CONTROVERSIAL REASONING IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

MAJOR TEXTS AND
ARGUMENTS ON *ARTHÂPATTI*

Edited by Malcolm Keating

Kumārila Bhaṭṭa's
Explanation in Verse

Translated by ANDREW OLLETT and ELISA FRESCHI

This chapter contains a translation of the section on *arthâpatti* in Kumārila Bhaṭṭa's *Explanation in Verse* (*Śloka-vārttika*). This work, dating to the sixth or seventh century, is what it sounds like: an explanation, written entirely in verse, on Śabara's *Commentary* (*Bhāṣya*) on the Mīmāṃsā system, which was composed a few centuries prior. Kumārila's *Explanation*, which provided detailed philosophical arguments for his reading of the Mīmāṃsā system, proved to be one of the most influential works in South Asian philosophy.

The discussion of *arthâpatti* in Śabara's *Commentary* actually forms part of a long quotation of an earlier commentator, who is known only as "the author of the *Vṛtti*" or *Vṛtti-kāra*. The *Vṛtti-kāra* provided definitions of the six epistemic instruments (*pramāṇa*; see p. 2 in the Introduction to this volume) that would be accepted as valid and independent in the Mīmāṃsā system. About *arthâpatti*, the *Vṛtti-kāra* had provided the following definition, which has since formed the starting-point of all discussions of *arthâpatti* in Mīmāṃsā:

> Also *arthâpatti*, that is, the postulation of a thing when another thing that is seen or heard does not make sense otherwise.

Kumārila's main task in this eighty-eight-verse section of the *Explanation* is to argue against the reduction of *arthâpatti* to inference. Thus, after applying the *Vṛtti-kāra*'s definitions to various types of cognitions (vv. 1–9)—with the exception of linguistic cognitions, to which he will return—Kumārila devotes forty-one verses (vv. 10–50) to anti-reductionist arguments. He uses a single example throughout this section: "A certain man named Caitra, who is known to be alive, is not at home; therefore he must be outside." While he does not associate the reductionist position with any specific philosophical system, the understanding of inference that he takes for granted, and imputes to his opponents as well, follows that of the Buddhist philosopher Diṅnāga. He demonstrates, in several ways, that the pattern of reasoning Mīmāṃsā authors call *arthâpatti* necessarily takes a different *form* than the pattern of reasoning that South Asian philosophers, following Diṅnāga, call inference (*anumāna*). This point is perhaps made most clearly in verse 22, where Kumārila shows that the two premises, Caitra's being alive and Caitra's absence from home, guarantee the

conclusion, Caitra's presence outside, immediately and independently of the formal relations between the premises and conclusions that are required for inference.

Kumārila then (vv. 51–78) discusses another type of *arthâpatti*, "*arthâpatti* on the basis of what is heard." His motivation for arguing that this type is qualitatively different from the preceding type seems to come from the need to invest the cognitions produced through this type of *arthâpatti*, when applied to Vedic texts, with the same authority of the Vedic texts themselves. But the distinction between "*arthâpatti* on the basis of what is seen" and "*arthâpatti* on the basis of what is heard" would come to distinguish Kumārila's theory of *arthâpatti* from that of Prabhākara (see the following chapter, p. 89). Kumārila then "zooms out" and argues that his account of *arthâpatti* is consonant with a broader epistemological theory in which the relations that *cause* valid cognitions need not be known at the moment of cognition (vv. 79–86). He concludes with a discussion of the applications of *arthâpatti* (vv. 87–8).

Three commentaries are available on this section of Kumārila's *Explanation*: those of Umbeka (early eighth century), Sucaritamiśra (middle of the tenth century?), and Pārthasārathimiśra (early eleventh century).[1] Our reading of the *Explanation* is deeply informed by these commentaries, and we have given summaries and extracts of them throughout.[2]

ARTHÂPATTI: DEFINITION AND EXAMPLES

According to UMBEKA, there are two potential sources of confusion in the definition quoted by Śabara. The first is the use of the phrase "seen or heard." The word "seen," by itself, could potentially refer to three domains: that which is literally *seen* with the organs of sight; that which is *perceived* in general (including what is heard, touched, smelled, and tasted in addition to what is seen); and that which is *apprehended* in general (including inferential, analogical, testimonial, and suppositional cognitions in addition to perceptual cognitions). The first and second senses are too narrow, as we will want to include cases of *arthâpatti* that start from inferential cognitions. The second and third senses make the separate mention of something "heard" redundant, since hearing is covered by both perception in general and apprehension in general. SUCARITAMIŚRA mentions a fourth possibility, according to which "seen or heard" does not refer to different things, but is an idiomatic way of saying "anything apprehended in general." This was how Prabhākara and Śālikanātha understood the text (see the following chapter, p. 89).

The second potential source of confusion is the use of the phrase "does not make sense otherwise," (*anyathânupapatti*) which will turn out to be a crucial component

---

[1] For these dates, see Kataoka 2011: 112. These commentators have different agendas and styles, and in particular, Sucaritamiśra—and Pārthasārathimiśra after him—have tried to defend Kumārila's positions against the arguments of Prabhākara and Śālikanātha. See also Freschi (forthcoming).

[2] Editor's note: Because of the need for significant commentary on Kumārila's concise verses, the main text in this chapter is indented, surrounded by the translators' comments, unlike other translations. The names of classical commentators are in small caps to draw attention to their remarks translated or paraphrased in the comments.

of *arthâpatti* in all of its varieties. It is not immediately obvious why something that does not make sense should cause us to postulate something in virtue of which it comes to make sense. After all, UMBEKA claims, if I imagine a hundred herds of elephants on the tip of my finger, this clearly does not make sense, but I don't go postulating something else in virtue of which it comes to make sense; I simply give up the imagined idea.

Kumārila addresses both questions in his commentary:

1. When a thing that is known from one of the six epistemic instruments does not make sense otherwise[3] and causes one to postulate (*kalpayet*) something that is not known, that is *arthâpatti*. Examples of it follow.

In this way, Kumārila makes it clear that the word "seen" in Śabara's commentary is to be understood in the third sense, namely, "apprehended" in general, and furthermore, that it is apprehended through one of the six well-known epistemic instruments. Hence *arthâpatti* does not start from any cognition at all—which would include bogus cognitions of the elephants-on-the-fingertip type—but only from *valid* cognitions.

Since the problem of redundancy still remains in this interpretation—that is, "heard" is surely included within "seen" if the latter really means "apprehended" in general—Kumārila provides a justification for mentioning a type of *arthâpatti* that begins from what is "heard" separately from the more general case of *arthâpatti* that begins from what is apprehended:

2. "Seen" means cognized through the five other epistemic instruments. The type that starts from what is "heard" is mentioned separately, because it is different from the previous type, insofar as it encompasses an epistemic instrument.

This verse establishes that there are two qualitatively-distinct kinds of *arthâpatti*, namely, *arthâpatti* on the basis of what is seen (*dṛṣṭârthâpatti*) and *arthâpatti* on the basis of what is heard (*śrutârthâpatti*). Whereas the content of the first type is a thing, the content of the second type is another epistemic instrument, namely, a linguistic expression. Kumārila returns to this distinction in verse 58cd.

PĀRTHASĀRATHIMIŚRA explains the choice of words by referring to the principle of the cows-and-bulls (*go-balī varda-nyāya*): just as the word "cow" can refer to a male or female, but when used in conjunction with the word "bull" it most naturally refers to the complement of "bull," namely female cows, in the same way the word "seen" can refer to something that is cognized through any epistemic instrument, but when used in conjunction with the word "heard" it most naturally refers to the complement of "heard," namely, something cognized through the five epistemic instruments apart from language. This principle is actually taken from one of Pārthasārathimiśra's opponents, Śālikanātha, who invokes it in his discussion of the same passage from Śabara (see p. 102 in our translation of Śālikanātha's *Straightforward and Lucid Gloss* below).

---

[3] *bhavet* Su, Pā; *bhavan* U. The reading of the Umbeka MS is a *lectio facilior* insofar as it solves the slight syntactic problem of two unlinked verbs (*bhavet, kalpayet*).

Kumārila now exemplifies different kinds of *arthâpatti* based on the five epistemic instruments, excluding testimony. All of them involve (a) a starting cognition, which is the result of any of the five epistemic instruments; (b) some problem that afflicts the starting cognition; (c) a final cognition, the result of *arthâpatti*, which resolves the aforementioned problem. Kumārila's examples are very compressed, and in particular, he does not tell us why the starting cognition does not make sense without the additional cognition supplied by *arthâpatti*.

3ab. Among the six varieties, it is on the basis of *perception* that we cognize burning, and from this we get that a fire has the capacity to burn.

The perceptual cognition is the feeling of being burned by fire. Since we cannot make sense of the fact that fire burns without also supposing that fire has an inherent capacity to burn, we postulate the latter.

3cd. It is on the basis of *inference (anumāna)* that we cognize the sun's movement, and from this we get that the sun has the capacity to move.

According to Kumārila, the fact that the sun has moved *on its own* (as opposed to having been moved by something else) is an inference from the fact that it has changed its position in the sky over the course of the day. The sun's movement, thus established inferentially, would not make sense unless the sun had the capacity to move, and hence the capacity is understood through *arthâpatti*.

4ab. *Arthâpatti* on the basis of what is heard will be discussed later on in this section.

See verses 51ff. "What is heard" refers to language, which the Mīmāṃsakas accept as a distinct epistemic instrument.

4cd. When we cognize a cow on the basis of *comparison* with the gayal, the possibility of the cognition of the cow being included in that cognition is admitted on the basis of *arthâpatti*.[4]

Comparison (*upamāna*) is a relatively marginal epistemic instrument, and the cow–gayal example is the only one that is commonly cited.

A cow can be cognized on the basis of perception, that is, by looking at a cow. But the Mīmāṃsakas admit that a cow can also be cognized on the basis of comparison. For it is a characteristic of Kumārila's treatment of comparison that once a similarity between two terms has been established, the perceptual cognition of one introduces an analogical cognition of the other.[5] When one sees a gayal, one has the cognition, "a cow is similar to a gayal." Yet there is apparently nothing in the gayal that would provoke such a cognition. According to SUCARITAMIŚRA, if the analogical cognition of the cow was caused simply by the gayal, then we would have that cognition whenever we see the gayal, even if we had never seen a cow before. There must therefore be another cause of the cognition. "There must," he says, "be some special property of

---

[4] gavayopamitāyā gos tajjñānagrāhyatā matā U, Su; gavayopamitā yā gauḥ tajjñānagrāhyatā matā Pā.
[5] See *Explanation in Verse*, section on comparison (*upamāna*), v. 46.

the cow which, once it becomes manifested by the perception of its correlate, generates the cognition of its similarity to the gayal."

> 5. We have to rely on *arthâpatti* to understand the power of linguistic expressions to convey their meanings, in order that their function of expression can be established, and on this basis, we rely on *arthâpatti* once again to understand that those linguistic expressions as fixed.

The cognition that linguistic expressions have a power to denote a meaning is based on *arthâpatti*. That is to say, we know that linguistic expressions bring about the cognition of a meaning, and in order to account for this process, we suppose that linguistic expressions have an inherent power to communicate their meanings. Apart from this power, it would be impossible to otherwise account for the specific kind of connection that exists between linguistic expressions and their meanings (a particular characteristic of which is, for example, that linguistic expressions only bring about a cognition of their meanings for somebody who has learned those meanings). As SUCARITAMIŚRA notes, no other kind of connection between expressions and their meanings exists, least of all an ontological connection (e.g., physical contact). Mīmāṃsakas further maintain that it is impossible to account for the power of linguistic expressions to denote their proper meanings so long as the relationship between linguistic expressions and meanings is arbitrary, and hence we appeal to *arthâpatti* once again in order to conclude that linguistic expressions are fixed.

Kumārila explains the example of *arthâpatti* based on *arthâpatti* in greater detail:

> 6–7. Expression cannot be established otherwise, hence we understand on the basis of *arthâpatti* that linguistic expressions have a power to express meanings. And because there is no other way, by means of yet another *arthâpatti* we conclude that linguistic expressions are fixed. This will be said in the commentary to the *sūtra* "because its appearance is for the sake of others." (MS 1.1.18)

> 8–9ab. The final type of *arthâpatti* is the one based on absence (*abhāva*), which Śabara has adduced as an example:[6] we can establish that Caitra is outside on the basis of his house, which is qualified by Caitra's absence, which is itself ascertained on the basis of the epistemic instrument known as absence.

> 9cd. Other examples can be found in the discussion of the faults of the locus (*pakṣa-doṣa*).

See the commentary on *Mīmāṃsā Sūtra* 1.1.18 (*Explanation in Verse*, section on the fixity of the relation between words and their meanings, vv. 237ff.) and see *Explanation in Verse*, section on inference, vv. 68ff.

ARTHÂPATTI IS DIFFERENT FROM INFERENCE

Now Kumārila shows that *arthâpatti* is a qualitatively different epistemic instrument than inference:

---

[6] *udāharat* Su, U; *udāharet* Pā.

10. The suggestion of Caitra's being outside, on the basis of perceiving that Caitra is absent, is completely different[7] from inference, since it does not have all of the necessary components (*aṅga*) of an inference, such as "being a property of the locus."

The purported inferential reason cannot be a property of the locus

A well-formed inference has certain formal properties. An inference will always have a thesis (*pratijñā*), which attributes an inferred property (*sādhya*) to a given locus (*pakṣa*), and an inferential reason (*hetu*). For example, in the standard example, the thesis, "there is fire on the mountain" expresses an inferred property (fire) present in a given locus (the mountain), and "because there is smoke" is the inferential reason. One of Kumārila's most important influences is the Buddhist logician Diṅnāga, who argued that an inference of this form will only be valid if it meets three additional criteria. (1) The inferential reason must be a property of the locus. In the standard example, since we are trying to infer the presence of fire *on the mountain*, the inferential reason, smoke, must also be present on the mountain. (2) The inferential reason is present in at least one co-locus, that is, another locus in which the inferred property is present. In the standard example, the co-loci are defined by the presence of fire. The inferential reason, smoke, is indeed present in many but not all of the cases where fire is also present. (3) The inferential reason is absent in all of the counter-loci, that is, loci in which the inferred property is absent. Since there is no non-locus, i.e., a situation in which fire is absent, where smoke is *not* absent, the standard example also meets this third criterion.

Kumārila now explains what it means to say that the criterion of "being a property of the locus" is not satisfied in the case of *arthâpatti*:

11. How can absence from home be a property of the locus? It would have to belong to either something qualified by someplace outside, or someplace outside qualified by it.

If we were to try to model the example of *arthâpatti* on an inference, we would have to say, "Caitra is outside (thesis), because he is absent from home (reason)." As we have seen, however, the thesis must be formulated as a relationship between an inferred property and a given locus. We have two options in this case: we could either say that *Caitra* is the locus, and that he is qualified by being outside, or we could say that *outside* is the locus, and that this is qualified by Caitra. As for the inferential reason, we see that it is "absence from home" in both cases.

But how, exactly, do we understand this phrase, absence from home? SUCARITAMIŚRA mentions the possibility that the inferential reason is absence itself, but quickly rejects it on the grounds that *anything's* absence can do nothing to establish that Caitra is outside. This reason, therefore, would be inconclusive (*anaikāntika*). He mentions an additional possibility that the inferential reason is absence qualified by the house, but he rejects this as well, on the grounds that the qualifier should be

---

dependent on what it qualifies, and the house, being a substance, should be said to be qualified by absence, rather than the other way around. As UMBEKA points out, we have two more realistic possibilities for the inferential reason: the house, qualified by absence, or Caitra, also qualified by absence. Kumārila rejects both:

> **12–13ab.** On the one hand, a house qualified by somebody's absence is not a property of anything. On the other hand, Caitra, qualified by absence from the house, is not understood at that time. What we understand is the house, and Caitra is not understood there.

"Anything," or more specifically, the two possibilities of the locus that were mentioned in verse 11: Caitra, or outside. Kumārila will take for granted, however, that the locus of the proposed inference is Caitra, rather than outside, in the subsequent verses.

Verse 11 introduces the main formal problem with the proposed inference. In order for something to be a suitable inferential reason, it needs *both* to be cognized— for one cannot reason on the basis of what one does not know—*and* to be a property of the locus. If the inferential reason is "a house qualified by absence," the first condition is met, but not the second: we do in fact cognize the house, but the house is not a property of whatever it is we are trying to produce inferential knowledge about (e.g., Caitra). If the inferential reason is "Caitra qualified by absence from home," the second condition is met, insofar as it is Caitra's being outside that we are trying to establish inferentially, but the first is not.

SUCARITAMIŚRA would claim that the second condition, being a property of the locus, is not met in this case either. He says that a test for something's being a property of the locus is that it is cognized when one cognizes the locus. We cognize smoke when we cognize the mountain. However, in this example, given the cognition of the supposed inferential reason (Caitra qualified by absence from his house), we do not cognize the locus (Caitra). There can be no cognition of a property of something, if we have not cognized the property-possessor in the first place. In this case, we cannot have a cognition of a property of Caitra—such as his absence from home—given the fact that we have not cognized Caitra himself.

The problem with understanding the inferential reason as "Caitra qualified by absence from home," according to Kumārila, is that Caitra is not directly cognized. As PĀRTHASĀRATHIMIŚRA says, we only cognize Caitra indirectly. He cannot be perceived. Nor, according to SUCARITAMIŚRA, can he be inferred, since such an inference would contradict his observed absence.

Kumārila has now eliminated all of the possibilities of understanding the example as a formal inference. To review these possibilities, we have two potential loci, Caitra (C) and Outside (O), corresponding to two slightly different (but practically the same) theses, Caitra qualified by Outside, and Outside qualified by Caitra, which we can represent as $C(O)$ and $O(C)$. We also have two potential inferential reasons, the house qualified by Caitra's absence, and Caitra qualified by his absence from his house, which we can represent as $H(A)$ and $C(A)$. We therefore have the following:

$H(A) \rightarrow O(C)$, fails because $H(A)$ is not a property of $O(C)$
$H(A) \rightarrow C(O)$, fails because $H(A)$ is not a property of $C(O)$

$C(A) \rightarrow O(C)$, fails because C is not cognized
$C(A) \rightarrow C(O)$, fails because C is not cognized

The opponent might argue that we can in fact cognize the purported inferential reason, Caitra's absence from home. Since the opponent is a "reductionist," who wants to reduce both *arthâpatti* and absence to inference, he will argue that this cognition is produced on the basis of inference rather than on the basis of absence as an independent epistemic instrument. According to Kumārila, however, we cannot infer the absence of a thing simply from the fact that we do not apprehend it. See *Explanation in Verse*, section on absence, vv. 29–53.

> **13cd–14ab.** Not seeing someone in a certain place can never be an inferential reason, as will be explained in the section on absence. Therefore, you cannot suppose that the inferential reason is the fact that he has not been seen in the house.

The opponent now faces two problems. What he wants to infer is Caitra's being outside, on the basis of Caitra's not being apprehended at home. In actual fact, however, this inference would need to be split into two smaller inferences:

> The preliminary inference, Caitra is absent from home because he is not apprehended there.
>
> The replacement inference, Caitra is outside because he is absent from home.

The preliminary inference fails because it lacks a suitable inferential reason, as Kumārila had just explained in verse 13*cd*–14*ab*. Therefore, the replacement inference will fail because it lacks the step needed to establish Caitra's absence from home. And any attempt to skip the first step, and infer Caitra's being outside directly out of not apprehending him at home, will fail for the same reason that the preliminary inference fails.

> **14cd–15ab.** It is only if the absence of what is to be known could be ascertained on the basis of not apprehending him that there could be an inferential cognition of his being outside, and hence not apprehending him is not a reason for that cognition.

"The absence of what is to be known," namely, the absence of Caitra himself. SUCARITAMIŚRA: "It is only when the non-apprehension of Caitra has been completely used up (*upakṣīṇa*) in ascertaining Caitra's absence that the cognition of his being outside arises." PĀRTHASĀRATHIMIŚRA: "Given that absence is understood first, on the basis of not apprehending Caitra, and subsequently a cognition of his being outside arises, it follows that this latter cognition cannot have not seeing Caitra as its immediate cause."

