavān dēvanandī. tad ētat sarvam ākalanam bhāsāyām api samānam ēva. tattva-cintāyā yukti-cintāyāś ca sarvatrāpy aviśēsāt. kēvalam prakriyā-cintā-mātram ēva param viśisyatē nānyad iti. tathaivātrāpi prathamam asūtrayat sūtrakārō muktē iti. vicāritam ca tatraivaitat. tad idam sāmānādhikaranyam kartarīva karmany apy anusandheyam. atah samanadhikarana eva kartari karmani vāmī am-ādayō bhavanti nānyatra. *dēvadattanam kanday* ity-ādisu pradarśita-sthalēşu tu anyaikatvē saty api dvitīyānta-padābhidhānavişayatayā prathamānta-padābhidhāna-vişatayā nāstīti sāmānādhikaranyābhāvād am-ādavō na bhavantīti.

atrām-ādīnām madhyē pañcamō hrasvādir ēva yady api sūtrē nirdistas tathāpi dīrghādīm api kēcid icchantīti āha *en*-ity-ādi. tathā ca prayōgaḥ—

Nor is it the case that the first case is taught for something else, like the second case, and therefore its capacity for expressing something else has also been exhausted. For although those other cases are not taught ... we see that the first case, too, expresses particular meanings such as number. That is to say: Śākaṭāyana teaches it in reference to one, two, or many; Śarvavarman teaches it in reference to the gender and number; Pāṇini teaches it in reference to the meaning of the stem, the gender, and the number. Hence we see it taught in reference to different things according to the different views of the grammarians. How, then, can it be said that its capacity to express its meaning is not exhausted? One could say that it is because its capacity is exhausted only in the place that is taught. For this tani-vaņņam lañcam īvēm puruļi ninage pū-goñcalam bēgadindam ninag' īvēm tumbi kendāvareya misupa mel-moggeyam māņad' endum ninag' īvēn añce kampam ninag' osayisuvem kūde tengāļiy enn ōpanan ind' āraydu tand' ennodan irisidod' end' āke mātādutirppaļ

iti. tathātra trtīyam aikāram ardhaikāram api kēcid icchanti.

śrī-kānta nīne sale geldai kantuvan amala-mukti-satiyoļ nered' āntai kiḍada sukhaman uļidargg' ī kr̥tyam asādhyam arīven ān avaroļavam

tathā

kantuvan ent' alariside kr tāntanan urad' entu gelde mukty-anganeyam ent' oliside niravadhi-sukhasantatiyan ad' entu padede pēl eneg' arhā

iti ca prayōga-darśanāt. nanu ca vākya-prayōgēṣu kriyā-kārakasamanvayō dvēdhā bhavati sahānvayaḥ pratyēkānvayaś cēti. yatrānēkēṣu kāraka-padēṣu kriyāpadam ēkam sahaivānvēti sa sahānvayaḥ. yatra tu tat pratyēkam ēvānvēti sa pratyēkānvaya ucyatē. ubhayathāpi prayōga-darśanāt. tatrādyasya yathā —

avatōkāvaļi naicikī-pratati ghrsti-śrēņi-pīnōdhnikānivaham baskayaņī-kadambakam acaņdī-maņdalam dhēnu-kōtivasā-santati-vatsakā-samudayam prastauhikānīkam i-

rdduvu gövardhana-götra-götra tatadol gövinda-gövrndadol

iti. dvitīyasya yathā —

Similarly, in the following example,

Śrīkānta, you alone have conquered well Kantu, joining with (neredu) the good woman (sati) of pure liberation, you have joined (āntai) pleasure that does not fade (kiḍada), This deed was impossible for the rest (uḷidarge). I know (among them?) Similarly: tridaśānaka-vāsanav asu-

gu divya-ravam ātapatram esaļ vaļe camaram

sad-amala-bhā-maṇḍalam ese-

vudu ninnol jinapa nīne jagad-ārādhyam

iti. tatra pratyēkānvayē yāvanti kāraka-padāni santi tāvatsv api kriyāpadasyāvrttyā samanvaya iti na kāpy anupapattih. sahānvayē tu yatrānyaika-vacanāny ēva bahūni santi tatra tad-anēkatvē niyuktam aram ēvādāya prayōktum śakyatvē 'pi yatrānya-yusmadōr anyāsmadōr yusmad-asmadōr vā dvayōr dvayōr anya-yusmadasmadām trayānām vā padānām prayogas tatrānēkatva-vācinām ar-ir-evūnām madhyē kim vā prayoktavyam. sarvasyāpi nimittasya jāgarūkatvād ity āśankyātrānya-yusmad-asmadām uttarōttarāśritam ēva kāryam nānyad iti pratipādavitum tathaivodāhrtya darśayati ātanum nīnum irddir ity-ādi. parāśraya iti parāpēksayā yah paras tad-āśraya ity arthah. tatra bījam āha — śabda-para-vipratisēdhād iti. ayam āśayah. anya-yuşmad-asmāsv ity atrānyatva-pratipattau pratiyōgi-pratipatty-artham sannihitayōr yusmad-asmadōh prāg ēva nirūpanīyatvē tatrāpy asmad-yusmador vyutkramē 'py adosatvē 'pi yad artham anya-yusmad-asmāsv ity ēva pātha-kramah krtas tat-paripātīm āśrityöttaröttarāśraya ēva vidhir bhavati. ētēna yugapad-vacanē parah purusānām iti kātantra-śāstravad yatnāntarakarana-prayāsō nānubhōktavya iti śucitam iti.

References