SUCARITAMIŚRA understands the verse to be directed against the possibility of inferring that Caitra is outside *directly* out of the fact that he is not apprehended at home. He says that this inference is not possible because the reason (not apprehending Caitra at home) would be "used up" in a preliminary inference of Caitra's absence. Both commentators agree that there is a gap between not seeing Caitra and the

cognition of his being outside, such that the former cannot be the immediate cause (PĀRTHASĀRATHIMIŚRA calls it a *nimitta*) of the latter.

As noted above (vv. 13*cd*–14*ab*), the opponent is a "reductionist." Thus, although a non-reductionist, like a Mīmāṃsaka, may be able to cognize Caitra's absence from home directly, on the basis of absence as a distinct epistemic instrument, this possibility is not open to the opponent. He needs to reduce the cognition of Caitra's absence from home to an inferential cognition, and this ends up being impossible. Kumārila does not address the objection that a Mīmāṃsaka might raise, namely, that Caitra's absence from home is cognized directly, and hence this can serve as the reason for the inference of Caitra's being outside. This objection would be more difficult to counter.

Kumārila concludes the discussion of this formal defect of the proposed inference, namely that its reason is not a property of the locus, with the following half-verse:

15cd. It is claimed that Caitra's absence is an inferential reason. The locus of that absence, however, is his house.

We had been assuming that the purported inferential reason, Caitra's absence from home, can be a property of the locus because it is a property of Caitra. In fact, Kumārila says, the locus of this absence is not really Caitra, but Caitra's house. If it is a property of the house, then it cannot be a property of the locus of the inference, namely Caitra. The opponent's attempts to make Caitra's absence from home a legitimate inferential reason, insofar as it is a property of the same Caitra whose presence outside we are trying to establish, are therefore moot, since the locus of Caitra's absence from home and the locus of his presence outside are different.

The purported locus is not previously cognized Now Kumārila moves onto a different argument. The two loci that have been proposed, namely, Caitra himself and outside, are not valid loci for an inference, because the locus of an inference needs to be something that has been previously cognized.

16. When a locus has not been cognized previously it cannot be the subject of an inference. In this case, neither outside nor Caitra himself has been cognized previously.

At this point, Kumārila has an opponent raise an objection: if it is really necessary for us to have previously cognized a locus in order to make inferences about it, then many of the inferences that we commonly accept as valid will suddenly become invalid. One example is as follows: there has been a rain upstream, because the river is flooded. Here, the locus of the inference is a place upstream, which we don't need to have cognized prior to seeing the flooded river and making the inference.

17. What about the presence of rain somewhere upstream that is cognized on the basis of a flooded river? Surely being a property of the locus is impossible in this case, since the locus is not cognized!

Kumārila responds to this challenge in two ways. On the first pass, Kumārila says that the actual locus of the inference is not somewhere upstream, which is not previously cognized, but the very place where flooding has occurred:

> **18abc.** What people cognize is that the place where there is flooding is preceded by a place where it has rained.

The inference would therefore run as follows: this place, where flooding has occurred, is connected with some other place where rain has fallen, since the river is flooded in this place (and wherever there is flooding, there is a particular geographic connection with a place where rain has fallen). As the commentators note, however, this is rather far-fetched. When people engage in reasoning like this, they actually believe that they are reasoning about the place upstream, not the place where the river is flooded. Hence Kumārila takes another pass at the problem, and suggests that this purported inference is actually an example of *arthâpatti*:

> **18d.** Alternatively, this too is an *arthâpatti*.

Both SUCARITAMIŚRA and PĀRTHASĀRATHIMIŚRA, however, insist that this example is not really an *arthâpatti*, but simply an inference, and that this statement of Kumārila's is a "concession" to the way that the layperson might describe his or her own reasoning. The challenge is understanding why the flooding example should be an inference while the Caitra example should not be, despite the fact that both examples involve reasoning about something that is not cognized previously. In the case of the flooding example, we might plausibly be reasoning about a single locus, namely the river, throughout; in the case of the Devadatta example, it clearer that there are two loci—the place where Devadatta is observed to be absent, and the place where he is postulated to be present—and therefore it does not seem to be a canonical inference.

The purported inferential reason is not probative of the conclusion

Kumārila has now established (vv. 11–15) that the purported inferential reason, Caitra's absence from home, fails to be legitimate from a purely formal perspective, that is, it is not a property of the locus. Now he will argue that it fails to actually prove the conclusion. That is, however we understand "absence from home," there is no sense in which it would yield the knowledge of "presence outside" through a valid inference. Either it is not independent from the conclusion, in which case we have a *petitio principii*, or it is, in which case it is inconclusive.

Let us suppose, to begin with, that the inferential reason is "a living person's absence from home," as in the Vṛtti-kāra's formulation. According to Kumārila, this cannot function as an inferential reason, because we do not cognize it before the conclusion.

> **19.** In the case under consideration, the property of the locus that is posited is a living person's absence from home. But that cognition does not arise without the awareness that that person is outside.

In other words, we only know that the absence from home that we cognize to begin with belongs to somebody who is alive if we cognize, simultaneously, that the person

is outside. This is SUCARITAMIŚRA's interpretation, which recalls the Prābhākara position that the starting cognition is "thrown into doubt" that is only resolved by *arthāpatti*.

In contrast to this case, Kumārila adduces the familiar example of inference, and shows that the inferential reason (the fact of possessing smoke) is cognized independently of the conclusion (the fact of possessing fire).

> 20. By contrast, the fact that something possesses smoke is understood independently of the fact that something possesses fire. At the moment that one grasps the former, there is nothing that depends on fire.

"Nothing" likely means that both the inferential reason (the fact of possessing smoke) and the locus (the mountain) can be cognized without cognizing fire.

Now we might attempt to avoid the sequential problem that Kumārila raises by maintaining that the inferential reason is not "a living person's absence from home," as was supposed earlier (v. 19), but simply "absence from home." This modification does avoid the problem of dependency, insofar as "absence from home" does not depend on "being outside." But now we have a different problem: the purported reason, "absence from home," is not invariably concomitant with the conclusion (in Sanskrit: the conclusion is not "pervaded by," *vyāpta*, the reason), "being outside," in the sense that there might be people who are absent from home who are nevertheless not outside. The inference now becomes, as SUCARITAMIŚRA says, "inconclusive":

> 21. Sheer absence from home, apart from his being alive, cannot establish being outside, since that is also observed in people who are dead.

Now Kumārila has his opponent in a corner. The purported inferential reason, "absence from home," has to take one of two forms. Either it is conjoined with the cognition of a person's continued existence, in which case the cognition that he exists outside (the purported conclusion) is given already in the premises (namely, his being absent from home and his continued existence), without having to be inferred. Alternatively, it is not conjoined with any such cognition, in which case it does not lead us to infer that anyone in particular is outside, if indeed it leads us to infer anything at all. Thus the purported inferential reason either gives us to know too much, or too little, to have a valid inference. This will be argued more explicitly in verses 27–9.

Kumārila now explains the first part of the dilemma in greater detail. The key here is that the starting cognition of Caitra's absence from home, if it does include the fact that Caitra is in fact alive, already includes his being outside: for once the house is excluded (*utkālita*) as a locus of Caitra's presence, there is nowhere else for him to be.

> 22. Through the cognition of an absence from home that is conjoined with being alive, Caitra, being excluded from his house, has to exist outside.

> 23. But as for the sheer absence from home that is cognized independently, that alone will not allow us to ascertain that a particular person, Caitra, is somewhere else.

In these two verses, SUCARITAMIŚRA notes that the absence involved in the postulation of Caitra's presence outside is an absence of a special kind: it is qualified by Caitra's continued existence. Thus the qualifier, Caitra's continued existence, must be understood in the cognition of what it qualifies, namely, Caitra's absence from home. But it is not possible to cognize Caitra's continued existence without assigning it a substrate. Since the house is excluded from being such a substrate, we conclude by elimination (*pāriśeṣyād*) that the substrate must be "outside."

PĀRTHASĀRATHIMIŚRA notes that if you start from Caitra's being alive and his absence from home, the only possible way to connect these cognitions is in the cognition that Caitra is outside. "For one does not think: 'Caitra is absent from home, but he exists, either at home or outside.'" If you only start from Caitra's being alive, however, and a general cognition of somebody's (not necessarily Caitra's) absence from home, you would only cognize "there is nobody at this house," and that would never lead you to the cognition of Caitra's being outside.

Note that in contrast to SUCARITAMIŚRA, who comments on verses 22 and 23 together, UMBEKA comments on verses 23 and 24 together. UMBEKA notes that the "sheer absence" in this verse has a different consequence than the "sheer absence" mentioned in verse 21: in that verse, it was too broad, allowing us to incorrectly infer that *anyone* who is absent from home is present outside, even dead people or people who have not yet been born; in this verse, however, what we infer is is that *somebody* (e.g., Devadatta) is present outside if *somebody* (e.g., Caitra) is absent from home, which is insufficient for cognizing that the some person who is absent from home is present outside. Thus the purported inferential reason needs to have two qualifiers: it needs to relate to a particular person (e.g., Caitra), and the person who it relates to needs to be alive.

The next verse closely recalls verse 22, which established that Caitra's being outside followed as an automatic consequence of adding the fact of Caitra's being alive to the fact of his absence from his house:

> **24.** It is only when Caitra's existence has been established that the cognition of his absence from home leads us to believe that his existence, having been excluded from his house, is now located outside.

According to SUCARITAMIŚRA, this statement is directed against the followers of Prabhākara who would maintain that Caitra's existence is rendered "doubtful" by seeing that he is not at home (see the chapters on Prabhākara and Śālikanātha in this volume, p. 89). If such a doubt as to Caitra's existence really did arise, then simply postulating that he is outside would not put the doubt to rest. Rather, in SUCARITAMIŚRA's interpretation, Kumārila says we cognize that Caitra is outside when we have determined Caitra is actually alive (which is to say, from Kumārila's epistemological perspective, that neither a doubt nor a contrary cognition regarding Caitra's continued existence has arisen).

SUCARITAMIŚRA's interpretation hangs on the word "established" (*siddhe*), and it is possible that the word does not have the sense of being "free from doubt" that Sucaritamiśra assigns to it. If we do not follow Sucaritamiśra's interpretation, however, it is difficult to make sense of the apparent repetition of the ideas of verse 22: Umbeka considers that verse 24 restates the same problem as verse 22, but with

an additional qualifier (not just "being alive," but "Caitra's being alive"). In any case, the verse emphasizes that the cognition of Caitra's being outside is qualitatively different from inference, insofar as Caitra's existence is "automatically" said to be outside when his absence from home is cognized against the assumption of his continued existence. There is, as PĀRTHASĀRATHIMIŚRA says, "nothing left to infer."

The next verse restates the double bind that the proponent of a "reduction to inference" has been placed in:

> 25. Therefore,[8] in this case, if on the one hand the reason makes no reference to Caitra's being alive, then it will not be invariably concomitant with the conclusion, in case he is dead or not yet born. If, on the other hand, the reason is invariably concomitant with the conclusion, nothing apart from it is apprehended.

The purported inferential reason, absence from home, has two forms: in its "sheer" form, it is not invariably concomitant with its conclusion, in the sense that somebody who is absent from home is not necessarily outside if he is dead; in its "qualified" form—that is, the absence from home of a particular person who is known to be alive—it is invariably concomitant with the conclusion, but in that case the conclusion does not tell us anything that is not already there in the inferential reason.

UMBEKA expands on this verse according to his understanding that "absence from home" needs not one but two qualifiers: "The reason, absence from home, qualified only by Caitra will not lead one to infer that he is outside, since it would also apply to Caitra if he were dead. Nor would the reason qualified only by *somebody's* being alive, since that is the case when, say, Devadatta is outside, and Caitra is not. Rather, only when absence from home is qualified by both of them does it lead one to infer that Caitra is outside. But this is possible only insofar as it already includes the understanding that he is outside, so it cannot be an inferential reason for that understanding."

According to PĀRTHASĀRATHIMIŚRA, the following verse anticipates an objection: how can we say that nothing new is apprehended from the qualified inferential reason, given that being outside is surely different from being alive and being absent from home?

> 26. Therefore, when the house is cognized through perception, and Caitra's absence is cognized through absence, what is outside is nothing other than the cognition of Caitra's existence.

PĀRTHASĀRATHIMIŚRA: "Even though being outside is something different, nevertheless, as for the cognition of being alive, the fact of being alive that is the content of the cognition cannot be combined with absence from the house without assigning it to a locus outside,[9] and so in order to conjoin being alive with absence from home, it 'is located outside,' that is to say, it places the fact of being alive outside. There is not, however, an additional cognition that is produced by it."

---

[8] *tenātra* U, *tenāsya* Su, Pā.

[9] Read *bahiṣṭhānam asthāpya* for the editions' *bahiṣṭhānavasthāpya*. The change of *ma* to *va* could be conditioned by the similarity of these characters in southern scripts, and reinforced by the commonness of the prefixed root *ava-sthā*.

PĀRTHASĀRATHIMIŚRA explains the slightly odd expression in the verse, "what is outside is nothing other than the cognition of Caitra's existence," as a condensed way of saying that Caitra's being outside is given in the cognition of Caitra's continued existence. SUCARITAMIŚRA, however, understands the expression differently: "the cognition of Caitra's existence is outside," namely, outside of inference, or distinct from inference. The use of the equational sentence ("nothing other than") speaks in favor of PĀRTHASĀRATHIMIŚRA's interpretation, as does the fact that in this discussion Kumārila otherwise uses "outside" only to speak of Caitra's position. UMBEKA reads verses 26 and 27 together as a summary of why the cognition of Caitra's being outside, given his absence from home, is distinct from inference.

In the following two verses, Kumārila explains exactly why it is unacceptable to regard the present case as an inference:

> 27. In order for absence from home to be a property of the locus, the fact of being outside is introduced. Something qualified by being outside would be precisely what we sought to infer on the basis of co-presence and so on with the property of the locus.

"And so on" means that the fact of the locus (here Caitra) possessing a particular property (here being outside) is, in the standard case of inference, established on the basis of the inferential reason, and in particular, its (1) being a property of the locus; (2) being co-present with the property to be proven in similar loci; and (3) being co-absent in all counter-loci of the property to be proven. These, in any case, are the conditions accepted by Kumārila's reductionist opponents.

PĀRTHASĀRATHIMIŚRA then explains the problem as follows: "What we seek to infer is Caitra, qualified by being outside. But 'being outside' is introduced only at the moment of apprehending his absence from home, in order for this absence to be considered to be a property of the locus, which is the living Caitra."

> 28. If the cognition of the property of the locus and so on is based on the awareness of his being outside, then because that awareness is based on those cognitions, we will certainly be involved in circular reasoning.

The problem is as follows. To start with, we observe only Caitra's absence from his house. At this moment, we do not know whether Caitra is dead or alive; thus we do not know whether the property we have observed, namely Caitra's absence from his house, is indeed a property of the locus, namely the living Caitra. If we assume that Caitra is somewhere else, in order to provide a locus for his observed absence, then we are reasoning in a circle: for the locus, Caitra, qualified by being somewhere else, is precisely what we are supposed to infer in the first place.

As a conclusion to this discussion of the failure of "absence from home" to be a probative inferential reason, Kumārila anticipates the objection that all of the same faults that he had identified in the purported inference—above all, the introduction of the conclusion into the premises and the attendant fault of circular reasoning—would also apply to the Caitra example considered as an *arthâpatti*. In his answer, Kumārila insists that what would be a fault in an inference is not a fault in *arthâpatti*:

29. When something does not otherwise make sense, however, the introduction of the conclusion into the premises does not appear to us to be a fault,[10] because of the cognition having precisely that form.

As Yoshimizu (2007: 323) notes, "Kumārila includes Caitra's existence in the premise of the *arthâpatti* without discussing how it should be confirmed." This short verse moves the Caitra example away from the model of inference and towards the model of a distinct epistemic instrument that has, as SUCARITAMIŚRA and PĀRTHASĀRATHIMIŚRA both say, "distinct components." It is the closest Kumārila comes to an explanation of *arthâpatti* as such, in contradistinction to inference, and hence the three commentaries have attempted to expand on it. Rather than talking about inferential reasons, properties of the locus, and all of the other distinctive terminology of inference, Kumārila here uses the distinctive terminology of *arthâpatti*: "not making sense otherwise," and possibly "clash."

We say "possibly" because there are two different readings in the last part of the verse. One is the relatively banal "appears to us" (*pratibhāti naḥ*), which was possibly read by UMBEKA (he remains silent on this point) and definitely by SUCARITAMIŚRA, and the other "of what possesses a clash" (*pratighātinaḥ*), which was read by PĀRTHASĀRATHIMIŚRA. According to the latter, *arthâpatti* is the epistemic instrument that "possesses a clash," because it is generated by the clash between two other epistemic instruments. He gives exactly the same account of *arthâpatti* in his commentary (*Śāstra-dīpikā*) on *Mīmāṃsā Sūtra* 1.1.5. *Arthâpatti* works by postulating a further piece of information that resolves the clash, and in this way, according to PĀRTHASĀRATHIMIŚRA, it differs from inference.

There is another substantial disagreement in the commentaries on this verse. "Having precisely that form" is understood by SUCARITAMIŚRA and PĀRTHASĀRATHIMIŚRA to mean that the appearance of the conclusion in the premises is a distinctive feature of *arthâpatti* that characterizes it in contrast to inference. According to UMBEKA, however, it means that the cognition that *arthâpatti* results in "takes the form of" the cognition that it begins with, in the sense that it is what allows the original cognition to make sense.

SUCARITAMIŚRA: "suppose one objects as follows: 'In *arthâpatti*, too, the conclusion is introduced into the premises. For how can Caitra's absence from his house, which does not make sense as a result of another cognition and is therefore undetermined, lead us to cognize that he is outside?' This is the question that Kumārila responds to. For something can 'not make sense' in two ways. First, something does not make sense if there is no way at all for it to make sense. But something can also not make sense so long as something else is not postulated. Among these two, we do not need to be concerned about the first, something that does not make sense at all. But when something makes sense when something else is postulated, and does not make sense otherwise, it is possible to determine that it does indeed make sense by postulating that other thing. For this is precisely how everyone reasons, both laypeople and

---

[10] *pratibhāti naḥ* Pā (however the commentary clearly presupposes the reading *pratighātinaḥ*), Su (corroborated by his commentary); *pratighātinaḥ* U (he does not, however, comment on this part of the verse).

experts. Nor do we see that it is controverted in other places and so on. Therefore this is an instrument of valid knowledge. And just as, in inference, it is an inferential sign that has already been ascertained that leads to the conclusion, in the same way, in this case, it is something that has been understood on the basis of one cognition, and further consideration (*vitarka*) about it has been introduced by another."

SUCARITAMIŚRA, with a Prābhākara opponent in mind, hastens to refute the possibility that we actually doubt one of the two cognitions. To do so, he uses an example from Vedic ritual which would have been familiar to his audience (*Mīmāṃsā Sūtra* 2.4.26). The issue is that one recension of the Vedas enjoins the use of a *ṣoḍaśin* cup during the *Atirātra* sacrifice, while another prohibits it: "Nor do we doubt that one or the other cognitions is valid. Rather, there is simply a need to corroborate the two cognitions whose validity has already been ascertained, by saying, 'how does it make sense for both to be the case simultaneously?' It is similar to the case of the *ṣoḍaśin*, when there is one text that says to take it up, and another that says not to take it up. Therefore, just as in that case, given that there is a requirement for both options to make sense simultaneously, we find that there is such a way, namely, by distinct performances, in this case as well, two things which are accepted on the basis of a valid cognition, and whose validity has been ascertained, can be corroborated by postulating something else."

The impossibility of establishing an invariable concomitance

According to PĀRTHASĀRATHIMIŚRA, Kumārila has now concluded his point that in *arthâpatti* there is no "property of the locus" that provides the inferential reason in a well-formed inference. Now he moves onto a different argument: inference consists in cognizing one thing based on its invariable concomitance with something else, but such a cognition is impossible in the case of *arthâpatti*.

Kumārila says that an invariable concomitance between the two properties, absence from home and presence outside, can only ever be known *a posteriori*:

> 30. A relationship of inseparability in the case under consideration may be presumed only at that point. It is not determined before. Therefore, although this is present,[11] it cannot be a cause for the cognition itself.

We understand that in this section Kumārila uses the words "inseparable" and "concomitant" synonymously to refer to an invariable concomitance.

UMBEKA: "Although it is the case here that two things are inseparable, nevertheless it is not an inference, because only one who has previously grasped this inseparability can make the inference."

The point is not that there is no inseparability between absence from home and being outside (in fact, Kumārila does seem to admit that these qualities are inseparably connected, especially if the reading adopted here is taken), nor is it that their

---

[11] *saty apy eṣā* Pā, U (seemingly corroborated by their commentaries); *anyathaiṣā* (which would mean "unless it has been determined previously") Su (his commentary, however, does not corroborate this reading and actually hints at the other reading).

inseparability cannot ever be determined (in fact, Kumārila argues below, vv. 31–2, that it can be determined through *arthâpatti*). The point is rather that our cognition does not require that we have previously determined their inseparability. This is absolutely unlike the case of inference, which requires knowledge of the connection between the two terms to begin with. To emphasize the difference, SUCARITAMIŚRA mentions a definition of inference, namely "inference is the cognition of something inseparable for one who knows it," that is, the cognition is only an inference if one already knows that one term is inseparably connected with the other term. A very similar definition is discussed also in the *Explanation of the Nyâya System* of Uddyotakara.[12]

Kumārila says this in the following verses:

31–2. Absence from home and presence outside are not necessarily observed together. Rather, there is no other way to cognize their concomitance.[13] For it is only on the basis of not making sense otherwise that we understand one from the other. That is to say, we do not understand their concomitance unless we postulate it.

That is, although they are not necessarily cognized together, when they are, we have nothing to thank besides *arthâpatti* for this cognition. Kumārila is perfectly fine with saying that we infer one thing from another thing *afterwards*, that is, after we have cognized their co-presence on the basis of *arthâpatti*:

33. Therefore, at the moment of cognizing the relation, we have to cognize the other correlates through *arthâpatti*. Afterwards, it may well be[14] an inference.

That is, after cognizing the relation between the correlates (absence from home and presence outside) through *arthâpatti*, we can forever afterwards use inference to cognize one of the correlates given the other; this inference, however, will always be based on an original *arthâpatti*. Neither Kumārila nor his commentators explicitly say whether we can use such a cognition only in the case of Caitra's absence from home, or in any case where a person is absent from home.

Note that the relation of entailment between being present in one place and being absent in another place is the missing theorem that Yoshimizu (2007) noted in his discussion of the attempt, on the part of Kumārila's opponent, to reduce *arthâpatti* to inference. Where A means "Caitra's presence at home" and B means "Caitra's presence outside," the concomitance can be stated as $((A \lor B) \land \neg A) \to B$.

Even when concomitance is observed no valid inference is possible At this point someone objects, and says that it is indeed possible to cognize the two correlates of the relation as concomitant:

---

[12] On *Nyāya-sūtra* 1.1.5, p. 161 of Taranatha and Amarendramohan's edition. See p. 127, this volume, for translation.

[13] *sāhitye tu* U, Su; *sāhitye'pi* Pa.

[14] *astv* U (corroborated by his gloss *bhavatv*); *asty* Pa (although he glosses it as *bhavatu*), Su (although the editor conjectures *astv*).

34. But somebody who has stood at the door of the house might suppose that Caitra is outside: When he is in one place, then he is not somewhere else.

Kumārila now shifts from the example that the Vṛtti-kāra discussed, the cognition that Caitra is outside given his absence from home, to a different example. Here, somebody comes to Caitra's house and, while standing in the doorway, has two cognitions more or less simultaneously: he observes that Caitra is not in his house, but he also observes that Caitra is somewhere nearby. (UMBEKA imagines that Caitra is observed to be "in the *romaśā*," a rare word that might refer to a garden.) In this sense, there is a "concomitance" of Caitra's absence from home and his presence outside.

Is this, however, the kind of concomitance which can serve as the basis of an inference? The discussion now revolves around whether our joint cognition of Caitra's absence from home and presence outside, which occurs to us as we stand in the doorway, can ever be, or be transformed into, the cognition of an invariable concomitance (*avinābhāva*), *without* appealing to *arthâpatti*. What would need to be the case in order for these cognitions to yield an invariable concomitance, such that whenever we are given one of the correlates, we can infer the other? Kumārila will argue that, despite the existence of a real invariable concomitance between Caitra's absence from home and his presence outside, we can never *cognize* such a relation without *arthâpatti*, and hence every attempt to reduce *arthâpatti* to inference must fail. The "reductionist" argument that will be discussed in the following verses has a tripartite structure:

Somebody stands in the doorway of Caitra's house, and cognizes both his absence from home (through the epistemic instrument known as absence) and his presence outside (through perception).

Next, that person combines these cognitions into a cognition of the invariable concomitance between absence from home and presence outside *without* using *arthâpatti*.

Finally, that person is able to apply the cognition of the invariable concomitance in an inference.

This tripartite structure can be discerned in verse 34: somebody stands at the doorway of the house; the same person attempts to combine his cognitions into a cognition of an invariable concomitance ("when he is in one place, then he is not somewhere else"); finally, he is able to "suppose" (*prakalpayet*), that is to say infer, that Caitra is outside when he finds that Caitra is not at home, because he knows that "not being somewhere" is invariably concomitant with "being somewhere else."

The last part of the verse, which expresses the cognition of the invariable concomitance, can actually be read in two different ways: "whenever he is not in one place, then he is somewhere else," and "whenever he is in one place, then he is not somewhere else." It seems that Kumārila treats both of these formulations as logically equivalent, and perhaps we are even meant to understand the text in both ways simultaneously. In the following verses, however, it is clear that the invariable

concomitance that has been put forward is between "being in one place" and "not being somewhere else." Why does Kumārila, or rather the opponent that he introduces, use *this* version? It may be that, although Kumārila treats them as equivalent, he knows that one version is easier to refute than the other: in particular, "whenever he is not in one place, then he is somewhere else" does not necessarily involve a quantification, whereas "whenever he is in one place, then he is not somewhere else" involves a quantification over all other places besides the place where Caitra is, and this quantification is precisely what Kumārila will attack.

Kumārila now criticizes the reductionist argument of verse 34: the cognition of the invariable concomitance is problematic, because it relates Caitra's presence in one place with his absence from *every* other place.

35ab. But even then, the person's absence from *every* place is not understood.

PĀRTHASĀRATHIMIŚRA: "Now to the person who says that not being at home and being outside can be grasped at the same time even without *arthāpatti*, provided that one stands in the doorway of the house, the following reply can be made: this is indeed the case, but what is at issue here is the absence in *every* other place on the part of a person who exists in a single place, and since those two attributes (namely, being in one place, and not being in every other place) cannot be grasped at the same time, no inference is possible."

What the reductionist has observed is Caitra's presence in *one* place and his absence from *one* place. What he wants to be entitled to say, however, is that Caitra's presence in one place is invariably concomitant with his absence in *every* other place. Only if we know that his absence from *every* other place is concomitant with his presence in one place can we infer, on the basis of Caitra's absence from *any* place whatsoever, that he is present somewhere else. By contrast, if we only knew that his absence from *one* place was concomitant with his presence in one other place, then we could have to observe Caitra's absence from the *same* place in order to be able to infer his presence somewhere else.

Kumārila claims that one term of this relation—Caitra's absence from *every* place other than the one where he is—cannot be cognized. Thus it can't be cognized as concomitant with Caitra's presence in one place. And thus there can be no knowledge of the invariable concomitance.

Why can't Caitra's absence from every place, other than the one where he in fact is, be cognized? One could claim that it can be cognized, either on the basis of inference, or on the basis of non-apprehension. To begin with inference, we might reason as follows: "Caitra is not in any other place, because he is in a particular place, such as his garden." In this case, the inferential reason is Caitra's being in a particular place. Kumārila denies that this strategy is viable:

35cd. Nor can there be an invariable concomitance of the inferential reason on account of the person's not being in one place.

The suggested inference ("Caitra is not in any other place, because he is in a particular place") fails because the reason, namely his being in a particular place, is not invariably concomitant with the property to be proven, namely his not being in any other place. The reason is limited to a single locus, whereas the property to be

proven encompasses infinitely many. The opponent can appeal to the concomitance previously established between Caitra's presence in one place, such as his garden, and his absence in another place, such as his house, but such an appeal is in vain: the concomitance between Caitra's presence in one place and his absence in *one* other place is insufficient to establish a concomitance between Caitra's presence in one place and his absence in *every* other place.

SUCARITAMIŚRA admits that it would be possible to infer being outside on the basis of absence from home, provided that one has grasped an invariable concomitance between them. But besides the fact that it is actually impossible to grasp this invariable concomitance ("it is not possible to establish the invariable concomitance of the inferential reason with absence from the three worlds, simply on account of somebody's being in a certain place"), SUCARITAMIŚRA mentions another objection: people do not actually reason this way, "since even people who have not grasped the connection (between absence from home and being outside) can cognize Caitra's being outside."

The opponent now suggests that there is another way of establishing an invariable concomitance between being in one place and being absent everywhere else, namely, by using the non-apprehension of Caitra as a reason for inferring his absence:

36. One might object that the absence in the case under consideration could be known through non-apprehension. And because no special effort is required to establish it, that will work for a person who is in a single place.

"For a person who is in a single place": the objector states that non-apprehension is an "easy" way to establish that Caitra is absent everywhere else, since a person who is in a single place will not apprehend Caitra's presence elsewhere. This is the sense that UMBEKA and SUCARITAMIŚRA give to the phrase. Another interpretation, however, is possible: the objector could be saying that the non-apprehension "*of* a person who is in a single place," that is, of Caitra, will be established easily enough.

According to PĀRTHASĀRATHIMIŚRA, the sense of this objection is that we do not need to *infer* that Caitra is absent from all of the places in which we do not observe him; this is something we can cognize directly, through non-apprehension. In the same way that non-apprehension secures for us the cognition that Caitra is not in a particular place, it can also secure for us the cognition that he is not anywhere else. And again, if we can legitimately cognize that there is an invariable concomitance between a person's being in one place (established on the basis of perception) and his not being anywhere else (established on the basis of non-apprehension), then this might allow us to infer that Caitra is outside given his absence from home.

According to both UMBEKA and SUCARITAMIŚRA, however, inference still has a role to play in establishing the invariable concomitance in the opponent's view: that is, we can use non-apprehension as a reason to inferentially establish that Caitra is absent everywhere else. Since we do not apprehend Caitra everywhere else, we conclude that he is absent everywhere else. This recalls the reductionist opponent's strategy in vv. 14*cd*–15*ab*.

An answer to the previous objection:

37. It is not the case that through non-apprehension the absence of a thing is understood, because one has not gone to those places. For non-apprehension

operates in regard to things which, although they are not in front of us, nevertheless exist.

"Because one has not gone to those places": because one cannot possibly go to all of the places where a thing might be observed not to be present. The sense here is that non-apprehension only yields locatival predicates ("the pot is not *on the ground*"), and never existential predicates ("the pot *is not*"). Thus the knowledge produced by non-apprehension is necessarily qualified by the particular locus in which something is not apprehended.

"Absence of a thing" is a somewhat confusing turn of phrase, since the opponent is not seeking to cognize Caitra's absence, in the sense of his non-existence, but rather his absence from every place in the universe except for one. Kumārila's point, however, is that the opponent is not entitled to this cognition for precisely the same reason that we are not entitled to use non-apprehension to cognize the absence of a thing in general. Given that we can never be in a position to apprehend the absence of Caitra from every possible place, we cannot use non-apprehension to arrive at the conclusion that he is absent everywhere besides the place he in fact is. Under what circumstances can non-apprehension lead to the cognition of something's absence everywhere?

38. But if you do not apprehend a thing after going to all of those places, then, when there is no longer any other reason, you can understand that it does not exist.

"No longer any reason," that is, for its non-apprehension. Thus what the opponent said, "no special effort is required," is only half true: once we are in a place, the non-apprehension of a thing there is easy. But putting ourselves in a position to have similar cognitions about every place is impossible.

With these conditions, Kumārila has made it nearly impossible to cognize the non-existence of something through non-apprehension. This is a problem from the point of view of establishing a negative concomitance, for example, whenever fire is absent, smoke is also absent. Stated otherwise, smoke should be absent in *all* of the counter-loci of fire, or loci in which fire is absent. Buddhist philosophers, namely Diṅnāga and his followers, have put forward this negative concomitance as one of the conditions of a well-formed inference. Generally, such a negative concomitance is established on the basis of a joint non-apprehension, that is, when we do not apprehend fire in a locus (which is thereby a counter-locus of fire), we do not apprehend smoke in it, either. But Kumārila would seemingly require us to personally inspect every single possible counter-locus of fire to ensure that there really isn't *one* thing out there that possesses smoke but not fire.

39. One might object that, even in the absence of fire and so on, an obvious co-absence of negative concomitants such as smoke could not be established, since we do not go to those places.

"Those places" refers to every locus of the absence of fire, i.e., every place where there is no fire. Kumārila's response is slightly flippant:

40. That is indeed a problem for somebody who needs to know that the reason is absent from other loci. But as for me, just on the basis of not observing, one thing can trigger the cognition of its correlate.

"On the basis of not observing," i.e., not observing any cases where the reason is present in a counter-locus.

SUCARITAMIŚRA identifies the "somebody" here as a Buddhist, who insists that a valid inference requires us to know that the inferential reason is absent from every single counter-locus (in which the property to be proven is absent). Kumārila, by contrast, adopts the view that cognitions are valid unless proven otherwise. Thus something can cause us to infer its correlate, so long as we do not observe a contrary case. SUCARITAMIŚRA and PĀRTHASĀRATHIMIŚRA say that a concomitance between two things can be established on the basis of a handful of positive instances (in which, e.g., fire is present where smoke is present). The negative instances (in which, e.g., smoke is absent where fire is absent) do not need to be known *per se*, for which see Taber (1992).

If it is so easy to arrive at the cognition of an invariable concomitance in the case of smoke and fire—since, as Kumārila says, all we need to do is *not* observe a case in which smoke is present but fire is absent—then why is it so hard to arrive at the cognition of an invariable concomitance in the Caitra example? After all, we do not observe a case in which Caitra is present in one place and *not* absent in another place:

> **41.** One might object that, if this is so, then in the other case as well, the relation of Caitra's absence, which is based on non-apprehension, with his presence, would stand to reason, because it is observed.

"In the other case as well": this could refer to the example of Caitra being observed to be in one place and not in another place, introduced in verse 34, or alternatively to the original example of Caitra being absent from home. The "relation" is between Caitra's being in one place and his not being in any other place. Kumārila responds to this criticism as follows:

> **42.** And since the concomitance of smoke and fire is well-established on the basis of their both occupying a a limited space, and hence no separation is seen, we suppose that smoke can lead to the cognition of fire.

This verse indicates an important difference between *arthāpatti* and inference that pertains to the different role of *universals* and *particulars* in each kind of reasoning, and thus also to the different role of *quantification*. Partly on the basis of this verse, Kiyotaka Yoshimizu has argued (2007 and in this book) that, in Kumārila's view, inference always involves universal quantification over a particular locus, whereas *arthāpatti* operates in cases where universal quantification is impossible.

One reason why the invariable concomitance between smoke and fire is easy to establish, in contrast to the invariable concomitance between Caitra's presence outside and his absence from home, is the fact that smoke and fire both occupy a "limited space," which in turn explains why "no separation is seen." According to UMBEKA, fire and smoke are each found in a a limited space and hence they can each be apprehended as a whole. SUCARITAMIŚRA and PĀRTHASĀRATHIMIŚRA explain further that, although inference concerns universals, the universals inhere completely in particulars. Thus through any particular instance of a universal, the entire universal can be apprehended, as can its concomitance with another universal. Thus, if smoke

were not invariably concomitant with fire, then we would have noted it after a few observations, since each observation apprehends the entire locus and hence also the entirety of the relevant property (e.g., the fact of possessing smoke, or the fact of possessing fire). The fact that we do not observe any exceptions to this invariable concomitance is strong evidence that there are no exceptions. In this verse, "suppose" (*prakalpyate*) is used as an equivalent of "accept" (similar to verse 34). UMBEKA explicitly, and the other commentators implicitly, understands "separation" as the lack of invariable concomitance.

The case of the concomitance of Caitra's presence in one place with his absence everywhere else is different:

> **43.** In the case under consideration, this concomitance does not stand to reason, since one of the concomitants is present in an infinite number of loci.

Unlike the case of smoke and fire, Caitra's presence in one place and his absence from another place never have the same locus; indeed, his absence from "another place" really means his absence from every place apart from the one in which he is observed to be present, and hence there is an infinite number of loci of Caitra's absence. Thus, whereas it would have been possible to find an exception to the invariable concomitance of smoke with fire, had there been any such exceptions, given the fact that both properties (possessing smoke and possessing fire) inhere in spatially-delimited loci that can be apprehended as a whole, this cannot happen in the present case, because Caitra's absence is from an infinite number of places, and therefore we cannot apprehend it as a whole.

The opponent has failed to ground the invariable concomitance noted in verse 34, namely when one is in one place, he is not somewhere else, because the invariably concomitant property of "not being somewhere else" has an infinite number of loci, which cannot be checked individually. He now attempts to ground it in another way: the locus of Caitra's absence has a particular property, namely, being distinct from the locus of Caitra's presence. If we know that Caitra's being in one place is invariably concomitant with his *not* being in a different place, then once we know that Caitra is not in one place, we can infer that Caitra really is in another place. Thus one does not have to actually establish Caitra's absence from an infinite number of loci, but only the property of being distinct from the locus of Caitra's presence. From this, the opponent argues, we can establish his absence from all other places.

> **44.** One might object that what is understood in this way is that Caitra is absent from some other place, since it is distinct from the place where Caitra is, just like someplace nearby.

According to UMBEKA and SUCARITAMIŚRA, what the opponent needs to establish is Caitra's absence from *all other places* besides the place where he in fact is, and hence the "other place" that is the locus of this inference is any place within that set of "all other places." This inference may, however, be open to the objection that Kumārila had just made, namely that the opponent is attempting to reason about an infinite number of loci.

According to PĀRTHASĀRATHI, the opponent is able to establish the required invariable concomitance at a slightly lesser cost: we only need to establish that Caitra

is absent in *one other place*. Once we know that this place is distinct from the place where Caitra in fact is, we can infer Caitra's absence, on the basis of an observed concomitance between Caitra's presence in one place (his garden) and his absence from a place nearby (his house).

Kumārila responds to the objection by turning the opponent's reasoning on its head:

> **45.** However, in the same way we could also know that "Caitra is in that very place, since that place is distinct from someplace nearby, just like the place where Caitra is." And hence the invariable concomitance is contradicted.

About the "other place" that the opponent had tried to claim was a locus of Caitra's absence, we could just as easily reach the opposite conclusion, namely, that it is a locus of Caitra's presence. Hence, as Kumārila says, the "invariable concomitance" established by the opponent's inference is itself contradicted. How can that be so?

From the way that the commentators have explained these pair of inferences, it is clear that the problem lies in a single locus being susceptible to two contradictory conclusions on account of two contrary but, at first sight, equally valid inferential reasons. The opponent had given the reason that x is different from a locus of Caitra's presence ($x \neq a$, where $L(C,a)$), and Kumārila reasons that x is also different from a locus of Caitra's absence ($x \neq b$, where $\neg L(C,b)$). If "another place" really means "all other places," then Kumārila's response here has the additional character of a *reductio ad absurdum*, since it would be absurd to say that Caitra is present *everywhere* except for the putative locus of his absence.

According to PĀRTHASĀRATHIMIŚRA, the idea is that it is impossible to establish that Caitra is present or absent in an arbitrary locus (x) simply on the basis of this locus being different from another locus, where Caitra is presupposed to be absent or present, since this difference is precisely what is in doubt: is x the same, or different, from the locus of Caitra's presence? But the opponent might say that Kumārila's response, especially in Pārthasārathimiśra's formulation, misses the point. The opponent takes for granted that Caitra's presence in a given locus is known (e.g., $L(C,a)$). And it appears that once we are in a position to know this, then we can easily know that there is another place, x, where Caitra is absent. In Kumārila's inference, by contrast, we are also given to know that Caitra is present in a and absent in b, but we wrongly infer that Caitra is present in x simply because x shares with a (Caitra's garden) the property of being different from b (Caitra's house). This countervailing inference is wrong, but for a further reason that has not yet been introduced: Caitra cannot be in several places at the same time. Although Kumārila merely suggests it in the next verse, his commentators are more explicit about the fact that the impossibility of Caitra being in different places at the same time is one of the factors in our postulation, by *arthâpatti*, of his not being anywhere else in the world.

In the next verse, Kumārila says that the only way to ground the invariable concomitance between presence in one place and absence everywhere else is through *arthâpatti*:

> **46.** But the apprehension in one place of a person as a whole would not be established otherwise, and this accounts for his absence from other places.

The core of this argument is that Caitra's absence from other places is not something that we arrive at by perception, inference, or non-apprehension, but something that we postulate in order to account for the fact that we are able to cognize Caitra "as a whole" (*kārtsnyena*) in one place. UMBEKA explains that "the fact that the grasping of all of the parts of an individual that has parts would not make sense otherwise is evidence for its absence elsewhere."

SUCARITAMIŚRA explains the shape that *arthāpatti* takes here: we know that when we apprehend Caitra, we apprehend him as a whole; we are not missing a part of him that is in some other place. Yet this apprehension would not make sense if Caitra were actually in any other place. If we really need to, we can exclude the possibility that Caitra is "all-pervading" (*vibhu*). Thus the cognition of his being absent everywhere else comes to be included in the cognition that he is apprehended as a whole.

In their long discussions of this verse, both SUCARITAMIŚRA and PĀRTHASĀRATHIMIŚRA begin by rejecting what we would call an argument from analogy. One might claim that, on the basis of one's own experience, one can know one's own absence from places other than the place where one in fact is, and similarly, one might claim that Caitra's presence in one place guarantees his absence from other places. But both commentators insist that Caitra's absence from other places can only be known through *arthāpatti*. SUCARITAMIŚRA in fact denies that one can establish an invariable concomitance between "being in one place" and "not being in any other place" in one's own case, since the latter can never be observed. PĀRTHASĀRATHIMIŚRA reasons somewhat differently, saying that what we know on the basis of our perceptual experience of ourselves is that one cannot be in contact with multiple places at the same time. In both cases, however, they speak of a "clash"—an idea that was introduced, in one reading of the text, in verse 29—that would cause the original cognition, namely Caitra's presence in one place, to not make sense unless the conclusion, his absence from other places, were postulated. Both commentators thus seem to conceive of *arthāpatti* as an epistemic instrument that is called upon, not to adjudicate a conflict between cognitions (for that is ŚĀLIKANĀTHA'S position, which SUCARITAMIŚRA explicitly argues against), but to prevent such a conflict from arising.

According to SUCARITAMIŚRA, the potential conflict is between the countervailing inferences that Kumārila had introduced in verse 45, namely, the fact that from his presence in one place, we could infer either his absence from some other place, or his presence in another place. But if we are to understand our apprehension of Caitra in a given place as a *total* apprehension, and thus to exclude the possibility that he is all-pervading, the cognition of his absence elsewhere must be included, by *arthāpatti*, in the cognition of his presence in a given place. Hence the countervailing inference, leading to Caitra's presence in some other place, is defeated.

According to PĀRTHASĀRATHIMIŚRA, the potential conflict is rather between the fact of Caitra's not being in multiple places at a given time (which PĀRTHASĀRATHIMIŚRA, in contrast to SUCARITAMIŚRA, believes it is possible to infer) and the fact of Caitra's being in one place at a given time (which is known through perception). The latter is compatible both with the former and its negation. In this case, *arthāpatti* plays its usual role in rendering the two cognitions compatible by adding a third cognition, namely, Caitra's absence from other places.

Given that our knowledge of the concomitance between Caitra's being in one place and his not being anywhere else can only be due to *arthâpatti*, any inference that is based on the knowledge of this concomitance—such as seeing Caitra's absence from home and inferring that he is outside—will ultimately be based on *arthâpatti*:

47a. Therefore it is based on an *arthâpatti* in the case under consideration.

"The case under consideration" refers to the example set out in verse 34, where somebody purports to infer Caitra's being outside on the basis of a previously-cognized concomitance between his presence in one place and his absence everywhere else.

Other types of arthâpatti are also not reducible to inference

Kumārila, having concluded his discussion of the Caitra examples, now discusses other examples of *arthâpatti*, notably those based on perception. This kind of reasoning is often applied in Mīmāṃsā in the postulation of "capacities."

47bcd. And wherever the existence of a capacity is understood on the basis of observing[15] an effect, given a cause.

The original reading of the verse seems to have been "on the basis of observing an effect," read by UMBEKA and SUCARITAMIŚRA. "On the basis of not observing an effect" might have been introduced later, under the influence of the following discussion (which revolves around the need for *arthâpatti*, instead of simply inference, given that the presence of the cause does not always guarantee the presence of the effect).

48a. One might object that the effect is the reason.

That is, a capacity is not postulated, but inferred on the basis of the effect. Kumārila answers the objection:

48b. That is wrong, because there is no requirement for a relation.

Arthâpatti, unlike inference, works in the absence of the knowledge of an invariable concomitance. This is important, because an invariable concomitance can only be known if the concomitant elements themselves are known. Kumārila uses the word "requirement" here, as well as in v. 81, in a specific sense: the requirement that the cognizing subject should have already cognized the relation between two things in order to have the relevant cognition.

Because it is impossible to know a capacity, which is by nature imperceptible, independently of its concomitance with an effect, the concomitance can't be established inferentially:

---

[15] *kâryadarśanataḥ* Su (corroborated by his commentary); *kâryâdarśanataḥ* U (although his commentary presupposes *kâryadarśanataḥ*), Pa.

48cd–49. And this capacity could be understood after having observed that it is a correlate of something else, but not otherwise. And because at that time it is impossible for perception and so on to observe it, *arthâpatti* should be its epistemic instrument, since there are not the three characteristics of inference.

The relevant background to this discussion is given by SUCARITAMIŚRA. Once we understand a concomitance between two things, we might understand a relationship of cause and effect: a seed, for instance, is the cause of a sprout. Sometimes, however, we do not observe the effect when we observe the cause. Sometimes a seed does not put forth a sprout. Thus we have a set of arguments for the seed being the cause of the sprout, based on the seed being a necessary condition for the sprout, but we have a second set of arguments for the seed *not* being the cause of the sprout, based on the seed *not* being a sufficient condition for the sprout. In order to reconcile these two positions—or rather, as SUCARITAMIŚRA would say, in order to decide in favor of the seed being the cause—we have to postulate a capacity that needs to be present in the seed when the sprout is produced. This capacity is not accessible to perception or inference.

Because the whole point of discussing *arthâpatti* separately from inference is that it is a distinct epistemic instrument, with different conditions of validity, it is important to avoid adducing examples of *arthâpatti* that are in fact reducible to inference. According to all of the commentaries, another commentator had adduced the example of the snake and the mongoose, but Śabara did not, precisely because that example is reducible to inference:

50. As for victory and defeat in cases like the snake and mongoose, on the basis of their being predator and prey, they have not been discussed because they are not different from inference.

The example must have been as follows: you see the bloody corpse of a snake, and you postulate that it must have been killed by a mongoose, on the basis of the fact that the mongoose and the snake are natural enemies, and if one has been defeated, the other must have been victorious. This is not a good example of *arthâpatti* because it can be reduced to an inference for someone who is aware of the invariable concomitance between victory and defeat, on the one hand, and the fact that mongooses are the only natural predators of snakes. This example was discussed by Diṅnāga in his *Compendium of the Epistemic Instruments*.[16]

ARTHÂPATTI ON THE BASIS OF WHAT IS HEARD

Now Kumārila turns to the topic that he announced in verse 4, when *arthâpatti* based on the various epistemic instruments was discussed:

51. "The stout man doesn't eat during the day": when you hear a statement like that, and cognize that he eats at night, that is what is called "*arthâpatti* on the basis of what is heard."

---

[16] See Chapter 2, beginning of the section on Sāṅkhya. See also Freschi (forthcoming).

52. Some people suppose that its content is a *meaning (artha)*. Others, that its content is a *linguistic expression*. But people agree that this kind of *arthâpatti* is not different from linguistic communication.

There has been a debate about whether this type of *arthâpatti* results in the cognition of meaning or of a linguistic expression. Both sides, however, agree that whatever *arthâpatti* produces should be viewed as identical to linguistic communication, which is to say, it has the same epistemic authority as linguistic communication. Why should this type of *arthâpatti* be considered to be the same as linguistic communication?

> **53.** It is through this kind of *arthâpatti* that a procedure in the Veda is generally settled. If it were different from linguistic communication, then it would follow that such procedures were no longer Vedic.

The key question here is one of authority. If I am a Mīmāṃsaka, and I find that the prescriptions pertaining to a particular ritual do not establish what the result of the ritual is, I need to postulate one of two things: either I postulate a meaning, e.g., that the ritual has heaven as its particular result, or I postulate a linguistic expression, namely "one who desires heaven should perform this sacrifice."[17] In either case, the whole point of introducing this additional piece of information is to make sense of a set of existing statements in the Vedas, so we want the additional information to be equal in authority to the Vedas, as if it were an "extension" to the Vedas (or, to use the metaphor that Kumārila uses in verse 54, an "overflow" of the Vedas). If this kind of *arthâpatti* produced cognitions that were qualitatively different from those produced by the Vedic texts, then it is at least unclear why the deliberations of Mīmāṃsakas regarding this additional information should be accepted and followed as equal in authority to Vedic prescriptions themselves, rather than dismissed as speculative.

Among those who accept that this type of *arthâpatti* is identical to linguistic communication, there are two positions:

> **54.** Some people accept that the meaning belongs to the very same statement that has been heard. Other people want it to be the meaning of another sentence, which is in turn an overflow of the meaning of the first.

In the case of the sentence "the stout man does not eat during the day," is the additional meaning of eating at night conveyed by the very same sentence, or is it conveyed by a different sentence, namely, "he eats at night"? UMBEKA says that the "overflow" sentence is one that is brought into consideration by the sentence that is actually heard. In the following, Kumārila will refer to these two sentences as "the day-sentence" (i.e., "the stout man does not eat during the day") and "the night-sentence" (i.e., "he eats at night").

---

[17] The *viśvajit* principle (*Mīmāṃsā-sūtra* 4.3.15) says that the result of any ritual whose result is left unspecified is understood to be heaven.

The meaning belongs to an overflow sentence and not to the sentence that is heard

Kumārila concludes by taking the second position, namely, that one cognizes eating at night as the meaning of the night-sentence, which is itself an "overflow" of the meaning of the day-sentence. He reaches this conclusion by an argument from elimination (*pariśeṣya*), by showing that the first position, namely, that one cognizes eating at night directly from the day-sentence, is impossible.

55. Now we do not accept that this meaning belongs to the statement that is heard. For it would not be appropriate for a sentence to have multiple meanings, or for a sentence to be what conveys meaning at all.

There are two problems with the suggestion that eating at night belongs to the day-sentence as its meaning. As UMBEKA notes, it conflicts with more general features of Kumārila's philosophy. First, we would have to entertain that a single sentence is expressive of more than one meaning. We have here two meanings, namely not eating during the day and eating at night. To ascribe both of them to a single sentence would entail that any sentence might have the possibility of multiple meanings. This violates the Mīmāṃsā principle of postulating entities, including expressive capacities, only when they are absolutely needed, as UMBEKA points out.

Second, we would have to account for why it is that a single sentence is expressive of more than one meaning. And if we say that the sentence itself expresses those meanings directly, we will have an additional problem: as SUCARITAMIŚRA and PĀRTHASĀRATHIMIŚRA point out, in Kumārila's view it is the words rather than the sentence which are the actual expressive units of language.

Thus Kumārila rejects the first alternative because it is incompatible with the theory of meaning that he has argued for elsewhere in the *Verse Explanation* (section on sentence): a particular sentence is not an expressive element, and even if it were, then it would be problematic for it to express multiple meanings simultaneously. If a sentence is not expressive of a meaning, then how do we arrive at the meaning of a sentence?

56ab. For the meaning of a sentence is understood in the form of a complex of word meanings.

This verse summarizes Kumārila's theory of sentential meaning, which later authors would designate as *abhihitānvaya*, "the relation of expressed meanings," in contrast to Prabhākara's theory of *anvitābhidhāna*, "the expression of relational word meaning." According to Kumārila's view, the words in a sentence first denote their proper meanings, and these meanings are then incorporated into a relational complex. In Prabhākara's theory, the word meanings are already related to each other at the moment that they are expressed.

Kumārila will now proceed to show that there is no way of arriving at the meaning of the night-sentence from the day-sentence. First of all, none of the constituent word-meanings of the night-sentence are expressed by the day-sentence:

56cd. And the meanings of the words "night" and so on are not understood from the day-sentence.

Secondly, one cannot arrive at the meaning of the night-sentence by considering it to be a kind of overall sentence-meaning of the day-sentence:

57. Eating at night is not a combination (*saṃsarga*) of the meanings of the words "day" and so on. There is no mutual exclusion (*bheda*), on account of which that sentence should convey that meaning.

"On account of which . . .": on account of which the day-sentence (or rather the meaning of the words therein) produces the meaning of the night-sentence.

Kumārila mentions two theories of sentence-meaning that were proposed by ancient Indian grammarians. The first, associated with Vājapyāyana, holds that the sentence-meaning is a combination of the word-meanings; the other, associated with Vyāḍi, holds that the sentence-meaning results from the mutual exclusion of the words in a given sentence from other possible referents, for which see Kunjunni Raja (1969: 192). In either theory, there is nothing in the day-sentence that would lead us to the meaning of the night-sentence.

According to Sucaritamiśra, Kumārila now elaborates upon the point raised in verse 55, namely that sentences do not have multiple meanings, by explaining how multiple meanings cannot be produced on the level of the word:

58ab. And because they have already operated in regard to one meaning, there is no postulation of a second meaning.

Kumārila does not brook the possibility that the word-meanings in the day-sentence can first denote their proper meanings, which are then assembled into a complex that conveys the meaning of the day-sentence, and then the denotative process can begin all over again to yield the "night" meaning. Once a word denotes its meaning, the process stops, as Śabara has said (at MS 1.1.25). According to Pārthasārathimiśra, even though a linguistic expression might have multiple meanings, if it has been used in a sentence in a given meaning, it cannot mean something else in the same sentence.

One might also add that it is not possible to understand the meaning of the night-sentence as a secondary meaning of the day-sentence, because, according to Kumārila, one only resorts to secondary meaning when the primary meaning of a sentence fails to make sense. Kumārila's conclusion is that the state of affairs of eating at night has to be cognized from the night-sentence, which is not directly heard, but is rather present in the intellect:

58cd. Therefore eating at night is understood by means of another sentence that arises in the intellect.

Arthâpatti *is the only acceptable epistemic instrument for the overflow sentence*

Having established on the basis of elimination that we can only understand the meaning of the night-sentence from the night-sentence itself, Kumārila will now use another argument from elimination to establish that we owe our cognition of the night-sentence to *arthâpatti* and not to any other epistemic instrument.

59. As for the sentence that is understood, even if this was based on a statement, one should say which among the six is the epistemic instrument for it.

Which of the six epistemic instruments (perception, inference, comparison, language, *arthâpatti*, and absence) has the night-sentence as its content? In the next verse, he begins with perception:

60ab. But perception is not acceptable in the case of a sentence that has not been pronounced.

Perception, namely auditory perception, cannot be the means by which we know the sentence "he eats at night," since that sentence is not actually pronounced. Since inference is a more plausible candidate, the argument against inference is more extensive. Kumārila begins by denying that the knowledge of an invariable concomitance between two things, which is required for an inference, is necessary in this case:

60cd. Nor is inference.[18] For this is not observed to be concomitant with that anywhere.

Inference requires knowledge of an invariable concomitance between the reason and the property to be inferred, which would mean that the day-sentence has to be observed to be invariably concomitant with the night-sentence. For it is not the case that we first observe a relationship between these two sentences, and then at a later point we use one to infer the other; rather, what happens is that we cognize the night-sentence more or less directly out of the day-sentence. This discussion recalls the impossibility of reducing *arthâpatti* on the basis of what is seen to inference, which also turns on the lack of an invariable concomitance.

One might claim that the day-sentence could allow one to infer the night-sentence even in the absence of a previously-established concomitance between the two.

61. And if one accepts that something can be an inferential reason even if the relation between two things has not been apprehended, then the result would be that any sentence whatsoever could be cognized[19] as soon as that sentence is pronounced.

The problem is that unless there is a way of accounting for the understanding of a particular sentence given another particular sentence, then we will have two bad options: first, as UMBEKA and SUCARITAMIŚRA note, we might only understand that one sentence (say the day-sentence) is connected with another sentence in general, but we would be unable to know exactly what that sentence is; second, if we were able to cognize a particular sentence, it could be any particular sentence whatsoever.

One might claim that in this case one could first grasp a concomitance between the two sentences and then infer one from the other, just as an opponent attempted

---

[18] *na tv* U (corroborated by his commentary); *na hy* Su (corroborated by his commentary), Pā.

[19] *mitir* U, Su, Pā (Chaukhambhā); *matir* Pā (Ratna ed.), a *lectio facilior* and probably an error for *mitir* (given that the Ratna edition otherwise follows the Chaukhambhā edition closely).

to do in the previous example (verse 34). But Kumārila's point is precisely that we do not need to do this:

> **62.** It is not the case that we encounter all those sentences that we know on the basis of *arthâpatti* as already standing in a relation to all of their correlates, such that, when those correlates are present, an inference is possible.

Although it is possible to know the relation between two sentences beforehand, this is not the case with all of the sentences that are known through *arthâpatti*. Given any sentence that "does not make sense otherwise," we can easily arrive at the corresponding "overflow" sentence, even without knowing the relation between them beforehand.

UMBEKA provides some exegetical background for this point. It is very often the case that, in the course of attempting to determine the hierarchical relations between different elements in a ritual, a particular sentence acts as an "indicator" (*linga*) of that relation. Hence we might suspect that the day-sentence might similarly function as an indicator—or, to use the language of inference, an inferential reason (*linga*)—of the night-sentence. The difference, however, is that in the exegetical case, all of the sentences involved are known through direct perception, and all we need to determine inferentially is how they relate to each other, whereas in this case, we do not have anything besides *arthâpatti* to make us aware of the night-sentence.

Kumārila adduces another argument against the role of inference in cognizing the night-sentence: inference draws a connection between two generic properties (e.g., the property of possessing smoke, and the property of possessing fire), whereas what one cognizes in this case is qualitatively different: it is the existence of a particular sentence. Neither the "existence" of anything nor a "particular" are admitted to be objects of inference. For more on this qualitative difference, see Yoshimizu in this volume, p. 225.

> **63.** And neither existence, nor a particular, is inferred through inference. Yet here what one understands is the very existence of a particular sentence.

UMBEKA: "Neither existence nor a particular can be inferred. Existence cannot be inferred because there can be no valid inferential reason for it: given that we want to infer the existence of something, if the reason were a property of an existing thing, it would be unestablished (because it is existence we are trying to prove, and if you start with something already existing, you are begging the question); if it were a property of a non-existing thing it would be contradictory, and if it were a property of both it would be inconclusive (because it could be used to infer both conclusions)."

An inference also has a standard form, wherein one infers that a property-possessor is qualified by a property, where these two are epistemically independent from each other (i.e., one knows the property-possessor independently of the property that is inferred). See verse 20. Once again, this cannot be said of the current case, since we do not infer the night-sentence as the property of an independent property-possessor:

64. In this case, we do not cognize what is inferred, namely, a previously-established and independent thing that is qualified by something independent, that is to say, a property-possessor qualified by a property.[20]

Kumārila anticipates another attempt to salvage the inferential framework: instead of inferring the night-sentence directly, we might infer, rather, that the day-sentence is qualified by the night-sentence. In this case, the day-sentence will be the locus of the inference.

65. One could object that what is inferred is the fact that the sentence we have heard is qualified by the night-sentence. But then, we would have to agree that locus would be qualified by something that is unestablished.

We can only inferentially attribute to a locus properties that are independently established, that is to say, known in some form already before the inference in question, just like fire is known to us before we infer its presence on the hill. If we do not know the night-sentence before hearing the day-sentence, how can we use the night-sentence as a property of the day-sentence in an inference?

Besides the fact that the inferred property is not previously established, there is another problem with the opponent's suggestion: if the day-sentence is the locus, and the night-sentence is the property to be inferred, then there is nothing left to be the inferential reason. In that case, we might end up in a situation where the same thing serves as the inferential reason and the locus. And this is a major fault in an inference, called "introduction of the conclusion into the premises" (*pratijñârthâika deśa*; see also verse 29).

66. Moreover, since there is no other reason, if this were to be the reason, then what would follow is the fault of the introduction of the conclusion into the premises, just as in the case of language.

Someone who wanted to reduce linguistic communication to inference might suggest that the word-meaning is inferred out of the word, but in that case, the word would act as both the inferential reason and the locus, which is unacceptable. In the same way, the day-sentence cannot function as both the inferential reason and the locus for inferring the night-sentence.[21]

In the following verse, according to Umbeka's and Sucaritamiśra's interpretation, Kumārila has another configuration in mind, according to which the day-sentence is the inferential reason, and the night-sentence is the locus. This will not work, either:

67. In precisely the same way we must reject[22] the relation of property and property-possessor between the two sentences.[23] For if the one is not grasped, the other cannot be a property of it, and if it is grasped, there is nothing to be inferred.

---

[20] *dharmī dharmaviśiṣṭo* Su (corroborated by his commentary, and suggested by Pārthasārathimiśra's commentary); *dharmādharmaviśiṣṭo* U, Pā, which could be translated as "qualified by a property or the absence of that property."

[21] See the section on language, verses *62cd–63ab*, and the section on the sentence, verse 232.

[22] *nivāryātra* U; *nirākāryā* Su (supported by his commentary), Pā (cf. Umbeka's *nirākartavya*).

[23] *vacasor* Su (supported by Sucaritamiśra's and Umbeka's commentary); *vacaso* U, Pā.

In the same way as we must reject the same relation between words and their meanings: if a meaning is not grasped, then a word cannot be a property of it; if it is, then the inference is pointless. In this case, too, if the night-sentence is not understood, the day-sentence cannot be understood as its property, and if it is, then there is nothing left to infer.

Kumārila has so far been addressing a formal problem: if we use the day-sentence as a reason to infer either the night-sentence or the day-sentence qualified by the night-sentence, the inference will fail, because the reason is not a property of the locus in the first case, and because the locus is qualified by something unestablished in the second case. He now steps back from the formal problems, and addresses the real impossibility of any relation between the day- and night-sentence, such that the one might be a property of the other.

> **68ab.** One sentence cannot be a property of another in the absence of a relation of action and factor of action between the two of them.

The only way for two sentences to be "related" to each other is through the relation of an action and its factors, and Kumārila denies that such a relation subsists between the two sentences at the time that the night-sentence is cognized. Umbeka and Sucaritamiśra claim that the same applies to the case of words and their meanings, which also do not stand in this kind of relationship.

There is, however, a difference between the case of words and their meanings, on the one hand, and the case of the two sentences, on the other. In the case of words, there is a relation of expressor and expressed insofar as the words denote a meaning. But this is ostensibly not the case in the case of the day-sentence and night-sentence.

> **68cd.** Since the day-sentence cannot express the night-sentence, the latter cannot be a property of the former in the sense of being its content.

Pārthasārathimiśra suggests that at this point an objector might contend that the night-sentence is indeed the content of the day-sentence and that the latter does indeed express the former. After all, we cognize the latter upon hearing the former.

> **69ab.** If you say that the day-sentence does express the night-sentence, because we do understand the latter out of the former, then it would follow that the same sentence has multiple expressive capacities.

One might argue that, given that we need to postulate something—either the night-sentence itself, or a capacity, on the part of the day-sentence, to express the night-sentence—there is no reason to prefer the former to the latter. But we already have to postulate the day-sentence's capacity to express its proper meaning. Nobody disputes that the day-sentence expresses its meaning, and is able to do so on account of an inherent capacity. Thus, if we postulate an additional expressive capacity for the day-sentence, we will end up in the situation where a single linguistic expression has more than one expressive capacity. And this is a problem for Mīmāṃsakas (as noted in the commentary to verse 55) because it would destroy the one-to-one correspondence between linguistic expressions and their meanings.

One might propose, as a last resort, that the day-sentence is a property of the night-sentence in the following way: the day-sentence is the inferential reason for

the night-sentence, and it is therefore a property of the night-sentence thanks to its role in the inferential cognition of the latter.

69cd. If[24] you say that one could infer that the night-sentence is a property of the day-sentence, then the fact of being such a property would be useless.

PĀRTHASĀRATHIMIŚRA: "If we only know that it is a property of the locus *after* we perform the inference, then the fact of being a property of the locus can't be a component of the inference." For the word "component," which has the sense of a precondition, see verse 10.

At this point, Kumārila has proven that the day-sentence cannot by itself give rise to an inferential cognition of the night-sentence. But the opponent now tries a different strategy: what if it is the individual word-meanings of the day-sentence that give rise to an inferential cognition of the night-sentence? Kumārila will argue elsewhere that we do not need to grasp the relationship between the individual word-meanings and a sentence-meaning in order to cognize the latter. So why shouldn't the same be the case here, namely, that from the individual word-meanings of the day-sentence we directly cognize the night-sentence?

70ab. That sentence is not understood from the word meanings, either, because there is no relation. For universals communicate a particular because they are not possible without it.

We understand that the word-meanings, which are universals, lead us to the cognition of a sentence meaning, which is a particular. This is because universals do not exist without their corresponding particulars. Specifically, universals, in the form of word-meanings, could not generate a linguistic cognition unless they conveyed a particular, in the form of the sentence-meaning.

The word-meanings do in fact convey something beyond themselves, a particular sentence-meaning, but they only convey the particular sentence-meaning in which they are present as universals. They don't convey another particular sentence-meaning. But this is not the case for the cognition of the night-sentence.

71ab. By contrast, it is not the case that the word-meanings of the day-sentence cannot produce a linguistic cognition without the other sentence.

The words in the day-sentence can convey their meanings even without conveying the particular sentence-meaning of the night-sentence. Kumārila now denies that there is any other way to imagine a relation of the word-meanings of the day-sentence with the night-sentence:

71cd. Nor is there any other alternative for a relation with the night-sentence.

According to UMBEKA, the only conceivable alternatives are not making sense otherwise (which has been disproven above, v. 71) and inference (which is not even raised as a possibility because of the lack of a relation). According to PĀRTHASĀRATHIMIŚRA, this verse signals that Kumārila has concluded his argument

---

[24] *ced* U (corroborated by his *pratīka*); *tu* Su, Pā.

that the cognition of the night-sentence cannot be the result of either perception or inference.

Kumārila's opponent now raises another possibility. If neither the day-sentence nor its word-meanings can cause us to cognize the night-sentence, then we might postulate another sentence which does. According to PĀRTHASĀRATHIMIŚRA, this argument addresses the possibility that the night-sentence is not cognized on the basis of perception or inference, but on the basis of language, namely, a sentence which directly conveys it.

> 72–73ab. Well then, another sentence might be postulated to express that sentence. But if that were so, we would still be far from avoiding the aforementioned undesirable consequence, since there would still be no relation. Therefore, it is better to know it just from the first sentence, since any other sentence will lack a relation to it.

Any additional sentence that the opponent might postulate to express the night-sentence would have precisely the same problem, namely, the lack of a relation between it and the day-sentence. Hence it seems better to postulate the night-sentence in the first instance, without any intermediate steps. SUCARITAMIŚRA adds to this the point that, whatever sentence we postulate, it will fail to express the night-sentence because it will inevitably lack a relation with it, and hence we will keep on postulating sentences endlessly.

The next half-verse discusses the inapplicability of co-presence and co-absence (*anvaya-vyatireka*) for determining a relation between the day-sentence and the night-sentence.

> 73cd. And co-presence and co-absence cannot be applied here, as they can be in the case of words.

As noted by PĀRTHASĀRATHIMIŚRA, this argument, too, concerns the possibility of cognizing the night-sentence using language as an epistemic instrument. The decisive argument in favor of language as a distinct epistemic instrument is that words have a fixed relation with meanings that is not established on the basis of inference, but is rather observed from co-presence and co-absence: when we hear the sentence "bring a cow" and see someone bringing a cow, and then when we hear the sentence "bring a horse" and see someone bringing a horse, we can form the idea that the linguistic expression "cow" is linked to the meaning of a cow, and that the linguistic expression "horse" is linked to the meaning of a horse. In contrast, no co-presence or co-absence obtains between the day-sentence and the night-sentence, or between their respective meanings.

SUCARITAMIŚRA makes this point clear: "For it is not the case that there is a co-presence and co-absence, such that the day-sentence is only present when the night-sentence is present, and absent when it is not, because of the lack of a connection such as having the same place or the same time." One might object: it is in fact possible to have the cognition of the night-sentence at the same time as the cognition of the day-sentence. In fact, that is the very phenomenon that *arthāpatti* is introduced to explain. But SUCARITAMIŚRA argues against this as well: "Nor is there a co-presence of their cognitions, since there is a cognition of the day-sentence on the part of one

who has learned the language even if there is no corresponding cognition of the night-sentence, and because co-presence and co-absence, which arise subsequent to the time of the cognitions, are of no use in cognizing the night-sentence in the first place. Hence it is like the case of words and word-meanings." The now-familiar point is that the relation between the sentences can only be established *a posteriori*.

Now Kumārila attacks the next epistemic instrument in the list, comparison, as the source of the cognition of the night-sentence:

> 74. There is no similarity at all between the sentence that we have heard and the one we haven't. Therefore it is not comparison. Nor is the meaning of the day-sentence similar to the night-sentence.

Since there is no similarity between the day-sentence and the night-sentence, or between the former's meaning and the latter: the hallmark of comparison as an epistemic instrument is absent.

> 75ab. Both the possibility of comparison and an inferential reason[25] have been refuted in reference to the night-sentence. Precisely the same is true in reference to its meaning.

We have already established that neither the day-sentence nor its meaning can cause the cognition of the night-sentence through comparison or and inference; now we are also rejecting the possibility that the two of these can cause the cognition of the *meaning* of eating at night. By this point, Kumārila has reached the conclusion of the argument from elimination:

> 75cd. Therefore it is impossible in the case of the preceding epistemic instruments.

What is impossible is the cognition of the night-sentence. The epistemic instruments that precede *arthâpatti* in the list accepted by Mīmāṃsakas are perception (60*ab*), inference (60*cd*–71), language (72–3), and comparison (74–5).

> 76. Therefore this is what we accept: the meaning that the sentence we have heard conveys could not come into being without it.

That is, without the sentence that is known through *arthâpatti*. In this example, the meaning of the day-sentence does not make sense as such unless we postulate the night-sentence. Hence *arthâpatti* is the only epistemic instrument available for our cognition of the night-sentence.

SUCARITAMIŚRA notes that there must be a clash (*pratighāta*) between two sets of cognitions, namely stoutness (which SUCARITAMIŚRA claims is perceptually experienced, although that seems not to be a requirement in this example) and the lack of eating during the day. Once again, PĀRTHASĀRATHIMIŚRA summarizes the point nicely: "The night-sentence is postulated as a supplement (*śeṣa*), in order for the stoutness and the lack of eating, which are mutually contradictory (*pratiṣedha*) and would not otherwise make sense in the same sentence, to make sense."

---

[25] *liṅgatve* Pā (Ratna, and corroborated by Umbeka's commentary); *liṅgena* Su, U, Pā (Chaukhambhā).

Arthâpatti *on the basis of what is heard has a linguistic expression as its content*

The following verse introduces two objections. The first returns to the question of whether *arthâpatti* in this case results in the cognition of a meaning, or in the cognition of a linguistic expression from which, in turn, a meaning is cognized. Kumārila had maintained the latter view. But the explanation that Kumārila put forward in verse 76, that the meaning of the sentence that we actually hear "could not come into being without it," raises once again the question of what, precisely, is lacking in order for this meaning to come into being. Why is it the case that we need a linguistic expression rather than its meaning?

> 77ab. When something cannot exist without something else—namely, a meaning—why not postulate that meaning directly?

In the example in question, why should we postulate the sentence "he eats at night" rather than the meaning expressed by that sentence, when the latter would solve the difficulty equally well?

As UMBEKA imagines it, the opponent claims that this objection does no harm to the principles of Mīmāṃsā in general. First, if the meaning that we understand is something that we wouldn't have understood without the Vedas, then the cognition of this meaning has the same status as the cognition of Vedic sentences, even without postulating an additional sentence. Second, Mīmāṃsakas maintain that, when there are several kinds of evidence for understanding a hierarchical relationship between two things (these forms of evidence being called *viniyoga-pramāṇa*), we choose the type of evidence that is closest to the textual statement. Since a meaning that we postulate on the basis of a textual statement is closer to that statement than a sentence which would express that meaning, we should postulate the meaning directly. The objector, in UMBEKA'S understanding, could have also used Kumārila's own words against him: for he had stated in verse 51 that an example of *arthâpatti* on the basis of what is heard is "the cognition of eating at night," and not of the sentence "he eats at night."

This objection seems similar to the arguments of Prabhākara, who claimed that the content of *arthâpatti* should always be a meaning and not a linguistic expression. Kumārila was most probably older than Prabhākara, and thus not aware of the arguments about *arthâpatti* that Prabhākara presented in the *Long Explanation*, but Umbeka does seem to refer to them.

> 77cd. Why can't we understand it as a meaning communicated by language, just like sentence meaning?

Whereas UMBEKA understands the phrase "just like sentence-meaning" to mean that the postulated meaning is said to belong to the sentence (e.g., "the stout man does not eat during the day") in the same way as the non-postulated meaning of the same sentence, PÂRTHASÂRATHIMIŚRA and SUCARITAMIŚRA interpret it in the light of an overall theory of sentence-meaning called "the relation of expressed word-meanings" (see verse 56). The fact that UMBEKA does not do so might hint that this theory had not yet been systematized as such.

The sense of this objection, in SUCARITAMIŚRA and PĀRTHASĀRATHIMIŚRA's interpretation, is the following. A general condition on a cognition's being "based on language" is that the cognition arises immediately upon the cognition of a linguistic expression. Yet Kumārila himself had admitted that there is one important case where we consider a cognition to be "based on language" even if it does not arise from the cognition of a linguistic expression: namely, the case of sentence-meaning. In Kumārila's theory of language, at least as SUCARITAMIŚRA and PĀRTHASĀRATHIMIŚRA understand it, what we directly understand from linguistic expressions are word-meanings, which are subsequently assembled into sentence-meanings by secondary cognitive processes. Our cognition of the meaning of the night-sentence might be "based on language" in the same way, since it arises ultimately, if indirectly, from our cognition of the meanings of the words in the day-sentence.

From Kumārila's response to this objection, in verse 78cd it seems that the phrase "a meaning communicated by language" could also mean "the purpose of linguistic communication." Kumārila responds to these two objections in a single verse. His response has occasioned an enormous amount of discussion by the three commentators. To begin with, he responds to the first objection (v. 77ab):

78ab. What we understand first, through conceptual cognitions (savikalpaka-vijñāna), is a linguistic expression.

UMBEKA finds this response to be wrong, because it seems very close to the position of Bhartṛhari, who had argued that "every cognition appears as if permeated by language." This is at odds with Kumārila's own position, according to which the objects of language as an epistemic instrument and the objects of perceptual cognition are separate.[26] We do recall linguistic expressions whenever we experience conceptual cognitions, but the expressions are, precisely, "recalled"; they do not figure as crucial ingredients in the cognitions themselves.

UMBEKA proposes an alternative response that is more closely aligned with the principles of Kumārila's system. What we understand from a linguistic expression is a sentence-meaning in the form of the actualization, or bringing-into-being (bhāvanā), of a particular result.[27] UMBEKA notes that the actualization is only properly conveyed by (1) a linguistic expression conveying the impelling of the agent (i.e., the optative affix); in conjunction with (2) a linguistic expression conveying the agent himself (who is impelled), and (3) a linguistic expression conveying the content of the action. He says that one actually needs the *linguistic expressions themselves* to come to a complete understanding of the actualization. Therefore when we hear a statement that "doesn't make sense," like "the stout man does not eat during the day," we actually only hear a part of a statement that would,

---

[26] See the perception section of the *Explanation in Verse*, v. 230, which Umbeka refers to. The verse of Bhartṛhari quoted here (*anuviddham iva jñānam sarvaṃ śabdena bhāsate*) is from *About Sentences and Words* (*Vākyapadīya*) 1.115.

[27] See Kumārila's *Explanation of the System*, p. 445: "it is the actualization that is the sentence-meaning" (*bhāvanāiva ca vākyārthaḥ*). On actualization, which is a technical term of Mīmāṃsā, see Frauwallner (1938).

if it were to be given to us in full, be an instance of language as an epistemic instrument. It is in order to complete the actualization of this statement that we postulate the missing portion of it. Hence, what we are postulating is not an entirely separate statement, but just enough to complete the sentence we are given. This accounts for the qualitative difference between *arthâpatti* on the basis of what is heard, on the one hand, and *arthâpatti* on the basis of what is observed, on the other: there is nothing incomplete in the starting cognitions of the latter.

SUCARITAMIŚRA and PĀRTHASĀRATHIMIŚRA also raise a similar problem: if Kumārila really means that language is the ultimate object of all conceptual cognitions *per se*, then he will have a difficult time explaining why perception and inference, although conceptual in his own view, should not also have linguistic expressions as their objects. Indeed, Kumārila had explicitly argued that the objects of perception, inference, and language are different. PĀRTHASĀRATHIMIŚRA notes that the object of *arthâpatti* is whatever causes the starting cognition to "make sense." In the case of *arthâpatti* on the basis of what is observed, this is always a thing, or a state of affairs (e.g., Caitra's being outside). In the case of *arthâpatti* on the basis of what is heard, this is always a linguistic expression.

Why should it be the case that the "not making sense" of the starting cognition is repaired by a linguistic expression, rather than by a meaning? SUCARITAMIŚRA, and PĀRTHASĀRATHIMIŚRA following him, argue that this is because the specific form of "not making sense" that happens when we hear a sentence such as "the stout man does not eat during the day" is a kind of "expectancy" (*ākāṅkṣā*) that can only be satisfied by a further linguistic expression.[28] SUCARITAMIŚRA in particular is concerned to justify his explanation by an appeal to the widespread practice, in Mīmāṃsā, of completing a Vedic sentence with further linguistic expressions. He mentions several examples: the modification (*ūha*), which occurs in an ectypal ritual, of a *mantra* that is prescribed in its archetype; the completion (*adhyāhāra*) of a *mantra* by means of the syntactically-required word; the extension (*anuṣaṅga*) of a word to subsequent sentences in a ritual context. In all of these cases, the expectancy is only satisfied when a linguistic expression is supplied. SUCARITAMIŚRA cites a passage from the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra*s to this effect (2.1.40). In perception and inference, there is no such expectancy; what is grasped in those cognitions is a state of affairs. If one attaches a linguistic expression to that state of affairs, SUCARITAMIŚRA says, then that is fine, but it is "just there" (*sanmātra*): it doesn't make an essential contribution to the cognition. In the case of *arthâpatti* on the basis of what is heard, by contrast, it is "satisfied" by a linguistic expression and hence the resulting cognition does not need to go "as far as the meaning" of that expression, to use PĀRTHASĀRATHIMIŚRA's terminology.

SUCARITAMIŚRA complements his argument that perception and inference have expectancy for linguistic expressions by means of pointing out that animals, which have no language, nevertheless have perception and inference, but not

---

[28] In the Mīmāṃsā theory of sentence-meaning, expectancy is one of the three criteria for a sound sentence, together with compatibility (*yogyatā*) and proximity (*sannidhi*). It is described as the relation which obtains between the action expressed by the verb and the factors of action (such as agent, patient, and so on) which are expressed by nouns.

arthâpatti on the basis of what is heard. Indeed, even human beings who have not properly learned a language cannot avail themselves of this kind of *arthâpatti*. He then weakens his claim that the expectancy is satisfied by a linguistic expression alone by claiming that what makes the starting cognition make sense again is a "meaningful linguistic expression, not a meaning alone or a linguistic expression alone." PĀRTHASĀRATHIMIŚRA does not follow him in either of these arguments.

Kumārila addresses the second objection (77*cd*) as follows:

> 78cd. When a sentence already has a purpose, another one is not based on linguistic cognition for us.

The use of the word "purpose" in this response suggests that the term "meaning" (*artha*) in the objection has the additional sense of the "purpose," as noted above (verse 77*cd*).

The central issue, which SUCARITAMIŚRA and PĀRTHASĀRATHIMIŚRA identify, is when a cognition that originates from a statement "not making sense" should be considered to be the result of language as an epistemic instrument, and when it should be considered to result from *arthâpatti*. This question is indexed to the question of when a linguistic expression can be said to "fulfill its purpose." This is especially important because, as discussed in the previous half-verse (78*ab*), SUCARITAMIŚRA and PĀRTHASĀRATHIMIŚRA claim that what generates *arthâpatti* on the basis of what is heard is an unfulfilled "expectancy" in the original expression. Such an interpretation seems difficult to reconcile with Kumārila's claim here that each sentence, including the day-sentence, is complete in itself.

According to these two commentators, the sentence has not "fulfilled its purpose" until it communicates a sentence meaning that makes sense. Up until this point, any cognitions that we have about the sentence are considered to be the result of language as an epistemic instrument. Once a sentence-meaning has been ascertained, however, any additional cognitions we have from it are not considered to be based on language as an epistemic instrument, but rather on *arthâpatti*.

It is unclear whether the examples that SUCARITAMIŚRA had mentioned in his commentary to verse 78*ab*, such as completion and extension, fall in the first phase (and thus are known through language as an epistemic instrument) or the second phase (and are thus known through *arthâpatti*). Presumably SUCARITAMIŚRA wants them to be examples of *arthâpatti*, but in most of the examples, the original sentence is actually incomplete, unlike the day-sentence.

At this point, SUCARITAMIŚRA pictures an objector who thinks that deciding whether the additional meaning belongs to the statement we have actually heard, or whether it belongs to the statement that we have postulated, is splitting hairs. SUCARITAMIŚRA then explains what difference it makes to ritual practice: if an error takes place during a performance based on an actually heard Vedic text, one will have to perform the corresponding expiation rite. For an error occurring during a performance based on a precept obtained through *arthâpatti*, by contrast, one will need to perform a generic expiation rite.

ARTHÂPATTI DOES NOT REQUIRE A RELATION
BETWEEN THE STARTING AND FINAL COGNITIONS

An opponent now tries to attack *arthâpatti* on the grounds of a lack of a relation between the starting cognition and the final cognition. The objection pertains to both varieties of *arthâpatti*, namely on the basis of what is observed and on the basis of what is heard. According to UMBEKA, the opponent expects the cognition to be grounded on a relation of inseparability (see verse 30), which comes in two varieties, according to the theory of inference defended by Dharmakīrti: either x is identical with y, or x is caused by y.

> 79. One might object that when there is no relation, or when it has not been ascertained, it would turn out that this sentence, from which the cognition arises, would lack an epistemic instrument.

Kumārila responds:

> 80. Well, is there a royal decree that only a relation can be an epistemic instrument? How would perception be an epistemic instrument in the absence of a relation?

The counter-example to the opponent's claim is perception, which according to Kumārila does not require any kind of relation.

> 81. If one objects that in that case there is a relation between the sense faculties and the thing perceived, that is wrong, because there is no such requirement. For nobody ascertains that relation at the moment of perception.

For the sense of "requirement" here, see 48*b*. Kumārila shuttles between two senses of the word "relation" in this and the following verses. On the one hand, it has an ontological sense: two things are related if they stand in some relation to each other in the real world. On the other hand, it has an epistemic sense: two things are related if they are always found together in the mind of a cognizing subject. The latter sense can also be reflexive, that is, the subject can be aware that the two things are so related. Hence the latter sense can refer not simply to the relation itself, but also to the cognition of the relation. Kumārila trades on this ambiguity, although SUCARITAMIŚRA clearly distinguishes the two senses: in his commentary on verse 79, he notes that it may be the case that despite a real, ontological relation between the object of cognition and some other thing, this relationship is nevertheless not known to the cognizing subject.

In the case of perception, the sense faculties are related (in the ontological sense) to the external objects that they perceive. But this relation can only ever be known to the cognizing subject (in the epistemic sense) after the fact. As UMBEKA says, "with reference to the visual form, which can only be cognized through the faculty of sight, there can be no grasping of a relation with the faculty of sight itself, which can only be cognized through the visual form."[29]

---

[29] Umbeka goes further and argues that there is no relation in the ontological sense, either. For such a relation, he claims, there would have to be either suitability (presumably, of the sense faculties to intercept and produce perceptual cognitions of certain types of external objects), or contact. He interprets the subsequent two verses as eliminating each of these possible relations, respectively.

82. By contrast, that relation by means of which you might ascertain something after the perceptual experience could not be a component of the epistemic instrument. It is as if it did not exist.

This is the now-familiar argument: that which is only ascertained *a posteriori* cannot be said to lead to the production of a given cognition. We follow SUCARITAMIŚRA's understanding of this verse. PĀRTHASĀRATHIMIŚRA, however, seems to take the verse as referring to a *person* who ascertains the connection, since he comments that a person who has no means of ascertaining the connection would not have this component of the perceptual cognition (and therefore wouldn't have the perceptual cognition at all), which is false.

83. There are those who claim that the faculties of sight and hearing produce valid cognitions without coming into direct contact with their objects. It should be the same in this case.

Kumārila himself accepts a theory of perception in which there is contact between the sense faculties and the external objects they perceive. However, not everyone accepts this theory. Some, whom PĀRTHASĀRATHIMIŚRA identifies as Buddhists, argued that the sense faculties operate without direct contact with their objects. Kumārila says that, for these philosophers, there is not even an ontological relation between the sense faculties and their objects, much less the conscious apprehension of a relation. Yet they still admit the validity of perceptual cognitions. So, too, we should admit the validity of *arthâpatti* even in the absence of a relation.

At the end of this sequence of verses (vv. 79–83), UMBEKA adduces another example of valid cognition in the absence of a predetermined relation, namely, the cognition of the meanings of Vedic sentences. The passage is terse and its meaning not completely clear.

Kumārila summarizes by stating his view that, whatever the cause of a cognition's *arising* may be, the cause of its *validity* is always the absence of a sublating cognition. This is the theory of "intrinsic validity," about which see Taber (1992).

84. Therefore, whether a relation exists or not, for us, any cognition at all that might arise,[30] so long as it is not invalidated, should be valid.

SUCARITAMIŚRA says that a cognition can be invalid on account of three circumstances: not having been produced, being sublated by a subsequent cognition, and being put into doubt. He understands Kumārila's verse in reference to all three: "that might arise" refutes invalidity as a result of a cognition not having been produced, and "so long as it is not invalidated" refutes invalidity as a result of either sublation or doubt.

Now the discussion returns to *arthâpatti* in particular. Kumārila claims that nobody entertains serious doubts regarding the validity of the cognitions it produces, despite their doubts about whether *arthâpatti* or some other epistemic instrument is responsible for producing those cognitions.

---

[30] *jâyeta* all witnesses, although Su's commentary suggests *jâyate*.

85. And there is nobody who would disagree with the validity of *arthâpatti*. The debate is about its difference from inference, or lack thereof, and we have settled this point.

An objector may interrupt here, disturbed by Kumārila's seemingly flippant disregard for a relation between the starting and final cognitions in the case of *arthâpatti*. If we don't need a relation for *arthâpatti*, then why would we ever need it? Couldn't we infer smoke from fire, even in the absence of a relation, in either the ontological or epistemic senses? As UMBEKA says, "why should we need a relation of inseparability, or the knowledge of such a relation?"

86. By contrast, in those cases where the cognition itself does not arise in the absence of a relation,[31] what is to be done? Even that kind of relation would not be a reason for the cognition's validity.

SUCARITAMIŚRA: "The knowledge of the relation is a component in the production of the cognition. It is not a component of the cognition's validity, which is assured only by the absence of sublating cognitions." Even in the case of inference, its validity is not due to the knowledge of the relation, but is rather intrinsic to the cognition itself.

APPLICATIONS OF *ARTHÂPATTI*

UMBEKA now notes that it was important for Kumārila to state the difference between *arthâpatti* and inference because of the use of *arthâpatti* in the interpretation of the Vedas, which he will now describe:

87. Here, the Vedic statement that is postulated on the basis of traditional texts, and the applicatory statement that is postulated on the basis of indication and the other forms of evidence, and the completion of a Vedic sentence that is postulated on the basis of the result and so on—in none of these is there any hint of a relation.

"Here": in this system, i.e., Mīmāṃsā. The first example is the postulation of a Vedic statement (*śruti*) on the basis of traditional texts (*smṛti*) such as Manu's *Laws*. When the possibility that those texts were composed by human beings has been ruled out, the only possible remaining option is that they were based on Vedic texts that are now lost.

The second example is a Vedic statement that is postulated in the process of "application," which situates all of the elements of a ritual together into a hierarchical unity (see UMBEKA'S comments on verse 62 and 77*ab*). In this process, when it is not explicitly mentioned which element is subordinate to which, Mīmāṃsakas avail themselves of five additional forms of evidence to make the decision. And on the basis of this evidence, they can postulate an additional sentence that makes the relation clear. SUCARITAMIŚRA gives examples for the postulation of sentences on the basis of each of these five forms of evidence. For example, nowhere in the context of the Full- and New-Moon Sacrifices is it explicitly prescribed that the *mantra* "I cut the *barhis*, the seat of the gods" (*barhir deva-sadanaṃ dāmi*) is to be employed

---

[31] *ṛte* Su, U; *kṛte* Pā.

in the cutting of the *barhis*-grass, although both the *mantra* and the cutting of the grass are so prescribed. But on the basis of a "indication" (*liṅga*) in the *mantra*, we postulate the "applicatory statement" that "one should perform the cutting with that *mantra*." The third example is the postulation of a result in relation to Vedic prescriptions in which the result is not explicitly mentioned. The result is one of required elements of a prescription. Whenever it is not mentioned it has to be supplied, and hence it is brought in from other contexts or postulated. Most commonly the result with which Vedic prescriptions are construed is "heaven." Mīmāṃsakas understand "heaven" very broadly, in the sense of a felicity which every human being desires, as argued in a section of Śabara's commentary on the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra*s (6.1.1).

> 88. All of this and more would be invalid, if *arthâpatti* were not different from inference. But if *arthâpatti*, as we have defined it, were to be called inference, then we would be satisfied.

Kumārila thus makes it clear that much of the interpretive enterprise of Mīmāṃsā depends on *arthâpatti*, in the sense that Mīmāṃsakas must postulate texts that are equal in authority to the text of the Veda.

UMBEKA understands the last half of the verse to mean that *arthâpatti* can be called inference in an etymological sense, that is, an "after-cognition" (*anu-māna*), since like inference it occurs subsequent upon another cognition. In the case of *arthâpatti*, it occurs after a cognition of something not making sense; in the case of inference, it occurs after the cognition of an invariable concomitance. As long as the essential differences between inference and *arthâpatti* are maintained, Kumārila has no issue with using the vocabulary of inference to talk about *arthâpatti*. He made a similar concession at the end of the section on language as an epistemic instrument (verse 111).

REFERENCES

Primary sources

Commentary [*Bhāṣya*] (Śabara)
  See *Mīmāṃsā Sūtra*.
Compendium of the Epistemic Instruments [*Pramāṇasamuccaya*] (Diṅnāga)
  Steinkellner, E., H. Krasser, and H. Lasic, eds. (2005), *Jinendrabuddhi's Viśālāmalavatī Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā Chapter 2*, Beijing and Vienna: China Tibetology Publishing House and Austrian Academy of Sciences.
Explanation in Verse [*Ślokavārttika*] (Kumārila)
  With the commentary of Umbeka:
    Ramanatha Sastri, S. K., ed., revised by K. Kunjunni Raja and R. Thangaswamy (1971), *Slokavartikavyakhya Tatparyatika of Umveka Bhatta*. Madras: University of Madras.
  With the commentary of Sucaritamiśra:
    Rāmasvāmiśāstrī, Vi. E., ed. (1943), *Kumārilabhaṭṭapraṇītaṃ Mīmāṃsāślokavārtikam Sucaritamiśrapraṇītayā Kāśikākhyayā Vyākhyayā Sametam*, Vol. 3, Anantaśayana [Thiruvananthapuram]: Rājakīyamudraṇayantrālaya.

With the commentary of Pārthasārathimiśra:

> Tailanga, Râmaśâstri, ed. (1898–9), *The Mîmânsâ-Śloka-Vârtika of Kumârila Bhatta, With the Commentary called Nyâyaratnâkara by Pârtha Sârathi Miśra*, Benaras [Varanasi]: Vidya Vilas Press.

Explanation of the Nyāya System [Nyâyavārttika] (Uddyotakara)

> Nyaya-Tarkatirtha, Taranatha and Amarendramohan Tarkatirtha, eds. (1985), *Nyâyadarśanam with Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya, Uddyotakara's Vārttika, Vācaspati Miśra's Tāt-paryaṭīkā and Viśvanātha's Vṛtti*, New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal.

Explanation of the System [Tantravārttika] (Kumārila)

> See *Mīmāṃsā Sūtra*.

Mīmāṃsa-sūtra (Jaimini)

> Subbāśāstrī, ed., vols. (1929–34), *Śrīmajjaiminipraṇīte Mīmāṃsādarśane*, 6 vols., Pune: Ānandāśramamudrālaya. Ānandāśramasaṃskṛtagranthāvaliḥ 97.

Secondary literature

Frauwallner, E. (1938), "Bhāvanā und Vidhi bei Maṇḍanamiśra," *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes* 45: 212–52.

Freschi, E. (forthcoming), "*Arthāpatti* in early Mīmāṃsā and until Pārthasārathi Miśra," in V. Eltschinger, B. Kellner and E. Mills (eds.), *A Road Less Travelled—Contributions to the Study of Indian Philosophy in Honour of John Taber.*

Kataoka, K. (2011), *Kumārila on Truth, Omniscience and Killing*, Sitzungsberichte der philosophisch-historischen Klasse, No. 814, Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften.

Kunjunni Raja, K. (1969), *Indian Theories of Meaning*, Madras: Adyar Library and Research Institute.

Taber, J. (1992), "What did Kumārila Bhaṭṭa mean by *svataḥ prāmāṇya?*" *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 112, no. 2: 204–21.

Yoshimizu, K. (2007), "Kumārila's Propositional Derivation (*Arthāpatti*) without Pervasion (*Vyāpti*)," in K. Preisendanz (ed.), *Expanding and Merging Horizons: Contributions to South Asian and Cross-Cultural Studies in Commemoration of Wilhelm Halbfass*, 315–35, Vienna: Austrian Academy of Sciences Press.

Yoshimizu, K. (1994), "Der Geltungsbereich des *niyoga* bei den Prābhākaras," *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens* 38: 485–507.

CHAPTER TWO

Prabhākara's *Long Explanation*

Translated by ANDREW OLLETT and ELISA FRESCHI

Prabhākara was most likely a younger contemporary of Kumārila and might have therefore lived in the seventh century.[1] His only extant work is the *Long Explanation* (*Bṛhatī*) on Śabara's *Commentary* (*Bhāṣya*). Prabhākara's style is quite elliptical, and his ideas are often original and challenging. For these reasons, it is often difficult to follow the thread of his argument. In our translation, we have often followed the commentary of the ninth-century philosopher Śālikanātha, called *Straightforward and Lucid Gloss* (*Ṛjuvimalā*). Indented discussion marked COMMENTS is our explanation also often following him. Śālikanātha, however, is an original thinker in his own right, and in our reading, he sometimes diverges from Prabhākara on key issues. The following chapter (see p. 95) will examine Śālikanātha's original ideas on *arthâpatti*, while in this chapter we have only included a few extracts from his commentary.

Prabhākara's understanding of *arthâpatti* differs sharply from Kumārila's in the following respects:[2]

- The element which does not make sense, according to Kumārila, is the trigger, e.g., the cognition of Devadatta's absence from home, whereas for Prabhākara, it is the thing known, e.g., the cognition of Devadatta's presence elsewhere.

- "Not making sense otherwise" for Kumārila seems to mean a logical impossibility, whereas for Prabhākara, it only means that something *in fact* does not occur apart from something else.

- On whether and how the relation between trigger and the thing known through *arthâpatti* is known, Kumārila insists that the relation is not known beforehand, whereas Prabhākara admits that a relation must be known in general terms.

- On whether "*arthâpatti* on the basis of what is heard" constitutes a distinct type of *arthâpatti*, Kumārila argues at length for this type, while Prabhākara does not even mention it.

---

[1] See Yoshimizu (1994) for an insightful discussion of the chronology of Kumārila and Prabhākara.
[2] For more on the differences between Kumārila's and Prabhākara's understanding of *arthâpatti*, see Freschi (forthcoming).

THE *PRIMA FACIE* POSITION

COMMENTS: Prabhākara structures his discussion by first introducing the definition of *arthâpatti* that was provided in Śabara's *Commentary*, and then presenting a *prima facie* position (*pūrva-pakṣa*), according to which *arthâpatti* so defined is no different from inference.

"Also *arthâpatti*, the postulation of a thing when a thing that is seen or heard does not make sense otherwise. For example, on seeing that Devadatta, although alive, is not at home, the postulation of his being outside, which is not seen."

Now, what is this "not making sense otherwise?" If, to begin with, one says that the existence of a thing does not make sense without something else, then that is simply the inference of an effect from the cause, and it is not a distinct epistemic instrument.

COMMENTS: Note that the sense of "not making sense otherwise" according to this position is very close to the sense that Prabhākara will later give to it: namely, that (the cognition of) one thing simply does not occur without (the cognition of) another thing.

Śālikanātha makes it even clearer that no *logical* inconsistency is involved in "not making sense otherwise": "For the word 'otherwise,' which generally denotes a manner other than the manner under discussion, denotes the absence of what is postulated. And this is also denoted by the phrase 'does not make sense.' So we get this meaning: when we understand that this state of affairs does not obtain in the absence of something postulated, we postulate another state of affairs."

If, instead, one says that the definition of inference is a cognition of something whose relation with something else is *known*, whereas in this case the relation is not known, and for that reason it is a distinct epistemic instrument, that too is incorrect.

COMMENTS: The definition of inference quoted here is the one that Śabara, too, had given in his *Commentary* to *Mīmāṃsā Sūtra* 1.1.5.

If one has not already known of a relation between two things, how can one understand that one of them does not make sense without the other? For not making sense otherwise is not something that can be apprehended through perception. For that is apprehended on the basis of an invariable concomitance with its effect, and such an invariable concomitance is always established through multiple observations. Therefore, no matter whether something is observed or not, only if its relation with what one perceives is known can one know it on the basis of the fact that what one perceives would not make sense otherwise. Therefore a distinct epistemic instrument is simply a mirage.

COMMENTS: Śālikanātha takes this opportunity to explain that it is not enough, for *arthâpatti*, that one thing does not occur without another; it must be *cognized* that one thing does not occur without another: "Not making sense otherwise does not lead to an understanding of anything at all if it is not ascertained in the

first place. For Śabara has used the phrase 'does not make sense otherwise,' followed by *iti*, where the word *iti*[3] is commonly understood to refer to a cognition. If not making sense otherwise is not ascertained, then it cannot be the reason for a particular understanding. Therefore it is only when it is understood that not making sense otherwise leads to another understanding."

PRABHĀKARA'S POSITION

COMMENTS: At this point, another speaker—whom we, following Śālikanātha, identify as Prabhākara himself—responds to the *prima facie* position.

That would be true, if that which did not make sense without something else were the trigger. But in this case, what does not make sense is precisely what is known through *arthâpatti*.

COMMENTS: As Śālikanātha explains, "if the trigger for the cognition of something was the thing that does not make sense without it, then this would simply be an inference." In contrast, Prabhākara maintains that it is exactly the thing known through *arthâpatti* which "does not make sense otherwise."

OBJECTION: Now what does not make sense in this example? When a person is observed to be absent from home, provided that he is alive, what does not make sense is his absence from other places. And what follows from this? It is not his absence that is understood, but rather his presence. And it is not the case that his presence does not make sense once we have observed his absence from home.

RESPONSE: Surely it does not make sense. For presence outside does not make sense apart from observing his absence from home.

COMMENTS: Prabhākara's response is that the being outside would indeed not make sense if it were not for one's experience of the absence from home. Thus, he understands "not making sense otherwise" as a factive statement: the cognition of x would not take place in the absence of the cognition of y. Śālikanātha makes the point explicit when he says that "'Otherwise' means 'without the postulation of the thing that is postulated,' that is, so long as its relation with being outside is not understood." Note, however, that our interpretation of Prabhākara's text differs significantly from Śālikanātha's, which we provide in the following chapter (see p. 95). In the following exchange, Prabhākara addresses an objection to his interpretation of the text of Śabara's *Commentary*. He must be aware that his interpretation is rather strained, from a grammatical point of view.

OBJECTION: In saying "a thing that is seen or heard does not make sense otherwise," Śabara has made it clear that it is the trigger that does not make sense otherwise.

---

[3] In Sanskrit, /it/ marks the end of an embedded clause and in this context, it marks the end of one part of Śabara's definition, 'when a thing that is seen or heard does not make sense otherwise' (p.90).

RESPONSE: God bless you, how little you know the text! Śabara has said, "a thing that is seen or heard is the postulation of a thing." Now what does he mean by "the postulation of a thing"? A thing that is seen or heard is the epistemic instrument for another thing.

OBJECTION: So with what is the phrase "does not make sense otherwise" construed?

RESPONSE: "Knowledge," we answer. In bringing about a state of not making sense otherwise, it triggers the cognition of another thing.

> COMMENTS: In other words, in Prabhākara's interpretation, the clause "does not make sense otherwise" in Śabara's commentary is not to be construed with "a thing heard or seen" but rather with an unspoken and implicit word "knowledge." At this point, an objector claims that one needs to know that the trigger is correlated with the thing one is about to know through *arthâpatti* in order for this instrument of knowledge to work. Prabhākara seems to accept that knowledge of a "mere relation" is necessary.

OBJECTION: Isn't there a requirement in this case of being known to be a correlate of something else?

RESPONSE: What is required is the knowledge of a mere relation, not the fact of being a correlate. In inference, by contrast, the trigger is the fact of being a correlate itself, and this is suggested by the phrasing of the definition of inference as "the cognition of something whose relation with something else is known."

> COMMENTS: Unfortunately Prabhākara does not elaborate on what it means to be a "mere relation" (*sambandhamātra*). Śālikanātha elaborates as follows: "True, a relation between being alive and a place is required. But absence from home, which is the trigger, is not a correlate (*sambandhin*) of presence outside. Therefore, in *arthâpatti*, what is required for the understanding is the cognition of a mere relation between being alive and a place." In other words, one needs to be aware that being alive is related to being somewhere, but one does not need to know the invariable concomitance linking absence from home and presence outside. If one knew it, the instrument of knowledge used would be inference, not *arthâpatti*.

"A THING THAT IS SEEN OR HEARD"

> COMMENTS: The final topic of Prabhākara's discussion concerns the purpose of the words of "heard" and "seen" in Śabara's definition. The answer is that they are just synonyms and that all is meant is that something has been apprehended. Noteworthy here is the fact that Prabhākara does not mention the existence of a distinct type of *arthâpatti*, "*arthâpatti* on the basis of what is heard" (*śrutârthâpatti*), which occupies so much of Kumārila's discussion.

OBJECTION: Does the mention of seeing and hearing in the definition of *arthâpatti* serve to exclude other causes?

RESPONSE: No, we say. It just means something that is apprehended.

OBJECTION: Why, then, is the word "heard" used, when just "seen" should have been used?

RESPONSE: It is just a different way of expressing it. "Seen or heard" expresses apprehension.

REFERENCES

Primary sources

Long Explanation [Bṛhatī] (Prabhākara)
    Ramanatha Sastri, S. K., ed. part 1 and 2, and S. Subrahmanya Sastri, ed. part 3, 4, and 5 (1934–67), *Bṛhatī of Prabhākara Miśra [on the Mīmāṁsāsūtrabhāṣya of Śabarasvāmin] with the Rjuvimalāpañcikā of Śālikanātha*, Madras University Sanskrit Series, Nos. 3.1, 3.2, 24, 25, 26, Madras [Chennai]: University of Madras, 110–17.
Straightforward and Lucid Gloss [Rjuvimalā Pañcikā] (Śālikanātha)
    See *Long Explanation*.

Secondary literature

Yoshimizu, K. (1994), "Der Geltungsbereich des *niyoga* bei den Prābhākaras," *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens* 38: 485–507.
Freschi, E. (forthcoming), "Reconstructing an episode in the history of philosophy: *arthāpatti* in Kumārila's commentators,"in F. Sferra and V. Vergiani (eds.), *Festschrift for Raffaele Torella*.

Śālikanātha's
Straightforward and Lucid Gloss; Comprehensive Survey of the Epistemic Instruments

Translated by ANDREW OLLETT and ELISA FRESCHI

Śālikanātha was an author of the later eighth or ninth century who is best known as the earliest commentator on, and expositor of, the thought of Prabhākara. He is thus one of the earliest representatives of a "Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā" (Mīmāṃsā following Prabhākara), which came to be doxographically opposed to "Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā" (Mīmāṃsā following Kumārila). Śālikanātha wrote widely on Mīmāṃsā topics, besides authoring a commentary—now lost—on an important text of the Vaiśeṣika system (the *Praśasta-pāda-bhāṣya*).

The sections translated below come from two separate works. The first comes from the *Straightforward and Lucid Gloss (Ṛju-vimalā Pañcikā)*, which is a running commentary on Prabhākara's *Long Explanation*. Since Śālikanātha's commentary is mostly dedicated to explaining Prabhākara's remarks, we have focused on three sections where he offers something above and beyond what Prabhākara discusses. These are (1) his understanding of the crucial condition of "not making sense" which applies in any case of *arthâpatti*; (2) the "summary verses" which he supplies toward the end of Prabhākara's discussion; and (3) his discussion of *arthâpatti* on the basis of what is heard, which Kumārila had taken to be a qualitatively distinct kind of *arthâpatti*. In these selections, the quotations from Prabhākara are in bold.

The second section is the section on *arthâpatti* in an independent essay entitled *Comprehensive Survey of the Epistemic Instruments (Pramāṇa-pārāyaṇa)* that Śālikanātha wrote on the six epistemic instruments that Mīmāṃsā authors accepted as valid and distinct: perception, inference, testimony, comparison, *arthâpatti*, and absence. This essay forms part of a collection of essays on Mīmāṃsā topics called *Prakaraṇa-pañcikā* (which might be translated as *Topical Elaborations*).

FROM THE *STRAIGHTFORWARD AND LUCID GLOSS*

What does not make sense in arthâpatti

In response to the proponent of the accepted position, an OBJECTOR (*pūrvapakṣin*) now speaks: **Now what does not make sense in this example? When a person is observed to be absent from home, provided that he is alive, his absence from other places does not make sense.** This is a single passage.

When absence from home on the part of someone who is alive has been observed, the same person's absence anywhere else does not make sense, because that would result in the absence of his being alive. **And what follows from that?** In response to this question, the OBJECTOR makes his own position clear. **It is not his absence that is understood as a result of *arthâpatti*, but rather his presence. And it is not the case that his presence does not make sense once we have observed his absence from home.** What is understood is his presence outside. This is what is called the postulation of something that is not observed, namely, his presence outside. And it is not the case that this does not make sense given his absence from home. By contrast, up until that point, it makes perfect sense. What does not make sense is his absence, but this is not what is understood through *arthâpatti*. Therefore it is not suitable to say that *arth â patti* is the understanding of something that does not make sense.

Now suppose an OPPONENT (*uttarapakṣin*) responds to this objection as follows: True, when we do in fact observe his absence from home, it is not the case that his presence elsewhere does not make sense. But without observing his absence from home, it is indeed the case that his presence outside does not make sense. And the word "otherwise" simply expresses the meaning of the word "without," so what this means is that his presence outside does not make sense without observing his absence from home.

> COMMENTS: In our reading, the critic of the opponent—that is, the *uttarapakṣin*, who does not necessarily side with the proponent of the accepted position (*siddhāntin*)—takes a position very close to Prabhākara's own position. Śālikanātha, however, interprets Prabhākara rather forcedly, and thus his reconstruction of the accepted position (*siddhânta*) differs both from the position defended here (by the *uttarapakṣin*) and from what we understand Prabhākara's own position to have been.

A response from the first OBJECTOR (*pūrvapakṣin*): That would be wrong. For it is not the case that his presence outside does not make sense without observing his absence from home. For even someone who does not see that Devadatta, for example, is absent from home will not experience the slightest glimmer of not making sense with respect to his being outside. Therefore this manner of responding to the objection, too, does not stand to reason.

Now the proponent of the ACCEPTED POSITION (*siddhāntin*) speaks: **Surely it does not make sense.** Here is the idea. It is not the case that we say that his presence outside does not make sense without observing his absence from home, but rather that when we observe his absence from home, his presence does not make sense without being outside.

> COMMENTS: As noted above, Śālikanātha identifies Prabhākara's statements with the "accepted position" (*siddhânta*), but he interprets those statements in a rather unnatural way, so effectively Śālikanātha's "accepted position" is different from Prabhākara's.

Therefore observing his absence from home is the cause of his presence not making sense, so long as we have not understood that it is related to being outside. And this state of not making sense is a conflict with another epistemic instrument. When we have observed his absence from home, so long as we have not understood that it is related to being outside, his being alive, which was understood on the basis of another epistemic instrument, is thrown into doubt—"Why isn't he here? Is he alive at all?"—and is then understood to be related to his being outside. Therefore it is precisely his presence that does not make sense here, and it is precisely his presence that is understood through *arthâpatti*. This is the accepted position.

> COMMENTS: Śālikanātha understands "not making sense" to be a state of potential or actual conflict with other veridical cognitions, while Prabhākara understood it to refer to a necessary antecedent condition.

For presence outside does not make sense apart from observing his absence from home. The meaning of the text is that, when we have observed his absence from home, his presence does not make sense unless it is outside. The word "surely" expresses that it really doesn't make sense at all.

> COMMENTS: Once again, Śālikanātha forcibly construes Prabhākara's text to support his own interpretation of *arthâpatti*. In this case, he construes *vinā* "without" with *bahiḥ* "outside," where a much more natural reading of Prabhākara's text would construe *vinā* with *gṛhâbhāva-darśanena* "observing his absence from home."

Summary verses on arthâpatti

On this topic there are the following verses:

The domain of *arthâpatti* is something
that is postulated because of something else
that would bring about a state of not making sense
if the first thing were not postulated.[1]
For example, being outside is postulated
because if it were not postulated,
a person's absence from home would cause
his being alive to not make sense.
Here the state of not making sense without
the postulation of the result is characterized

---

[1] A very similar verse is found in Śālikanātha's *Comprehensive Survey of the Epistemic Instruments*, at the beginning of the *arthâpatti* section (p. 272). See our translation on p. 102 in this volume.

by the fact that one ends up with a doubt,
because of a conflict (*virodha*) with another epistemic instrument.
For being alive is never observed without a place.
Because of one's absence from home,
although one's being alive is already established,
it becomes doubtful.
The postulation that arises in order to resolve
that doubt is called *arthâpatti*, because of
the thing (*artha*) that generates (*âpâdaka*) the doubt.[2]
In inference, by contrast, what is understood is
that the trigger does not make sense apart from the thing
that is understood through inference,
a condition that is characterized
by absence from all of the counter-loci.

COMMENTS: A "counter-locus" is a locus where the property to be proven (e.g., the presence of "fire" in the inference "there is smoke on the mountain, therefore there is fire on the mountain") is absent. The inferential reason (e.g., the presence of "smoke") must be absent from all such loci, otherwise it will fail to be probative (e.g., if there is smoke in a place where fire is absent, then the invariable concomitance between the two properties does not hold).

Therefore, these two epistemic instruments
called *arthâpatti* and inference are different,
because their components are different.
That is what we have ascertained.

Arthâpatti *on the basis of what is heard*

COMMENTS: In this section, we have identified the OBJECTOR (*pūrva-pakṣin*) as "Bhāṭṭa," that is, a follower of Kumārila's interpretation, and the proponent of the ACCEPTED POSITION (*siddhāntin*) as "Prābhākara," that is, a follower of Prābhākara's interpretation. Śālikanātha does not label them as such. Bear in mind here that the word for "state of affairs" and "meaning" is the same (*artha*).

BHĀṬṬA: Even if what is heard, too, is in fact "apprehended," nevertheless the use of the word "heard" serves to suggest that *arthâpatti* on the basis of what is heard is different insofar as it results in an epistemic instrument.

COMMENTS: Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, *Explanation in Verse*, *arthâpatti* section, verse 2. See our translation on p. 45 in this volume. Note that throughout this discussion, Śālikanātha focuses on Kumārila's claim that *arthâpatti* on the basis of what is

---

[2] This verse is also found in Śālikanātha's *Comprehensive Survey of the Epistemic Instruments, arthâpatti* section (p. 275). See our translation on p. 105 in this volume. It provides an etymological explanation of *arthâpatti*.

heard is qualitatively different from other types of *arthâpatti*, and ignores Kumārila's parallel claim that this kind of *arthâpatti* has important hermeneutical applications.

PRĀBHĀKARA: Also in *arthâpatti* on the basis of what is heard, what is heard, namely the absence of eating during the day, does not make sense, given that Devadatta's being stout does not make sense without eating during the night, and therefore causes us to postulate simply his eating at night, and not the linguistic expression thereof. For it is not the case that a meaning does not make sense without a linguistic expression, but rather only without another meaning.

BHĀṬṬA: That is true. *Arthâpatti* gets started in order to postulate only a meaning. However, because that meaning is grasped by a conceptual cognition, we have to cognize it on the basis of a linguistic expression, and therefore *arthâpatti* stops at the linguistic expression that appears in the first instance. It does not extend up to the meaning. It is the linguistic expression itself, that, once it is understood, puts the meaning in place.

> COMMENTS: This explanation closely follows verse 78*ab* of the *arthâpatti* section of Kumārila's *Explanation in Verse*; Pārthasārathimiśra borrows from Śālikanātha's formulation in his commentary on that verse. See our translation on p. 81 in this volume.

PRĀBHĀKARA: If this were the case, then also in the case of perceptual cognitions and so on, conceptual cognition would not grasp a meaning, but would instead stop at the linguistic expression. With regard to comprehension of animals, infants, and other conscious beings not proficient in language use, a comprehension we maintain is non-linguistic, we have concluded that the sense faculties have a capacity exclusively in regard to a state of affairs, that is, a meaning. Therefore in the conceptual stage, too, they should have a capacity for precisely the same object, and not for anything else, because we have already used up the chance to postulate such a capacity.

BHĀṬṬA: *Arthâpatti* on the basis of what is heard, however, never exists among animals, because it depends upon language acquisition, since one who has not learned a language cannot cognize a sentence meaning, which is preceded by linguistic expressions.

PRĀBHĀKARA: In *arthâpatti* on the basis of what is observed, we have concluded that *arthâpatti* has a capacity exclusively in regard to a state of affairs, that is, a meaning, and in this case as well it should have a capacity for precisely the same object.

BHĀṬṬA: That is true, we observe that it has a capacity exclusively for a meaning, but it is insofar as the meaning is what causes something else to make sense. For even the meaning is not understood as such, but rather insofar as it causes something else to make sense. And what is it that makes something else make sense? That upon the understanding of which the state of not making sense disappears. And even as soon as a linguistic expression is pronounced, the state of not making sense disappears,

and hence *arthâpatti* on the basis of what is heard operates in regard to the linguistic expression that appears in the first instance. This is what the revered author of the *Explanation* has said:[3]

> And it is not the case that one meaning is understood
> on the basis of another meaning. By contrast,
> the first meaning is concealed,
> because it is grasped by a conceptual cognition.

COMMENTS: The following verse appears to be an objection, to which Kumārila responds in the subsequent verse. Kumārila believes that our perceptual and inferential cognitions are conceptual, and if he is claiming that linguistic expressions "conceal" all such conceptual cognitions, then he would be in the absurd position of arguing that, on the one hand, animals have conceptual cognitions, and on the other hand, that these cognitions are "concealed" by linguistic expressions that the animals themselves could never understand.

> It is fire that is grasped on the basis
> of the sense faculties or of an inferential sign,
> not the word "fire."
> Similarly, this fire is apprehended by animals, too,
> only insofar as it is a state of affairs.
> *Arthâpatti* on the basis of what is heard, however,
> is never observed in animals. For the cognition
> produced by *arthâpatti* on the basis of what is heard
> is considered to arise out of linguistic competence.
> It does not arrive at the meaning itself,
> insofar as it cognizes other linguistic expressions and stops there.
> Thus it necessarily has a sentence as its domain
> in the first instance.

COMMENTS: In other words, as soon as one postulates another linguistic expression (e.g. *rātrau bhuṅkte*), one stops there; one does not need to postulate the meaning of this linguistic expression. The meaning would be delivered, as usual, by linguistic communication, as he explains:

> In turn, it is the sentence alone that causes
> one to know the meaning
> because this sentence is what is understood.

---

[3] The following verses come most probably from Kumārila's *Long Remarks* (*Bṛhaṭ-ṭīkā*), as noted by Yoshimizu (1999:6). Very similar ideas are discussed in Sucaritamiśra's commentary on Kumārila's *Explanation in Verse*. See our translation on p. 43 in this volume.

PRABHĀKARA: The blessed author of the *Commentary* doesn't stand for any of this. We might answer in accordance with Prabhākara's views as follows. In conceptual cognitions, a linguistic expression is understood in the form of something that delimits a meaning, and a linguistic expression delimits a meaning insofar as it expresses it. Therefore in the cognition (of the word) "cow," we understand a meaning in a particular manner, namely, that 'this is expressed by the linguistic expression "cow."' And it is not the case that a linguistic expression expresses the fact that its meaning is expressed by a linguistic expression. Thus, a linguistic expression does not convey a meaning in reference to this (namely the fact that its meaning is expressed by a linguistic expression). Rather, a linguistic expression appears as specifying what it expresses as being expressed by something that is understood in the discursive practice of adults. Therefore, even though it appears in the first instance, that is not sufficient to dispel the state of not making sense, because it does not set a meaning in place. Therefore it cannot be what is known through *arthâpatti*. And hence, since this too has a meaning as its content, the use of the word "heard" does not have the purpose of pointing out a difference between types of *arthâpatti*.

> COMMENTS: On the next topic, Śālikanātha abandons the back-and-forth dialogue with an adherent of Kumārila's views for a more polemical criticism. It is noteworthy that most of the positions that the opponent held in the above dialogue can be found, in some form, in Kumārila's works, and hence Śālikanātha treats them with respect. The opponent's position in the following section, however, cannot be found in Kumārila's works, and probably represents an elaboration on Kumārila's views by a later follower.

As for those who think that, in the case of the *viśvajit* sacrifice[4] and so on, it is a linguistic expression that does not make sense on account of its being incomplete, and that therefore it is a linguistic expression that is postulated to make sense of it, although those people, who speak nonsense in postulating according to their own judgment, deserve to be ignored, nevertheless beginners pay attention to them, so something may be said for the sake of educating the beginners.

What is it about the linguistic expression that doesn't make sense, above and beyond the meaning not making sense? If you say that it is the fact that it is incomplete, well then, what exactly is incomplete about the linguistic expression? For only a *meaning* can be incomplete when some portion of that meaning is lacking. If you say that the linguistic expression is incomplete because of the incompleteness of the meaning, that is fine, for when something's not making sense depends on something else, then we must accept that it's the latter that ultimately does make sense. Otherwise the linguistic expression would remain incomplete in that stage (i.e., the stage before the meaning of the linguistic expression is understood). Therefore, even when the linguistic expression is incomplete, we only need to postulate a meaning. Nor is it the case that when a meaning does not make sense, the

---

[4] See n. 17 on p. 70.

linguistic expression does not make sense either, since the linguistic expression and the meaning are different.

Now one might object that when a meaning does not make sense, there is nothing that results from the cognition of a linguistic expression, and hence the fact that the linguistic expression is an epistemic instrument would not make sense at all. That too may be true, but what would not make sense is the fact that a linguistic expression is an epistemic instrument, not the linguistic expression itself. Nor is it the case that this fact, of a linguistic expression's being an epistemic instrument, does not make sense on its own; rather, it does not make sense simply because its meaning does not make sense. If this is the case, then the fact that the underlying meaning does not make sense alone is what puts the *arthâpatti* in place. Moreover, what would render it impossible for a linguistic expression to be an epistemic instrument would be a doubt that there is no object of the cognition, in the absence of a meaning, not the absence of some further linguistic expression, such that one should postulate one. Well, enough of this extended discussion. We have gotten too far from the point, and now we will return.

The meaning of Prabhākara's commentary is that a total apprehension is not communicated by the word "seen" alone, but only when it is combined with the word "heard," and that is why the use of the word "heard" is not pointless. And how, precisely, is the fact of being apprehended communicated by the word "seen" together with the word "heard?" Listen: Although the word "seen" expresses something that has been apprehended in general, nevertheless, because of its proximity with the word "heard," it expresses everything besides what is cognized from language through the principle of the cows-and-bulls. What is the purpose of using this principle of the cows-and-bulls, you might ask? Look. We are worldly people, and in the real world, people are seen to use expressions like this. Nor is there any scope for criticizing such usages in the world, since they have no beginning. Therefore this is simply another way of saying the same thing: an expression that people in the real world understand to mean apprehension in general.

FROM THE *COMPREHENSIVE SURVEY OF THE EPISTEMIC INSTRUMENTS*

The definition of arthâpatti

Now the postulation triggered by an
observed state of affairs which would lead an
unobserved state of affairs to not make sense
in the absence of that postulation
is called *arthâpatti*.[5]

Arthâpatti is the postulation of an additional state of affairs on the basis of an observed state of affairs which would lead to an unobserved state of affairs not

---

[5] A very similar verse is found in Śālikanātha's *Straightforward and Lucid Gloss.* See our translation on p. 98.

making sense so long as that additional state of affairs is not postulated. For example: on the basis of not seeing Devadatta at his home, although he is alive, we postulate an unobserved state of affairs, namely, his being outside.

Arthâpatti *is distinct from inference*

OBJECTION: The postulation that someone who is alive is outside, on the basis of observing his absence from home, is simply an inference. That is to say: we understand with reference to ourselves that whoever, being alive, is not in one place, is in another place, and hence it makes sense that when we understand, on the basis of someone's absence from one place, that person's existing in another place, which is known to have a necessary connection with it, that is simply an inference.

Thus, existence in once place and absence from another place, being connected in a relation defined by occurring at the same time, are complements belonging to the same time, just as high tides and the rising of the moon are complements belonging to the same time. One can infer through this inferential complex that when Devadatta, being alive, is not at home, he is somewhere else.

Similarly, given Devadatta's absence from one place, his existence elsewhere stands in a relation of necessary connection to this absence that is characterized by inherence in the same thing, on account of his connection with another place, and is thus a complement to this absence, both properties—the absence from one place and the existence elsewhere—being located in Devadatta. Thus all of the elements are available for an inference to take place:

1. Devadatta is in contact with an external place (thesis),
2. because he exists while being absent at home (reason),
3. since whoever exists while being absent from home is somewhere else (invariable concomitance),
4. just as in the case of myself (example).

RESPONSE: To start with his being alive, this cannot be an inferential reason, because this is precisely what is put into doubt. For suppose someone has understood Devadatta's existence only in relation to his house. So long as the connection between Devadatta's existence and an external place is not brought in, when such a person sees that Devadatta is not at home, that would bring the fact that he is alive into doubt, even though it previously was understood on the basis of an epistemic instrument: "How can Devadatta be alive," he will think, "if he is not at home?" For once something has been apprehended, understanding a form of it different from the form that had previously been apprehended is sufficient to generate a doubt. And Devadatta's existence was understood only in connection with his house. Hence, when his absence from home is apprehended, it would be rendered doubtful, so long as its connection with an external place is not understood. For this reason his existence, being afflicted by doubt, cannot function as an inferential reason.

One might say that his existence becomes an inferential reason when we come to understand his relation with an external place, and consequently our doubt regarding his existence is dispelled. But that is not the case, since there would be nothing to

infer. For it is precisely Devadatta's relation with an external place that we wanted to infer in the first place, and if that is admitted, there is nothing left to be known. This is what the learned author of the *Explanation* has said:

> Therefore, it cannot be an inferential reason,
> since insofar as it is independent
> from what is to be known, it is doubtful.
> At the very moment, however, when it can
> become an inferential reason,
> nothing remains to be inferred.[6]

Therefore his being alive is not capable of producing any further understanding, since it is subject to doubt.

To move on, then, to his absence from home: it does not make sense that his absence from home is the reason that allows us to infer that he is related to an external place. For it is not his absence on its own that we must provisionally admit to be an inferential reason, but rather his absence qualified by his being alive, since absence from home on its own can be accounted for even without being outside, in the case of dead people and people who have not yet been born, as has been said:

> Sheer absence from home, apart from his being alive,
> cannot establish being outside,
> since that is also observed in people who are dead.[7]

Since being alive, which is the qualifier, is rendered doubtful, whatever is qualified by it cannot be an inferential reason.

Therefore it makes sense that the trigger is just absence from home, on its own, which is itself free from any doubt. And there is no epistemic instrument which might render this cognition doubtful.

One might object as follows. If this alone were the trigger, then we would run into the absurd consequence that we understand a dead person, or a person who has not yet been born, to be related with an external place. To this we say: we define the trigger to be something that is capable of throwing something else into doubt so long as the postulation of some other thing does not take place.[8] That is to say, Devadatta's absence from home, which throws his existence into doubt so long as the postulation of his being related to an external place does not occur, is in fact a trigger, whereas the absence from home of dead people, or people who have not yet been born, does not throw anything at all into doubt, and hence it is not a trigger. Therefore the absurd consequence that you mentioned will not occur. Moreover, what is

---

[6] This verse is probably quoted from Kumārila's *Long Remarks* (*Bṛhaṭ-ṭīkā*).

[7] Kumārila, *Explanation in Verse, arthāpatti* chapter, v. 21 (see our translation on p. 53 of this volume).

[8] In this and several following sentences we have both *sasaṃśayam āpad-* and *saṃśayam āpad-*; possibly the first involves an implied *artha-* ("render something doubtful"), but it might also be a misreading (E. Freschi suggests *yas saṃśayam* might have been read as *yasasaṃśayam*). In the following sentence, read *vidyamānatāṃ saṃśayam āpadayan*.

understood in this case is precisely that which, if it is not postulated, a doubt arises, whereas if it is postulated, the doubt subsides.

> COMMENTS: Śālikanātha has used various forms of the verb *ā-pad*, which is present in the name *arthāpatti*, to describe how a cognition is "beset," "afflicted," or "seized" by doubt. Below he will quote a verse from an unknown source—possibly his own—which explains *arthâpatti* in precisely these etymological terms, namely as a cognition that arises when a given state of affairs (*artha*) is beset by (*āpatti*) doubt by another state of affairs.

Now absence is the trigger in this case, but it is nevertheless not an inference, because the way in which the cognition arises is different. When you observe one complement, the cognition that arises thereupon, assisted by the memory of a necessary connection between the two complements, is an inference. By contrast, so long as one does not postulate an external place, absence from home throws Devadatta's existence into doubt, and in order to resolve that doubt, it causes one to postulate his relation with an external place. Therefore it is not possible for this cognition to be an inference. Contrast an inferential reason such as smoke, which does not lead anyone to understand fire by throwing something unto doubt, and thus cannot be an *arthâpatti*. On this topic there is the following verse:

> The postulation that arises in order to resolve
> that doubt is called *arthâpatti*, because of
> the thing (*artha*) that generates (*āpādaka*) the doubt.[9]

> COMMENTS: The position espoused in this verse is that the trigger of *arthâpatti* is the cognition of a state of affairs that puts one's existing knowledge into doubt (in this case, Devadatta's absence from home).

An alternative view of arthâpatti

> COMMENTS: In the following section, Śālikanātha offers a different definition of *arthâpatti*, according to which the trigger is not the cognition that throws an existing cognition into doubt, but the existing cognition itself, which is thrown into doubt. Śālikanātha gives slight preference to this interpretation.

> Some people, however, say that *arthâpatti*
> is the postulation that is so called
> on account of the state of affairs which,
> although previously apprehended,
> would come into doubt without that postulation.

Some people, however, say the following. A state of affairs which, although it has already been known from an epistemic instrument, enters into a condition of not

---

[9] This verse is also found in Śālikanātha's *Straightfoward and Lucid Gloss*. See our translation above, p. 98.

making sense, in the form of a doubt, when a different form of it than was previously encountered has been understood, so long as another state of affairs is not postulated—that *first* state of affairs produces the postulation of that *other* state of affairs, in order to remove the doubt that affects it, and this is *arthâpatti*.

And this is to be preferred because of the relative strength of observation. For on this definition, despite having been apprehended on the basis of an epistemic instrument, it is the state of affairs that is thrown into doubt itself—because of the absence of the form in which this state of affairs had been previously observed—that generates the *arthâpatti*.

> COMMENTS: The idea seems to be that observation (*darśana*) is a relatively strong and secure epistemic instrument, especially in comparison with absence. In fact Prabhākara and his followers deny that absence is an epistemic instrument. Hence, in order to ensure that *arthâpatti* is an epistemic instrument, it must be demonstrated that the premises from which it starts—in this case, the "trigger" of the postulation—were also apprehended through valid epistemic instruments. Hence some followers of Prabhākara might claim that what sets the process of postulation in motion is not the cognition of "absence from home" itself, but rather the cognition of Devadatta's being alive, which has been rendered doubtful in some way.

There is no contradiction in saying that what generates an inference is an inferential reason that has been ascertained, whereas what generates an *arthâpatti* is a reason that has been seized by doubt. In fact it is for this very reason that it is distinct from inference. It is only when the smoke has been ascertained that it triggers the cognition of fire. Here there is no other thing that puts the smoke in a position of not making sense. Absence from home, by contrast, puts Devadatta's existence into a state of not making sense. His very existence, once it has been brought into a state of not making sense on account of his absence from home—so long as there is no postulation of his relation with an external place—is what causes us to postulate his own relation with an external place.

Therefore *arthâpatti* is different from inference in either case. Either, as in the previous view, it is Devadatta's absence from home, which puts his existence into a state of not making sense, that causes us to postulate his being outside. Or, on this alternative view, it is Devadatta's existence itself, which has been put into a state of not making sense by his absence from home, that causes us to postulate his relation with an external place in order for it to make sense again.

What does not make sense otherwise?

> COMMENTS: On both of the views that Śālikanātha has just sketched, the cognition which "does not make sense" in the absence of a postulation is the cognition of Devadatta's continued existence. He now addresses an opponent who takes the view that what does not make sense otherwise is Devadatta's absence from home. Noteworthy is the fact that Śālikanātha does not even discuss what we take to be the most natural reading of Prabhākara's views on *arthâpatti*, according to which it is the cognition of Devadatta's presence elsewhere that "does not make sense"

otherwise, in the sense that it would never arise were it not for the cognition of his absence from home.

There is someone, however, who believes that it is Devadatta's absence from home which does not make sense, and that this is what triggers the cognition of his being outside. This is wrong. That is to say: what is it about Devadatta's absence from home that does not make sense otherwise?

COMMENTS: Śālikanātha rejects, in sequence, two interpretations according to which Devadatta's absence from home can be said to "not make sense." The first would reduce *arthâpatti* to a particular kind of inference based on negative concomitance (there is no *x* in the absence of *y*), which is itself derived, by means of *arthâpatti*, from a previously-established positive concomitance (where there is *y*, there is *x*). In this first interpretation, "not making sense otherwise" means that one thing is logically impossible without another. In the second interpretation, which Śālikanātha rejects as psychologically implausible, Devadatta's absence from home is said to "not make sense" in that it is subject to doubt.

If, on the one hand, it is his absence apart from a relation with an external place—since the absence from home on the part of someone who is alive cannot occur without that person's relation with an external place—then what we have been calling *arthâpatti* would simply be an inference from negative concomitance, which is characterized by the absence of the inferential reason given the absence of what is to be inferred. And a negative concomitance can only ever be understood through a positive concomitance, which is characterized by the presence of what is to be inferred given the presence of the inferential reason. For it is not possible to ascertain that the inferential reason is necessarily absent from an infinite number of counter-loci—that is, instances where what is to be inferred is absent—until one ascertains that the presence of the inferential reason has a necessary connection with the presence of what is to be inferred. For it is only when that is ascertained that one may conclude, on the basis of *arthâpatti*, a necessary connection of the absence of the inferential reason given the absence of what is to be inferred.

COMMENTS: In the following paragraph Śālikanātha explains how a negative concomitance can be derived from a positive concomitance through *arthâpatti*: if a state of affairs *x* is known to have a positive concomitance with a state of affairs *y*, such that the presence of *y* guarantees the presence of *x*, then *x* cannot possibly be absent unless we postulate that *y* is also absent.

For there are two alternatives: either the inferential reason is present, or it is absent. Among these two, let us first assume that the inferential reason is present. If it is then established that the presence of the inferential reason has a necessary connection with the presence of what is to be inferred, then it will simply never be the case that what is to be inferred is absent. If it were not possible for what is to be inferred to be absent on the other alternative as well, wherein the inferential reason is absent, then it would not make sense at all for what is inferred to be absent. Therefore, on the assumption that the inferential reason is present, once it has been understood that the presence of the inferential reason is necessarily connected with the presence

of what is to be inferred, this very necessary connection would put the absence of what is to be inferred in a state of not making sense, so long as we do not postulate that we are actually in the other alternative, wherein the inferential reason is absent. And hence this very necessary connection should cause us to postulate that we are in fact in that other alternative, wherein the inferential reason is absent. Once this is done, however, it stands to reason that the absence of what is to be inferred has a necessary connection with the absence of the inferential reason. Therefore the cognition that something simply does not occur in the absence of what is to be inferred presupposes an understanding of a necessary connection, and therefore does not differ from inference.

If, on the other hand, Devadatta's absence from home does not make sense so long as his relation to an external place is not postulated means that it is actually doubted, then it could never be said to "not make sense."[10] For there is no reason at all why his absence from home would be subject to doubt. We have said, by contrast, that what is rendered doubtful is actually his being alive, since that has always been observed to be related to his home, and what renders it doubtful is his absence from home.

Our position, therefore, is that *arthâpatti*, literally "a sudden occurrence (*âpatti*) related to a state of affairs (*artha*)," is either the state of affairs that renders another one doubtful, or alternatively the state of affairs that is rendered doubtful by it.

Arthâpatti *on the basis of what is heard*

On the topic of *arthâpatti*, some say that the sentence "stout Devadatta does not eat during the day" causes us to postulate the very sentence "he eats at night," since the eating, understood in relation to Devadatta, that is negated in relation to the day and inferred from his being stout, does not make sense.

That, too, is incorrect, because in this case, as well, it is only appropriate to postulate a state of affairs, which in this case is a *meaning*. For something is understood through *arthâpatti* when it would not make sense if that thing were not postulated, and in this case it is Devadatta's eating which does not make sense so long as its connection with the night is not supposed. For it does not make sense because it does not have a relation to another time. And it is precisely a relation with that other time that its not making sense allows us to postulate.

> COMMENTS: Compare the following objection to Kumārila's *Explanation in Verse*, *arthâpatti* section, verse 78*ab* (see p. 81 in this volume), as well as the verses that Śālikanātha had quoted in his *Straightforward and Lucid Gloss* (see above, p. 100), probably from Kumārila's *Long Remarks*.

OBJECTION: We agree that *arthâpatti* starts out in order to postulate a state of affairs. But because that state of affairs is to be known from a conceptual cognition, and because conceptual cognitions are preceded by linguistic expressions, the postulation actually culminates in the preceding linguistic expression, and that linguistic expression, in turn, establishes its proper meaning. And we need not doubt that

---

[10] Reading *anupapattir* instead of *anupapatter.*

> every conceptual cognition,
> whether inferential or perceptual,
> culminates in a linguistic expression by this principle.[11]

Since the sense-faculties and an inferential reason are observed to be capable of producing awareness of a state of affairs at the non-conceptual stage, we assume that, in the conceptual stage as well, they operate with respect to precisely the same object, namely, a state of affairs. Any awareness based on *arthâpatti* on the basis of what is heard, however, cannot possibly be non-conceptual, because it presupposes language acquisition. For only a person who has acquired language, having understood the meaning of a sentence, would ever want to cognize another meaning when the previously-cognized meaning turns out not to make sense.

One might object as follows. In the case of *arthâpatti* on the basis of what is observed, *arthâpatti* is an epistemic instrument for a state of affairs, and hence it ought to be an epistemic instrument for a state of affairs, that is, a *meaning*, in the case of *arthâpatti* on the basis of what is heard as well. But that is not the case. *Arthâpatti* is an epistemic instrument for that upon the understanding of which a condition of not making sense is removed. And in this case, the condition of not making sense is indeed removed as soon as a linguistic expression is understood, so it is not unreasonable for it to be an epistemic instrument for a linguistic expression.

RESPONSE: The condition of not making sense lasts as long as the connection between eating and the night-time remains uncognized. Even if the mere form of the linguistic expression were understood, the condition of not making sense would not subside until it was understood, on the basis of that linguistic expression, that eating has a relation with night. For if one has not learned the meanings of the expressions "take meals" and "after dark," then the condition of not making sense related to the meaning of the sentence "stout Devadatta does not eat during the day" will not be resolved just by the mere utterance of the phrase "he takes his meals after dark."

Therefore it is a state of affairs that directly causes the original expression to make sense, and not a linguistic expression. And we have already understood *arthâpatti* to have, as its object, a state of affairs that causes something else to make sense in the case of *arthâpatti* on the basis of what is seen. Hence in no case is it ever an epistemic instrument for a linguistic expression which would, in turn, cause something else to make sense.

What's more, we must accept that a linguistic expression in any other conceptual cognition is the object of memory, and if this is so, then in this case, too, the linguistic expression ought to be the object of memory; it is certainly not the object of an epistemic instrument. Our position, therefore, is that no epistemic instrument—and not even *arthâpatti* on the basis of what is heard—causes us to grasp a linguistic expression, but rather, what it causes us to grasp is a state of affairs that causes something else to make sense.

---

[11] We read this quotation as a (corrupt) *śloka* in support of the objector's position, possibly from Kumārila's *Long Remarks*. Reconstruct as follows: laiṅgikam aindriyakaṃ ca sarvam eva vikalpakaṃ śabda etena nyāyena paryavasyet (maybe *iti sthitam* at the end).

COMMENTS: We follow Rāmānujācārya in his *Secret of the System* (*Tantra-rahasya*) in explaining this brief and difficult passage. The idea seems to be that the followers of Prabhākara do not accept that linguistic expressions in themselves can be valid epistemic instruments, since they are merely provided to us on the basis of associative memories formed from past cognitions, and therefore it does not help the of *arthâpatti* to say that it results in the cognition of a linguistic expression.

REFERENCES

Primary sources

Topical Elaborations [*Prakaraṇa-pañcikā*] (Śālikanātha)

Śāstrī, Subrahmaṇya, ed. (1961), *Prakaraṇapañcikā Mahāmahopadhyāyaśrīmacchālik anāthamiśraviracitā (Prabhākaraprasthānānusāri Mīmāṃsādarśanam) Śrījayapurinārāyaṇabhaṭṭavicaritapratyakṣaparicchedāntanyāyasiddhyākhyavyākhyāsaṃvalitā*, Vārāṇasī: Kāśīhindūviśvavidyālaya , 272–81.

Comprehensive Survey of the Epistemic Instruments [*Prāmāṇa-pārāyaṇa*] (Śālikanātha) See *Commentarial Essays.*

Straightforward and Lucid Gloss [*Rjuvimalā Pañcikā*] (Śālikanātha)

Ramanatha Sastri, S. K., ed. part 1 and 2, and S. Subrahmanya Sastri, ed. part 3, 4, and 5 (1934–67), *Bṛhatī of Prabhākara Miśra [on the Mīmāṃsāsūtrabhāṣya of Śabarasvāmin] with the Rjuvimalāpañcikā of Śālikanātha*, Madras University Sanskrit Series, Nos. 3.1, 3.2, 24, 25, 26, Madras [Chennai]: University of Madras, 110–17.

Secondary literature

Yoshimizu, K. (1999), "Śrutārthāpatti niyoru ninshiki no taishō ni tsuite," (On the Object of the Cognition by *śrutārthāpatti*), *Bukkyō-gaku. Journal of Buddhist Studies* 40: 1–22.